


# Kharkov Battles: The Battle for Vovchansk III

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1. On February 16th, 2024, the *Wall Street Journal* reported in its Saturday morning newspaper that “[outgunned] Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from the beleaguered eastern city of Avdiivka.” The former eastern Ukrainian city, Avdiivka, suddenly became Avdeevka, a Russian controlled territory in a wide belt of contested areas spanning the width of a series of battles for ultimate control over

the geopolitically significant Kharkov direction.

2. It signified the single most important advance for Russia, since the fall of Bakhmut-Artemovsk in May, 2023.[1] It also signified the single most important development for the overall war, since Russia’s expansion of its initial invasion on February 24th, 2022.

3. In the month following the fall of Avdiivka, Russian forces advanced well beyond the lines existing before the fall of Avdiivka. These are all in or towards the Kharkov direction. [2]
4. The Kharkov direction, whose history as a centre for the manufacture of Soviet tanks pre-dates the outbreak of World War II, stands as a gateway for advancing in either direction in Ukraine. In the east the road to Moscow is paved through Kharkov, in the west to Kiev.

### **Vovchansk: The Aggregate Plant**

5. During the past week, Ukrainians launched a counteroffensive in the southeastern section of the Vovchansk side of the Kharkiv offensive directed primarily at the Aggregate Plant located to the east of territory confined by the Vovcha river in the west before the highway T2108. The Aggregate Plant, which is located to the west of highway T2108.
6. At a certain point, the Ukrainians caught the Russians

by surprise after launching a lightning assault on the Aggregate Plant.

7. The battle for the Aggregate Plant provided for a short lived media sensation. A few of the articles published on the struggle to take control of the plant. The *Guardian*, for instance, published an article, relaying how “Russian soldier says army suffering heavy losses in Kharkiv offensive.” The American news agency, *Forbes*, published two articles on the battle. The first became: “Trying and failing to cross a river in Vovchansk, 400 Russian troops got cut off. Now they’re surrendering.” Another became: “Hundreds of Russian troops are cut off in a Vovchansk chemical plant as Ukrainian glide bombs rain down.” These articles suggested that Russian armed forces would lose the battle over the plant.
8. The battle ended shortly. Within less than a week, pro-Ukrainian war cartographers returned territory to the Russians. In a video by the 5-тый Рейджерский, for instance, the author published to Twitter, read the following: “عمليات القصف

الروسي في فولشانسك باستخدام منظومات  
солцепек.” In the days that  
followed, Russian dropped its  
first ever FAB-3000. The  
FAB-3000 contains 1387  
kilograms of explosives.

## Lipsti

9. It appears according to the latest Russian reports that extremely active battles are occurring in the region of Lipsti. “На Харьковском направлении по-прежнему идут активные бои. Наиболее ожесточенные боестолкновения сейчас в Вольчанске и в районе Липцев.” The report from Russia’s *Российское Информационное Агентство*, continues: “Противник подтянул рейверы и пытается контратаковать, но сталкивается с жестким ответом наших Вооруженных сил.” The Russian report on Alexander Syrsky’s assessment did not contain details on the outcome.

## The Kharkiv Offensive as a ‘Shaping Operation’

10. The first through the last of three waves in the Kharkiv offensive is a shaping operation.[] The

*New York Times* recently confirmed the results of Russia’s Kharkiv offensive. It claimed that “Since the fall, Russia has had the upper hand on the battlefield, allowing it to launch assaults on different parts of the more than 600-mile front line to probe and break through Ukrainian defenses.”

11. It specified: “Most recently, it has opened a new front in Ukraine’s northeast, near Kharkiv, quickly capturing several settlements and forcing the Ukrainian army to redeploy units there from other battlefield hotspots.” [Ukraine] - [“Russia Hits Southeast and North, Kyiv Says,” *NYT*, May 20th, 2024]
12. Ukraine’s decision to redeploy Ukrainian troops from southern to northern hotspots in particular underscores the effect of Russia’s Kharkiv offensive.
13. On May 30th, 2024, the Institute for the Study of War, published a tweet, claiming that “[senior] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces are transferring forces to northern Kharkiv Oblast from other sectors of the frontline, indicating that the Russian

military continues to prioritize efforts to draw and fix Ukrainian forces in northern Kharkiv.”

its anti-air defenses south than north.

### On the Military Purge

14. The ISW’s report confirms the author’s analysis that the Kharkiv offensive—at the current stage—is a shaping operation designed to draw UKR from the “pearl” in the Crown to the Donbas ‘мясорубка,’ where RUS is most easily supplied, fortified, or supported by reserves closest to the Russian borderlands.
15. The most recent advance on the SUMY side of the Kharkiv offensive is a second wave. Russian armed forces, for instance, seized Ryzhivka on June 10th, 2024. [] - [“Kharkov Battles: On the Fall of Ryzhivka,” *LeftOpposition*, June 10th, 2024] is the second wave.
16. During the month of May, Ukraine struck a record number of attacks on Russia’s artillery systems. [] - [“Defense Ministry: Ukraine destroys record number of Russian artillery systems,” *Kyiv Independent*, June 2nd, 2024] These strikes, however, have not resulted in a situation in which Russia deployed more of
17. The *WSWS* is the only news agency to come close to an understanding of the elements of Putin’s military purge that form a policy starting from the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Clara Weiss, one of the most intelligent writers at the *WSWS*, published an article entitled: “Putin launches purge of military.” Weiss’ resolution entitled “The economic and geostrategic significance of the Black Sea region and the imperialist proxy war against Russia in Ukraine,” for instance, is one the absolutely best pieces of writing on the *WSWS*.
18. Clara Weiss’s article on Russia’s military purge, however, focuses almost exclusively on the most recent purges. In contrast to the Weiss’ article, the Hebrew daily, *הקדמה* touched on many of the purges from the beginning of the war when Russia’s army suffered irreversible losses in territory, armor or manpower. Given the historical depth of these irreversible losses, there is no doubt that the FSB’s decision

to **deepen** its penetration into the Russian general staff stemmed not only from concerns over disagreements (which is discussed below) but from an emerging crisis with multiple aspects. One aspect of the rapidly evolving crisis is the territorial stalemate.

### **Territorial Stalemate**

19. It stands to mention that Russia's most recent advances in the eastern Donbas are for naught but the reclamation of territory Russia lost in the initial phases of the Ukraine war. At the level of territory, the Ukraine war is a negative territorial stalemate for Ukraine. Ukraine, for instance, is failing to defend its reclamation of territory from the initial phases of the war. It is a positive territorial stalemate for Russia.
20. A careful examination of the most recent depiction of Ukraine's territory indicate that Russia seeks to advance on so-called 'green' areas. In a diagram from an article entitled "Western intelligence agencies suggest Ukraine will face 'large territorial losses' this year," an unconscious confirmation of

Russia's reclamation of the 'green' areas is visible.[] - ["Western intelligence agencies suggest Ukraine will face 'large territorial losses' this year," May 25th, 2024] If one, for instance, recalls the territory on the left bank of the Dnipro for the Kherson region, the entire territory to the left bank of the river is a 'green' area, many Ukrainian propagandist claim as a 'liberation.' Although the Russians withdrew from the left bank, the territory is, nonetheless, an Ukrainian reclamation. In the Kharkiv region, for instance, the area the Ukrainians control is a 'green' area. The three sides of the Kharkiv offensive—Vovchansk, Liptsi, Sumy—Russia launched on May 9th, 2024 cannot be described as anything but an attempt to reclaim the territory lost in 2022. Another diagram by the *Bild*, a German news agency following developments in the war closely, depicts reclaimed Ukrainian territory in green but calls those areas 'befreit' (i.e., liberated). Russia's advances in the eastern Donbas are focused almost exclusively on the reclamation of the so-called 'befreit' areas in green. The Kharkiv area, which is currently

the site of Russia's Kharkiv offensive, is one of these areas in green. It stands to mention that Kharkiv initially fell to Russia [חרקוב] before Ukraine ultimately reclaimed the territory in "a lightning offensive in September 2022." [הארקוב], [4] In addition, the fall of Izyum, which is one of the territories in the green area, represented a catastrophic defeat for the Russians in 2022.

21. The most recent purges, therefore, take place within the context of a positive territorial stalemate for Russia that is only positive in so much as Russia, rather than Ukraine, is advancing on 'green' areas. If Ukraine, rather than Russia, were advancing on 'red' areas, then the territorial stalemate would be negative for Russia. The Russian general staff's saving grace is its subversion of its Ukraine's offense into defense. If a negative territorial stalemate arose for Russia, the political consequences could be extremely far-reaching.
22. In a confirmation of the fallout over the territorial stalemate, the Ukrainian daily, *Kyiv Independent*, speculated that

Putin's decision to sack Shoigu is a belated retaliation for his failure to successfully retain the advances the Russian armed forces achieved in the initial phases of the full-scale invasion. The WSWS article makes absolutely no mention of anything from the Kyiv Independent, Ukraine's premier venue for the analysis of the war from NATO's perspective. The article, entitled, "New Defense Minister Belousov to put Russia's economy on war footing," is misleading. []- ["New Defense Minister Belousov to put Russia's economy on war footing," *Kyiv Independent*, May 18th, 2024] While the title of the article speaks more to Belousov's appointment than Shoigu's removal, the tweet the *Kyiv Independent* published to promote the article on social media contained a key summary related to Belousov's predecessor. It stated: "Putin's decision to replace Shoigu could be his delayed reaction to Shoigu's failures during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, analysts say." The article does not appear to break down the aspects of the initial phases of the full-scale invasion. Hebrew

- language commentators, for instance, speculated that Kyiv would fall within 72 hours.[] - [] It is unclear from the article whether by ‘Shoigu’s failures’ the article means the invasion itself or its immediate aftermath. While the fact that Russia invaded earlier rather than later prevented NATO from being able to handle a situation like the one with artillery[] - [34] — [“Kharkov Battles: On the Eve of the Last Fall of Kharkov,” *LeftOpposition*, April 10th, 2024], neither the invasion nor its immediate aftermath fared well. It could be that the article means by “Shoigu’s failures” both the invasion as well as its immediate aftermath. By “Shoigu’s failures” the author could mean the generals Russia’s armed forces lost. These “losses” [28] could be the third [29], fourth[30], sixth[31], seventh[32], and tenth[33] general to be assassinated.
23. *Kyiv Independent’s* analysis not only confirms that the purge is rooted in the earlier history of the war but in the abysmal performance the general staff of the Russian armed forces exhibited in the initial phases of the war. There is evidence to support the idea that Russia’s abysmal performance *during* the full-scale invasion inspired Putin to initiate a crackdown.
24. An example is Rosgvardia. Rosgvardia, Moscow’s elite guards unit, for instance suffered historic losses after the invasion. [] - [FSB שירות הביטחון הרוסי ה-] - [עצר, היום הי 17.3, את סגן המפקד הראשי של יחידת ירוזגווארדיה גנרל רומן גברילוב של יחידת העילית של כוחות המיוחדים, תיק דבקה, מרץ 18, 2022]
25. Rosgvardia became one of the first units to cross the border from Belarus to Ukraine at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Even though *Rosgvardia’s* historic losses were not one-side, Russia’s Federal Security Bureau, nonetheless, initiated a crackdown on the immediate aftermath of the full-scale invasion, arresting Russia’s deputy chief of Rosgvardia, General Roman Gavrilov. It is widely reported that *Rosgvardia*, one of the few Russian elite guard’s units to suffer historic losses, became one of the first military units in the Russian armed forces to reconstitute fully. While the initial accusation is that Gavrilov leaked



intelligence that led to severe losses during battle, the excuse seeks to conceal the fact that his arrest is in response to the severe losses the 'leaked intelligence' caused. The arrest is one of the more significant arrests in the initial phases of the war, since Gavrilo's arrest became the first among the military leaders for slow progress on the battlefield.

26. Gavriolov's arrest, however, became only one among many in the immediate aftermath of the full-scale invasion, one of the greatest disasters in the history of the Russian army. In an article published by the Hebrew news agency, תיק דבקה, the authors mention how the FSB eliminated no less than eight generals responsible for the planning, acceptance or execution of the full-scale invasion. [גורמי ביון] - [מערביים: נשיא רוסיה פוטין פיטר שמונה גנרלים רוסיים ועצר ראשי אפגים של שירות הביטחון הפנימי], תיק דבקה, מרץ 12, 2022 FSB-ה-
27. Although the *WSWS* states that the FSB only recently penetrated Russia's general staff, the Hebrew language article suggests that Putin initiated a crackdown on the FSB with no

less an effect than on Russia's general staff. The article states that not only did Putin axe the heads of departments in the FSB, he did so in regards to the Ukraine war. The article states in Hebrew: "גורמי ביון מערביים: מדווחים, בשבת 12.3 כי הנשיא רוסיה ולדימיר פוטין פיטר כמה גנרלים רוסיים ועצר ראשי אפגים של שירות הביטחון הפנימי, בעקבות הקשיים בהם בצבא הרוסי נתקל במלחמה באוקראינה."

28. Within the context of the general staff's abysmal performance, there are multiple disagreements over the Ukraine war. These disagreements touch upon the treatment of Russian troops (i.e., such as a request for furlough) to such things as the military objectives in campaigns. These disagreements, one could argue, span the width within the common terminology for planning military objects, falling within the three levels (i.e., strategic, operational, or tactic). Major General Ivan Popov, the commander of Russia's 58th Combined Arms Army, for instance, criticized "the way the heads of the Ministry of Defense" lead the war.[]

גנרל בכיר רוסי הפקד על כוחות צבא רוסיה באוקראינה מותח ביקורת על הדרך בה ראשי

משרד ההגנה הרוסי מנהלים את המלחמה  
[באוקראינה, תיק דבקה, 15 יולי, 2023]

## Black Sea

29. The *WSWS* article does not mention the fact that Russia sacked its admiral for the Black Sea Fleet for his abysmal performance in response to Ukraine's novel strategy on the water. On April 2nd, 2024, Putin signed a decree to appoint Admiral Moiseyev as the Navy commander-in-chief. While the struggle over the Black Sea is a battle that continues today, the previous admiral, Sokoloff, failed to adapt the Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine's navy less strategy with fast evolving naval kamikaze drones, long range strike from Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, missiles, or drones. Moiseyev's appointment appears to be the application a deliberate corrective to the admiralty of the Black Sea fleet. The decision to appoint a new admiral to the Black Sea Fleet, therefore, stands in contrast to the appointments related to the purge, the majority of which appear to be motivated less by a military decision than politics.

30. Despite the fact that Weiss is an expert on the geostrategic significance of the Black Sea region, Weiss makes no mention of Moiseyev's appointment. It is likely due to the nuanced complexities of its geostrategic significance that she makes no mention of the Black Sea region. The grain corridor, about which both the *Kyiv Independent* [] - ["Ukraine's wheat exports drop to 10-year low, US Agriculture Department says," *Kyiv Independent*, June 13th, 2024] as well as the *New York Times* [] ["Ukraine's Seaborne Grain Exports Bounce Back to Near Prewar Levels," *New York Times*, May 12th, 2024], wrote seemingly contradictory articles is one of the more complex aspects of the battle's outcome, especially given the fact that Russia's projection of power on the Black Sea resulted in a reduction of Ukraine's revenues for exports on a per country basis. Egypt, for instance, became the subject of strategic external input substitution, importing Russian rather than Ukrainian grain, one of the more geopolitical consequences of the grain corridor. Russia imported more than 80% in grain to Egypt.

## Surovikin

31. The most unique victim of the military purge is General Sergey Surovikin. Surovikin, who is not only one of Russia's foremost military experts, is the only general to implement a solid strategy throughout the entire Ukrainian war. Surovikin, who witnessed the catastrophic setbacks the military planners amassed in the initial invasion, saved the Russian armed forces from certain defeat through his presentation of a report to Sergey Shoigu during the month of November in 2022. In his report, Surovikin established 1) a requirement to withdraw from the left bank of the Dnipro in Kherson (i.e., trading space for time), 2) utilize the Dnipro as a natural land barrier to ensure Ukraine's armed forces could not advance rapidly from south eastern Donetsk onto Crimea, 3) shaping their offensive towards the north, 4) for the sake of a 'meat-grinder' in the city of Bakhmut-Artemovsk, 5) the battle over which he accurately predicted would serve as a catalyst for the time required to build fortifications (i.e., Surovikin lines) before 6) the

construction of a railway connecting Sevastopol to Rostov. Surovikin's role in the war is the most Russian. Surovikin's strategy is the most Russified strategy any one of the generals have ever implemented.

32. Although Surovikin's strategy saved the Russian armed forces from the defeats at Kharkiv or Izyum, Surovikin lost his position in the Ministry of Defense. It is likely that Surovikin lost his position due to his overwhelming popularity within the Ministry of Defense. Surovikin's assignment to a less pivotal role for the Ukraine war in Ministry of Defense is to ensure that his overwhelming popularity may not provide a basis for politics, despite his role in the Ukraine war.

33. Surovikin's reassignment, however, points to an ever widening phenomenon among the members of Russia's ruling elites in the midst of a territorial stalemate. The Russian ruling elite is beginning to suffer. The reassignment of generals like Surovikin are the result of a profound crisis within the circles of Putin's ruling elite.

34. The assignment of Belousov, whom members of the general staff lecture on the deployment of glide bombs, is strikingly uncomfortable to watch. Anyone with even a slight military background cannot be but startled by its simplicity. The general staff lectures the chief of the Ministry of Defense. It is classic. It reminds one of the Napoleon era.
35. In contrast with the high quality of the Russian soldier, the officers were universally regarded as the worst in Europe. A recurrent theme since before the days of Peter the Great, one did not have to look hard for examples of extreme incompetence in the Russian general staff. During the Napoleon era, General Markov, for instance, was removed from his command when he proved incapable of distinguishing roads from rivers on a map. General Lasey, Supreme Commander, liked to take naps during meetings in which his subordinates would make influential decision for military. It is within the context of the Napoleonic era that Belousov's receipt of lectures on Russian glide bombs receives its significance.
36. It is clear that Belousov's appointment, far from an attempt to return Russia to the roots of the U.S.S.R., is a sign of an ever deepening crisis within Russia's ruling elite. The longer the war continues, the most pointed the crisis becomes. If the war continues, there is a likelihood that Russia may have no choice but mobilize the Russian population. The partial mobilization, a catastrophe that caused more than 300,000 Russians to flee to Russia's southern border, brought the crisis of the Ukraine war to a fever pitch.
37. The latest trend in journalism is to relate the current Russian regime to the one in power during World War I. In accordance with the latest trend, one may like to mention that the Czar Nicholas II did not abdicate the Russian throne because of protests in Petrograd. According to one of the most esteemed, least controversial, Russian historiographers, the Czar Nicholas II abdicated the Russian throne because of his patriotism. "When [the czar] was

told by the generals that the hostility towards him had reached a such a pitch of intensity that, for Russia to stay in the war, he had to abdicate, he abdicated. [The czar] took this step out of pure patriotism.” [The Three “Whys” of the Russian Revolution, Richard Pipes, 1995, Vintage Books]

38. Richard Pipes, for instance, writes: “It is a mistake to attribute the February revolution to fatigue with the war.” Pipes claims the contrary is true. “Russians wanted to pursue the war more effectively, and they felt that the existing government was not capable of doing it, that existing political structures were in need of a major overhaul.” Pipes explained how “[the] tsar, of course, could have saved the throne. All he had to do was to sign a separate peace, exactly as Lenin would do in 1918.”
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[1] — [“Kharkov Battles: On the Fall of Avdiivka,” *LeftOpposition*, February 17th, 2024]

[2] — [“Российские войска за март освободили в зоне СВО пять населенных пунктов,” *Телеканал 360*, 04.02.2024]

[3] - [@hosamalkrbash: طائرة روسية تقصف مبنى تستخدمه القوات الاوكرانية في فولشانسك، جرى استخدام قنبلة انزلاقية ولديها قوة تدمير مرعبة ODAB-1500]

[4] - [@JulianRoepcke: Eine russische 1.5 Tonnen schwere Gleitbombe vom Typ “ODAB—1500 UMPK” trifft zielgenau en ukrainisch gehaltenes Gebäude in Wovtschansk—weil wir der Ukraine nicht erlauben, russische Flugzeuge abzuschließen oder auch nur deren Luftwaffenstützpunkte zu bombardieren.” May 21st, 2024]

[5] - [“Ukraine Downs Fewer Russian Missiles,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 14th, 2024]

[6] - [“Air Force: Ukraine Downs All 13 Russian Drones Overnight,” *Kyiv Independent*, May 18th, 2024],

[7] - [“Air Force: All 37 Russian Attack Drones Targeting Ukraine Overnight Shot Down,” *The Kyiv Independent*, May 19th, 2024]

[8] - [המודיעין האמריקני השיג/הרכיב דגם] של המל"ט המתפוצץ האיראני שאהד.

המטרה: לפתח מערכת נשק נגדו. מטח  
אמריקני מיוחד למשימה זו פועל מקייבז,  
[תיק דבקה, אוק 22, 2022]

[9] - ["Some Notes on Burn's Essay  
in *Foreign Policy*," *LeftOpposition*,  
January 30th, 2024]

[10] - [*UnAmerican Activities: The  
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Press*, City Lights, 1981]

[11] - ["Huge C.I.A. Operation in  
the U.S. against Antiwar Forces,  
Other Dissidents in Nixon Years,"  
*New York Times*, December 22nd,  
1974, Seymour Hersh]

[12] - ["Teller of Truth," *New York  
Times*, July 16th, 1975]

[13] - ["أكثر من ٣٠٠٠ سجين تتقدمو  
بطلبات للانضمام إلى الجيش الأوكراني,"  
05.21.2024 الشرق الأوسط]

[14] - ["Russia's Advance in Eastern  
Stronghold Losses Steam After  
Quick Gains," *NYT*, March 10th,  
2024]

[15] - ["In Berdychi, Ukraine's M-1  
Abrams Tanks Made Their Last  
Stand—And Halted the Russian  
Advance," *Forbes*, March 8th, 2024]

[16] - ["A Ukrainian Brigade  
Disappeared. And A Russian

Brigade Almost Broke Through:  
How the Battle of Ocheretyne  
Upended the War In Ukraine This  
Weekend, *Forbes*, April 25th, 2024]

[17] - ["As Russian Troops Broke  
Through Ukrainian Lines, Panicky  
Ukrainian Commanders Had No  
Choice But To Deploy One of Their  
Least-Prepared Brigades," *Forbes*,  
April 26th, 2024]

[17a] - ["В ООН заявили, что  
продолжат считать Зеленского  
президентом Украины,"  
*Российская Газета*, 05.21.2024]

[17b] - ["Владимир Зеленский  
продолжает оставаться для ООН  
президентом Украины,"  
*Российская Газета*, 05.21.2024]

[17c] - [В ночь на 20 мая истек  
срок полномочий Зеленского на  
посту действующего президента  
Украины. *URA.Ru*, 05.21.2024]

[17d] - ["Выборы главы  
государства на Украине должны  
были состояться 31 марта, однако  
в ноябре 2023 года Зеленский  
заявил, что в сложившейся  
обстановке проведение  
голосования будет не ко времени,"  
*Известия*, 05.21.2024]

[17e] - ["В ходе брифинг журналисты поинтересовались, будет ли всемирная организация считать Зеленимого законным представителем Украины при проведении мирных переговоров," *Российская Газета*, 05.21.2024]

According to an article published on May 17th, 2024 by *The Kyiv Independent*, a newspaper that spreads Ukrainian propaganda and supports the war against Russia," the EU has banned a number of Russian news agencies for "spreading Russian propaganda and supporting the war against Ukraine." The EU's vote, however, is not based upon a study demonstrating to the contrary that the news agency publishes unverifiable information. It is the author's opinion that the EU's decision is based more on a desire to prevent Russian media from reporting within Europe than with the veracity of published information. Any or all Foreign Sources of Public Information (FSoPI) are fair game for our analyses, regardless of what the European Union legislates.

[18] - ["Ukraine can no longer win the war," *The Hill*, February 22nd, 2024]

[19] - ["Kharkov Battles: On the Fall of Avdiivka," *LeftOpposition*, February 17th, 2024]

[20] - ["Ukraine ups pressure on US to allow strikes in Russia: 'This is insane.'" *The Hill*, May 19th, 2024]

[21] - [@TheStudyofWar: "The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) argued in an analysis published earlier this week that the U.S. policy "makes no sense" and is "severely compromising Ukraine's ability to defend itself" against the Kharkiv offensive." May 20th, 2024]

[22] - [@ForeignPolicy, "What Does America Want in Ukraine?, May 11th, 2024]

[23] - [Letter dated May 20th, 2024, from: Congress of the United States, to: Lloyd J. Austin, III]

[24] - ["NYT: Blinken Supports Lifting Ban on Ukrainian Strikes inside Russia with US Arms," *Kyiv Independent*, May 23rd, 2024]

[25] - [@EjShahid: "Місцеві жителі фільмують удар АТАСМС з касетною бойовою частиною в районі Моспиного, Донецька область. 05.22.2024]

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