



Syria as a Powder Keg: Russo-Iranian Relations

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1. The ISW has repeatedly claimed that Russia is tied at the hip with Iran. However, there is little to no evidence to support such a claim. In Syria, Russia appears to be increasingly ready to minimize, sideline, distance, or eliminate Iranian influence in the country and there are a number of examples, many of which exist in Hebrew and Arabic, where the Russians have sought to ensure the execution of their strategy for Syria above and beyond Iran and its plan for the country.
2. A less persuasive though nonetheless noticeable advancement shortly after Russia successfully defended Syria from internal strife following its response to the subversion of the Arab Spring is the fact that Assad is actively building relations with China, a policy the Russians appear to be advancing.
3. A consequence of Iran's failure to provide Syria with the military support Assad required prior to Russia's arrival in 2015 and perhaps precipitating Assad's decision to go all in with Russia over Iran is that Iran 1) could not accomplish a military objective related to the Syrian civil war, 2) could not provide Syria with the ground troops, attack vehicles, tanks, helicopters, or air craft that Assad required to repel entrenched anti-Assad factions or Sunni Islamic terrorists organizations, and 3) could not assist with security in the capital of Damascus in the way that Russia was able to. The consortium of these aspects of Iran's performance as a military in support of the Assad regime necessarily degraded the image of Iran as a protectorate, elevated Russia's ability to continue to protect the Assad regime, the capital and the Syrian armed forces, and led to a situation in which Iran could not wield and was no longer in a position to exert a dominating influence over the embattled Assad regime and protect its political, religious Alawite or military institutions.
4. Russia is not in a position to concede power in Syria to Iran in a way that would reverse the overall outcome of the Syrian civil war; Russia is interested in a Syria that is not an Iranian dominated protectorate, and Russia is executing a strategy for

Syria does not depend upon nor require Iran or the Iranian military to do anything but follow suit and nothing in Iran's performance during the past decade provide leverage to the contrary.

5. It is thus incorrect and unprecedented that the ISW claims that the United States 'cannot drive a wedge' between Russo-Iranian relations and there is no such thing is an air tight diplomatic relation, especially in a globalized economy of competing nation states and the competition for a dominating influence in Syria between Russia and Iran is a clear demonstration of this fact. The ISW's ahistorical analysis, which leans on an understanding of Russo-Iranian relations in the absence of an analysis of the most significant benchmark of diplomatic, societal, political, or military contention in the past decade thoroughly undermines the claims their report makes.
6. Furthermore, the Russia relies almost exclusively on the Assad model as a diplomatic, political, and historical model for persuading African countries to concede a dominating influence

in their country and offer the model as a guarantee that come hell and high water, no nation may overthrow African partner government, as the Assad model can be cited as proof to the contrary. The Assad model notably relies upon nothing at all from Iran and is based almost exclusively upon Iran's exclusion and is not mentioned in any of the negotiations with African countries as a way to demonstrate the model's geopolitical sanctity.

Russo-Syrian Military Exercises

7. The activity of a robust, vibrant, fully awakened military partnership between countries is participating in a military exercise. In the military exercises in Syria, as reported by Russian or Syrian sources, Iran plays no part.
8. The most recent military exercise, which took place at a major military base at Tartus on April 23rd, 2024, focused almost exclusively on Syrian forces practicing an amphibious landing on its own base with live fire. [] - [بيان عملي بحري سوري] - روسي بانخيرة الحية باحدى القواعد البحرية في طرطوس، سانا،

٠٤.٢٣.٢٠٢٤] The Mi-8 helicopters Syria Arab Army flew for landing on the ports came to Syria's Khmeimim airbase after a Russian An-124 cargo carrier on February 29th, 2024. Although one of the first of its kind for Tartus, the Russo-Syrian military exercises in the past such as the exercises under the cover of darkness make no mention of Iran.

9. Iran's absence in major military exercises at sea or on land stands in sharp contrast with Russia's relationship to Iran in Syria. Arabic sources document how Russia is key to Iran's effort to build underground bunkers near Syrian airports. These reports mention how Russia plays an important role in these as well as many other infrastructure projects under Iranian development. Given Russia's undeniable engagement with Iranian forces in Syria, Iran's absence in Russo-Syrian military exercises begs the question. What is Russia's vision for Iran in its overall strategy for Syria?

Syria's Military

10. It is clear that Russia's vision for Syria's military is focused on its

influence to the exclusion of all others. Iran, *inter alia*, is one of these excluded influences. Syria's military, which has undergone many changes from the antebellum period on the eve of the subverted 'Arab Spring' in Syria to the present day. One of the most recent changes in Syria's military high command highlights Russian influence. The newspaper, *تيك دبكة*, calls "העיתון הסועדי," published an article detailing the promotion of a Russo-Syrian to command of the SAA's special forces. The newspaper cited the promotion as a reason to believe that Russo-Iranian relations are 'frozen' (i.e., "تجميد").[] - «النمر» قائداً للقوات الخاصة في سوريا... «تجميد» أم سباق نفوذ روسي-إيراني؟ صاحب فكرة «البراميل المتفجرة»، [04.11.2024 شرق الأوسط,

11. Described as the progenitor of 'barrel bombs,' a likely precursor to the development of Russia's 'glide bombs,' or, as they are described in Russian УМПК (i.e., "универсальный модулями планирования и коррекции"), the 'panther' (i.e., "«النمر»") represents a major shift within the power dynamics within the Assad regime's SAA. The Syrian Observatory for

Human Rights made the announcement regarding the appointment without an official notice posted on Syria's state-owned news station, SANA. The announcement of Major General Suhail al-Hassan appointment to the position of commander at the head of Syria's special forces in Syria resulted in the immediate replacement of an Iranian influenced general, Brigadier General Mudar Mohammed Haidar, whom Iran considers to be close to its regime. The decision, as "העיתון הסועדי" describes, comes as a repudiation of Iran's influence within the Syrian military.

12. A further indication of Russia's influence in al-Hassan's appointment is that the commander comes from the Russian backed- 25th division, an unit commanded by Major General Salih Abdullah. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights described the al-Hassan in the following manner: “

«سهيل الحسن هو صاحب استراتيجية البراميل المتفجرة إبان العمليات العسكرية على أحياء حلب الشرقية وطبقها أينما رحل، كما يعد الحسن من أبرز الشخصيات العسكرية المقربة

من روسيا، ودرب وأرسل كثيراً من المرتزقة للمشاركة بالحرب الروسية على أوكرانيا».

13. The description of al-Hassan is significant not merely as evidence for the exclusion of Iranian influence. The description is significant for its emphasis on the Russo-Syrian relations for the Ukraine war. It appears that decision to promote al-Hassan is related both to his ingenuity with 'barrel bombs' together with his success with the recruitment of Syrian soldiers for participating in Russia's special military operation.
14. Based on the similarity of the Aleppo 'barrel bombings' to Russia's 'glide bombs' on the eastern Donetsk front, al-Hassan likely received his promotion after recommending to Russia's Ministry of Defense that a way to improve the 'barrel bombs' could be 'glide kits.' If so, al-Hassan promotion may have been predicated on his military advice to Russia's MoD, indicating that commanders from SAA receive promotions based on their support for Moscow rather than Iran. The announcement's timing is significant. It comes only ten

days after Israel bombed a ‘consulate’ in Damascus, resulting in the death of multiple Iranian military leaders responsible for Iranian operations in Syria.

15. Shortly after the announcement of al-Hassan’s promotion, one of Russia's most detailed sources of investigative journalism published an article, declaring the exit of Iranian military elements from Syria. Citing the Agence France-Press (AFP), the article details how Iran began to redeploy their forces from the capital Damascus and the southern border with Israel.[] - [Почему Иран начал вывод своих военных из Сирии. AFP сообщила об уходе подразделения КСИР из Дамаска и с юга арабской республики, РБК, 04.25.2024] In an article published by *Le Journal de Montréal*, one of the few French language dailies to touch upon the subject,

published an article outlining the reasons for Iran's decision to redeploy its forces from the capital Damascus and the southern border with Israel.[] - [L’Iran a réduit sa présence militaire en Syrie, *Le Journal Montréal*, Avril 24, 2024] The author states: “L’Iran, allié du régime en Syrie, a fortement réduit sa présence militaire dans ce pays où il est sous le coup de frappes de plus en plus intense imputées à Israël, ont indiqué mercredi à l’AFP une source porche du Hezbollah et une ONG.”¹

16. Iran’s decision to leave the capital Damascus and the southern border with Israel occurs within a much wider context. In 2022, תיק דבקה, commented on an article from “העיתון הסועדי” that analyzed a request Russia made to pro-Iranian militias in Syria.

¹ The author recommends, as a follow up, an article about Israel's raid on Damascus[], as well as one about a strike, resulting in the death of 42 Syrian soldiers. []

[] - [“ Raid israélien sur Damas: onze morts dont sept Gardiens de la révolution iraniens, *Le Journal de Montréal*, Avril 1st, 2024]

[] - [“Syrie: 42 soldats syriens et combattants du Hezbollah tués dans des frappes israéliennes, *Le Journal de Montréal*, Mars 29, 2024]

העיתון הסועדי א-שרק אל-אווסט שיוצא לאזור בלונדון מדווח ביום שישי 2.9, כי רוסיה דורשות מהמיליציות הפרו-איראניות לסגת מעמדות צבאיות ממערב למחוז חמה בסוריה וכן מעמדות במזרח ובמערב סוריה. לפי הדיווח ההוראה נובעת מרצון להימנע מהמשך חשיפתן של מיליציות לתקיפות הישראליות באזורים אלה. בעיתון ציינו כי התקיפות הישראליות אף "התגברו בימים האחרונים". את הדרישה הרוסית העלו שלושה קצינים רוסים בפגישה עם עמיתיהם איראנים בנמל התעופה הצבאי של חמה ביום רביעי האחרון.

העיתון א-שרק אל-אווסט: רוסיה] - [דורשות מהמיליציות הפרו-איראניות לסגת ממערב למחוז חמה בסוריה וכן מעמדות במרכז במערב סוריה, תיק דבקה, 09.02.2022]

[TO DO] Find the article detailing Iran's recent meeting with Iranian **полчение**

17. In contrast with Iran, Russia occupies a position of strength in Syria. Russia's role in the organization of military exercises emphasizes its role in the Syrian military. In a display of solidarity with Syria's military, Russia recently established a military base in the Golan Heights. Iran has not. Dubbed a Russo-Syrian 'observation post,' the base is home to Russian special

operations forces. It is not home to Iranian special operation forces. Joint Russo-Syrian patrols along the Bravo line on the Golan Heights is increasing. Iran plays no part in these patrols.

18. Russia guards Tartus, a port in the Mediterranean. Iran does not. Where Iranian influence is expected to have prevailed, Russia has. Russia's position of strength at these geopolitically significant, key, historic landmarks supersedes outside influence, especially Iran.

Russo-Syrian Military Missions

19. Russo-Syrian ISR operations continue missions to strike at alleged terrorist groups operating at large throughout the north-western, north, and north-eastern and eastern untamed parts of war torn Syria. The cities or regions targeted are Aleppo, Badiya and Der-Izzor. Other, lesser known, cities are Manbij, Tall Rifat, and Al-Bab. On March 2nd, 2024, for instance, the Russian Center for Peace (i.e., Центр по Примирению) published a notice, detailing results of a Russo-Syrian strike. In the

notice, the Russians note that the strike by Russian armed forces in the area of Qabsin, a village in Aleppo's province, resulted in the destruction of a training camp for militants who participated in shelling Syrian government troops, killing more than 25 alleged militants. The notice, which contains no reference to Iranian armed forces or the IRGC, is a testament to the fact that Russia's continued projection of power in Syria operates in the complete absence of any reliance upon Iran or the IRGC.

20. Since 2015 when IRGC commander Qassam Suleyman, in whose namesake Hamas terrorist celebrated the creation of aimless rockets responsible for terrorizing Israeli fields outside the Gaza Strip, begged Russia to intervene on behalf of Syria's beleaguered Assad regime, as the ISW noted [], Russia has continued to magnify the scope of its mandate over all military relations with Syria's Assad regime rather than augmenting the power of a coalition with Iran. These missions testify to the latest stage in Russia's magnification of its scope.

21. The ISW claims that since 2015 a Russo-Iranian coalition has grown but the report cited the research center cites contains no reference to developments within the Syrian Arab Army to support its claim. It is likely that the absence of a reference to developments within the SAA is designed to prevent policy makers from being able to differentiate Russia's relationship with Iran from its relationship with Syria. The identification of Russia with Iran cannot be anything but a design to induce policymakers to attack Russian military installations in Syria just like Iranian military installations, despite the profound differences in Russo-Syrian, Russo-Iranian relations.

22. The Russo-Syrian missions are designed to train the Syrian Arab Army in long-range reconnaissance, intelligence gathering or targeting with a myriad of drones. Specially equipped with long-range First Person View (henceforth FPV) drones, the SAA under the direction of Russian instructors, the SAA is seeking to establish air superiority over the untamed parts of Syria. Iran is not a part

of these missions. Together with training in evacuating wounded soldiers, artillery with iron sights and maps, RPGs, ATGMs, RPO-Shmel' thermo-baric missiles, BMP-21, anti-drone weaponry, airborne or amphibious landings, Russia's influence encompasses the most important functions of the SAA. At the current stage in the SAA's development, Iran's influence is decisively diminished, especially since Iran lacks the matériel required to train Syrian troops in the higher levels of combined arms warfare.

23. Russia's emphasis on these missions and military exercises are to build a model the Russian Federation may export to countries in Africa where the years long struggle for access to, control over or exploitation of raw materials is reaching an entirely new phase in the advent of the Sahel Corridor, one of the consequences of Surovikin's well planned maneuver of retreating from the right bank of the Dnipro to induce Ukrainian armed forces into the 'meat-grinder' at the battle of Bakhmut-Artemovsk. The Sahel Corridor, whose formation arises from Russia's efforts to expel

isolated Western interests, concerns and concessions in the African countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, represents a large and qualitative difference in the development of Russian foreign relations.

24. It is clear from Russia's most recent decision to dispatch military instructors to Niger together with an S-300 *Flugabwehr* system that the Russians are preparing to execute on the Assad model in a stepwise fashion, instructing Niger troops in missions and military exercises just like in Syria. It is entirely reasonable to suppose that these missions and military exercises are scheduled for other mineral rich countries in the Sahel Corridor or for those beginning to join. Sudan, to whom Russia recently shipped large amounts of diesel fuel, is home to a Russian base where the now-decommissioned Wagner Private Military Corporation previously operated. [] - ["Wagner L'Histoire Secrète des Mercenaires de Poutine," *Les Arènes BD*, 2024]

Russo-Israeli Relations in Syria

25. Israel's strikes against high-ranking Iranian officials have played into Russia's strategy for Iran. On April 17th, 2024, NEXTA, an online tabloid magazine with a strong social media presence, published an article detailing how Iran withdrew IRGC officers from Syria over fears of an impending Israeli strike.[] - ["Iran is withdrawing some IRGC officers from Syria because of a possible Israeli strike," NEXTA, April 17th, 2024] Based on the fact that Israel struck Syria more than 200 times last year, the attempt to blame impending Israeli strikes is undoubtedly a smokescreen. Iran's IRGC simply have no progressive role to play in Syria, let alone in Russia's strategy for the country. Their presence invites further attack from Israel.

26. Within the Western press an effort to promote an extremist version of Russian 'rapprochement' attempts to identify Russia's relations with Iran as an attempt to advance Iran's Axis of Resistance. The journal, *Foreign Policy*, a liberal bourgeois research center for promoting American nationalism, published an article

recently entitled: "Russia's Dangerous New Friends." The subtitle reads: "How Moscow Is Partnering With the Axis of Resistance." While the article covers the countries in the axis, the article's treatment of Syria is superficial. A thorough examination of Russia's extension of its correlation of forces throughout Syria appears to recommend an entirely different point of view.

27. Although the article mentions that Russia joined a sanctions regime against Iran in the 2010s, the article makes reference to the event without analysis. The sanctions regime, as is stated in the article, sought to target Iran's nuclear program. Russia's ambition at that time could not have been anything but an attempt to exploit Western sanctions in favor of Russia's own nationalist goal for the preservation of a preeminent Rosatom at the expense of its Eurasian neighbors. A weak Iranian nuclear program is a favorable prospect for Russia's own diplomatic efforts to ensure its Arab partners prefer Rosatom over any or all alternatives, including an Iranian proposal. Russia is no less alarmed than

the United States by an Iranian proposal to Saudi Arabia. While the Israeli based news agency, *תיק דבקה*, for instance, reported that Iran sent shockwaves throughout both Washington and Jerusalem with its proposal to assist Saudi Arabia, with whom China is attempting to broker relations, with its nuclear ambitions. [5] - [זעזוע בווינגטון ובירושלים: איראן מציעה לערב הסעודית לעזור בפיתוח התוכנית הגרעינית שלה. סין תומכת, תיק דבקה, 06.10.2023] The author of that article, however, makes no mention of Russia's history of support for a sanctions regime against Iran's nuclear program.

28. Russia's support for a sanctions regime in the 2010s parallels its close monitoring of Iran's uranium enrichment program. The Russia News Informational Agency, *PIA*, published a series of articles, detailing the trajectory of Iran's uranium enrichment program. On May 1st, 2021, *PIA* published an article, detailing how Iran enriched uranium to 20% at Fordo, a nuclear site located in Iran.[] - [Ирану удалось обогатить уран до 20% на ядерном объекте, *PIA*, 05.01.2021] Iran's decision to

enrich uranium to 20% follows closely its announcement to enrich uranium to 60%.[] - [Постпред России оценил решение Ирана обогащать уран до 60 процентов, *PIA*, 04.13.2024] Within less than two years, international observers, as reported by *PIA* found in Iran uranium, whose enrichment was commensurate with uranium enriched at 84% percent.[] - [Международные наблюдатели нашли в Иране уран, обогащенный до 84 процентов, *PIA*, 02.19.2023] Written on the eve of the second anniversary of the Ukraine war, the article mentions that 84% is no less than 6% shy of the amount of enrichment required to create a nuclear weapon. It states: "Подчеркивается, что такая концентрация всего на 6% ниже уровня, необходимого для создания ядерного оружия. Иран ранее сообщал МАГАТЭ, что его центрифуги позволяют обогащать уран до 60% говорится в статье." The article cites *Bloomberg*. [] - [Iran's Uranium Enrichment Hits a New High, Testing Diplomacy] Russia's attention to Iran's enrichment capabilities and the results of its enrichment program

indicates that Russia, which joined a coalition to forbid further Iranian enrichment with G7 countries, views the advent of an Iranian nuclear weapon with apprehension.

29. Alongside the shockwave caused by Iran's proposal to Saudi Arabia, Russia is predictably cautious about Iranian ambitions for Nigerien uranium. [] Entitled, "Niger Ends Anti-Terror Pact with U.S. after Accusation of Iran Uranium Deal," an article published by *Wall Street Journal* on March 18th, 2024 indicates that uranium rather than anything else became a decisive factor for the expulsion of Washington. It is likely for this reason alone that Washington leaked the information about Iran's interest in Nigerien uranium. Described as a 'strategic victory' for Russia, Niger's expulsion is one of the first African expulsions of American interest on the continent, underscoring the significance of any mention of uranium. [] - ["Russian troop arrival spells end for US military presence in Niger," *Financial Times*, April 25th, 2024] ; [] - ["Eviction By Niger Derails U.S. Plans," *Wall Street Journal*,

April 22nd, 2024] America's eviction from Niger follows closely its expulsion from Chad.

[] - [نيويورك تايمز: "الولايات المتحدة" تسحب العشرات من القوات من قواتها الخاصة من تشاد في الأيام، ٠٤.٢٥.٢٠٢٤] ; [] - ["Chad Is the Kremlin's Next Target in the Sahel," *Critical Threats*, April 18th, 2024] ; [] - ["U.S. to Withdraw Troops From Chad, Dealing Another Blow to Africa Policy," *New York Times*, April 25th, 2024]

30. Washington, who is aware of Israel's comprehensive African intelligence, would prefer a Russian over an Iranian presence, given an inescapable choice. Israel, for instance, attacked the Khartoum missile factory, a major airbase, in Sudan, destroying Sudan's MiG-29 squadron, after Iran sought a foothold there for manufacturing Shebab and Fajar missiles. [] - ["Israeli Jets Bomb Sudan missile site in dry run for Iran attack," *The Times*, October 28th, 2012 Iran had sought to transfer from the Khartoum base there transferring weapon

through the Sinai deserts² Bedouin tunnels [] to the Gaza Strip, as Iranian ships dock on Red Sea ports in Somalia³ [], Sudan or other places. Should Iran attempt to gain a foothold on Nigerien uranium, a similar, if not identical, attack would likely be executed.

31. By way of the logic of power, Russia's interest in the preservation of a preeminent Rosatom at the expense of its Eurasian neighbors together with an attempt to monopolize access to, control over, or exploitation of uranium, a rare earth mineral critical to its atomic energy programs, therefore precludes the country from an embrace with Iran that might in any way challenge these two aspects of its own geopolitical power,

standing or interests in the Mideast or Africa.

32. Together with the airstrikes on Iranian targets in Syria, Russia's diplomacy in Syria favors Israel over Iran in many ways. 1) Russia, as Israeli sources mention, refuses to respond to Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets. 2) The Russians, for instance, were first to give advanced fighter jets to Syria but only for training. These fighter jets came to Syria before Russia completed its delivery of Su-35 fighter jets to Iran.
33. [TODO]

Russo-Turkic Relations in Syria

[Сирийская тройка: как Россия балансирует между Турцией и Ираном, *РБК*, 04.03.2024]

² משם סירות דייג מצריות הפועלות דרך קבע בשירות רשתות ההברחות הפלסטיניות-איראניות, תקבלנה את " המטען, תפרוקנה אותו בנקודה מסוימת על חוף סיני, ומשם ינסו להעביר דרך מנהרות ההברחה לעזה. הטילים מגיעים לעזה כשהם מפורקים, וצוותי טכנאי טילים פלסטינים, איראניים, ושל חיזבאללה, ירכיבו אותם לאחר הברחתם לתוך עזה."

אוניית נשק איראנית ועליה 270 טילים בדרך לעזה. 50 טילים הם טילי פאג'ר 5 משופרים, תיק דבקה, נובמבר) - [2012, 19]

³ עוד מוסרים המקורות הצבאיים שלנו כי מערכת ההברחות המסועפת הזו מבוססת על- 3 שבטים בדואיים בחצי האי" היושבים בדרום ובצפון סיני, קרוב לגבולות ישראל ועזה. שבטי התיאה, Tarabin סיני. המדובר בשבטי הטראבין שיש להם אוכלוסיות גדולות בצפון סיני הנגב הישראלי, Azazmeh השולטים במרכז סיני. שבטי העוזמה, Tiyaha. "ירדן וסוריה."

[איראן גייסה את הפיראטים הסומאליים כדי להבריח טילים ותחמושת לחמס, תיק דבקה, ינוי 19, 2009] - [

[TO DO]

34. Russo-Turkic relations position Syria's markets for the consumption of Turkish rather than Iranian goods.
35. In one of the more revealing articles Israel's *The Land* (i.e., הארץ) has published on Syria, the authors explain how on the eve of the Iranian president's first visit in Syria since the start of Syria's response to the subversion of the Arab Spring in 2011[],
- [] - נשיא איראן מבקר בדמשק, לראשונה - מאז פרוץ מלחמת האזרחים ב-2011, הארץ, 05.03.2023]
36. "had reasons to be worried." Syria, in which Iran "invested a lot of money and military resources to protect the Assad regime," "prefers Turkish goods over Iranian goods." There are two reasons. Turkish quality supersedes Iranian. Turkish prices are cheaper than Iranian. In support of his point of view, the author states: "Last year [in 2022] Turkish exports to Syria amounted to \$2.2 billion while Iranian exports to Syria amounted to no more than \$110 million dollars altogether." In an elegant expression of the

underlying strength of competition within an increasingly globalized economy, the author says: "Here is a role and the numbers speak for themselves." The disparity in Turkish to Iranian exports is a difference at twenty times the former over the latter. It is a significant difference.

[] מאחורי החיכוכים של נשיא איראן בסוריה] [מסתתר חשש גדול, הארץ, 05.09.2023]

37. The primary reason for conflating Russo-Iranian relations with Syria is that many conclude that Iran is a Shia republic whose regime is at the head of the 'Axis of Resistance' in which only the holy forces of the heavens play a more definitive role in its decision making processes than the objective reality of its economy.
38. Turkey currently occupies Syrian territory, conducts operations against its enemies on Syrian territory, or dictates policies in these areas. Iran does not. Iran does not occupy any Syrian territory. It does not conduct operations against its enemies on Syrian territory, or, at least, few, if any, sources exclaim an incident in which

Iranians struck Iranian enemies on Syrian territory. Iran does not dictate policy for any of its unoccupied Syrian territory or against its enemies on Syrian territory.

Conclusion

39. To make a long story short, Russo-Iranian relations are almost entirely asymmetrical. Although Russia initially entered into a military cooperation and has extended that cooperation in various ways (i.e., the joint electricity grid), Russia has entered into expanded military cooperation with many countries, including many African countries. The Cradle, a pro-Israeli media outlet managed by members of the American intelligence community, for instance, published a map detailing the number of African countries associated with the recent establishment of Russian military contracts. It is a large number.

40. There is little reason without a thorough comparative analysis to claim that Russia's expanded military cooperation with Iran is unique and in multiple ways supersedes any of those

consecrated in an African country. It is an unqualified claim. Nonetheless, Iran depends upon Russia more than Russia upon Iran and this is a defining characteristic in many case common to and a part of the expanded military contracts Russia maintains with African countries.

41. While Iran is an Eurasian partner on the continent and its proximity to Russia puts it on par with China, Mongolia and Kazakhstan, these countries maintain an independence from Russia and none are joined at its hip.

42. The Western world is at war with Iran and the Persian empire since the beginning of the ancient world and the city states of the ancient Greeks fought against the Persian menace and attempted to hold back Persia from extension into the Western World. Alexander's empire extended into its reaches and he killed many a Persian commander.

43. While Leibniz is responsible for extending the European Enlightenment deep into Russian thought, a prospect Peter the

Great, Putin's idol, sought to advance with gusto, there is no evidence to support the claim that the crisis of the European mind affected Persia, or, at least, from the perspective of the Radical Enlightenment, there is little to no evidence to support a Persian enlightenment. Jonathan Israel's monumental study into the international relations of the European enlightenments emphasizes the role played by an embrace of Islam, the Quran, or Mohammed, but Shia-ism plays little to no role in that embrace. The Axis of Resistance, the practice of whose five groups identifies with the methods of terrorism, is deeply inimical to the Western tradition of international law, protocols, or conventions.

44. It is likely deeply rooted within the unbreakable Russian affinity for its enlightened European roots that Russia is not entirely interested in advancing Iranian influence in Syria, let alone throughout the Eurasian continent, over its own.

THE END OF THE REPUBLIC

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[] - [צבא רוסייה נסוג מעמדותיו במזרח] - סוריה. כוחות גדולים של משמרות המפכה האיראניים ושל חיזבאללה תפסו את העמדות [של צבא רוסייה, תיק דבקה, 04.07.2022]

מקורות בדמשק ובמערב אירופה מדווחים, ביום חימשי 7.4 כי כוחות של צבא הרוסי אשר החזיקו עמדות במזרח סוריה נסוגו מהן לכיוון הבסיסים הרוסיים באזור תדמור שבאזור חומס. הנסיגה הרוסית כללה את כל הכוחות הרוסיים באזור, אלמנטים של 'כוח וואגנר' ואלמנטים של דוויזיה מס' 5 הרוסית. המקורות מוסרים כי לעמדות הרוסיות שננטשו נכנסו כוחות גדולים של משמרות המפכה האיראניים ושל חיזבאללה.

[4] - [Russia Tightens Grip on East Ukraine City, *Wall Street Journal*, February 17th, 2024]

[] - ["Assad says Syria has held 'meetings' with US on possibly mending ties with West," *The Times of Israel*, April 21st, 2024]

There is an article published by Maariv in the early days of the 2023 Israeli invasion of Gaza about Assad's silence on the Gaza conflict

that was one of the more well
written columns.

[אוריית נשק איראנית ועליה 270 טילים] - []
בדרך לעזה. 50 טילים הם טילי פאג'ר 5
[משופרים, תיק דבקה, נובמבר 19, 2012]

[איראן גייסה את הפיראטים הסומאליים] - []
כדי להבריח טילים ותחמושת לחמס, תיק
[דבקה, ינוי 19, 2009]

[Прорыв под Алеппо: почему
Асад не может захватить
стратегический город, *РБК*,
04.07.2016]