


The Battle of Khan Younis: IV

Published by the Military Revolutionary Committee, a Subcommittee of the Central Committee of the District Assembly, on the LeftOpposition.com on February 4th, 2024, Ariel Plotnik : ariel.plotnik@leftopposition.com
Updated Month Day, Year.



1. The battle over Hamas' southern stronghold, the city of Khan Younis, enters its third month. In pursuit of phase "λ," the Israeli Defense Forces (*henceforth* IDF) began to lay siege to the city as early as the beginning of December before the New Year amid calls by the Biden Administration for the government headed by Benjamin Netanyahu to scale his military operation back. A part of the earliest part of the 2023 Israeli invasion, the battle of Khan Younis appears to coming to an end.



مشاهد تظهر أصوات إطلاق نار وتصدي المقاومة
لمحاولات الاحتلال التقدم ووسط خان يونس
قناة الجزيرة AlJazeera Arabic
New 42K views

2. Reports have begun to circulate that the IDF has withdrawn from Khan Younis, alongside reports that the IDF has withdrawn from Gaza City. These reports have yet to be confirmed, as they have appeared on throughout non-mainstream Arabic YouTube channels.



المقاومة تنتصر.. جيش الاحتلال ينسحب بالكامل من غزة وشمال القطاع
AIQAhera News
New 1.2K views

Netanyahu's "War Aims"

3. A feature article on Netanyahu at war, the article conveys Netanyahu's three war aims. Netanyahu says "We have three war aims. One, destroy Hamas. Two, free the hostages. Three, ensure that Gaza never again poses a threat to Israel." [1]
4. A spokesman for the Israeli military, a native heritage Arabic speaker who speaks Fuṣḥa (i.e., "العربية الفصحى") extremely well, admits Hamas' survival when he says that the terrorist organization suffered only severe losses (i.e., "خسائر فادحة"). It has not suffered total annihilation.

5. The speaker claims that Hamas is “completely dismantled” (i.e., “تفكيك كمال”). It is unclear whether or not Hamas is “dismantled completely” but the most appropriate designation cannot be anything more than localized to a specific part of the Gaza Strip. It is doubtful that Hamas is “completely dismantled” in the Gaza Strip. There is evidence to suggest the claim that Hamas continues to operate from the Gaza City, as Hamas militants continue to upload videos, showing Hamas militants firing rockets at tanks. It does not appear as though Hamas is “completely dismantled” in Khan Younis. [2]
6. Israel’s Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant, announced on February 1st, 2024 that Israeli forces ‘dismantled’ Hamas’ Khan Younis bridge (i.e., “فككنا” “لواء خان يونس”), killing 10, 000 Hamas militants while injuring 10,000 more. These statistics stand on contrast with those reported before Israel’s expansion of its ground invasion directly into the Gaza Strip at the beginning of December when the number of killed in the Gaza Strip stood near 20,000. With the official number now less than 30,000, there appears to be an inconsistency amounting to no less than 3,000 to 5,000 Hamas militants.[3]
7. The fact that the speaker for the Israeli army frequently states “from the north to the south,” while discussing the City of Gaza, indicates that Hamas continues to operate in southern Khan Younis. No less than a week ago a Hamas militant uploaded a “military notice” to YouTube under the group’s moniker, indicating that within the city of Khan Younis Hamas militants targeted more than four Israeli Merkava tanks with the 105 MM Yaseen artillery rounds. [4] It seems as though the same may be said for the north in Gaza City where Hamas militants filmed similar videos. [5] The information from these videos does not require native fluency in the Arabic language to understand that these incidents appear to contradict the spokesman’s claim.
8. There are two reasons to discount accounts of a ‘dismantled terrorist’ organization. The first is that a terrorist organization operates in cells. The easiest way to

illustrate how cells operate is by way of reference to Gillo Pontecorvo's *La Battaglia di Algeri* where General Paul Aussarresse's demonstrates by way of a pyramid structure with a top most node containing a triangle, at the end of whose angles are two identical triangles. The topmost, rightmost or leftmost cells are unknown or do not know the others. A dismantled "topmost" cell therefore leaves the "leftmost" or "rightmost" cells intact.

9. The second reason is that the Hamas organization, which is composed of a political party together with a 'militant wing' (i.e., The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades) (i.e., "كتائب الشهيد عز الدين القسام") in the Gaza Strip, is a political party with offices beyond the borders of de facto *Palestina* in countries such as Turkey, Qatar, and Lebanon. [Hamas 'CEO' Keeps Group Funded From Base in Turkey, *Wall Street Journal*, January 5th, 2024] Although these offices are 'sanctioned,' [6] the offices continue to operate financially, politically, socially.

10. Based on these two reasons together with evidence of its

continued operation in Gaza City, there is no reason to accept the account that Hamas in the Gaza Strip is 'dismantled.' Even if Hamas were 'dismantled, as the IDF spokesman claims, Netanyahu's unattainable goal—to *destroy* Hamas—would still not have been achieved.

The End of the War

11. There has been a great deal of speculation about how the 2023 Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip is to end. A recently published article in *Time* magazine appears to suggest that the Biden administration is the decisive factor in the decision making processes for the end of the war. The article, entitled, "How the War Will End," is published in the most recent issue from February 12th, 2024.[7]
12. The article is at once self-contradictory and superficial. At once the author claims Israel hasn't 'won' a war but later extols Israel's accumulated victories. It is superficial. The idea that allied or 'international pressure' succeeds in the expression or suppression of military conflicts like those in the Middle East or Israel applies

with as little weight to its initiation as it does to its termination. In 1956, for instance, the breakdown in the political order arose from material interests, not considerations arising from “pressure,” such as who ought to control the Suez Canal.

that situation was Israel’s unwillingness to act in defiance of the illegal blockade, not the ‘international’ pressure exerted by Egypt under the influence of the Soviet Union, or, Anglo-French insistence upon its control in its spheres of influence.

13. Lustick appears to suggest that Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal after striking “an arms deal with the Soviet Union” led inevitably to the outbreak of war. In the preceding years many attempts were made to avert a disaster diplomatically with “pressure.” In his famous book, *Diary of the Sinai Campaign*, Dayan explains how the situation at the Suez Canal shifted downwards from September 1st, 1951 to March 29th, 1954 in the U.N. Security Council, just as Egypt—at the behest of the Soviet Union—began to double down against Israel with its illegal blockade. These acts of political pressure did not decide the question of who shall pass through the Suez Canal, any more than the rejection of Israel’s requests. However, the only thing that prevented the advent of war in
14. The war erupted in 1956 as Israel chose to pursue its policy of free passage through the Suez Canal by means other than petitioning at the U. N. Security Council. Israel won the war against Egypt in 1956 well before Dwight D. Eisenhower acknowledged the terms Israel provided for a cessation of the hostilities. Eisenhower’s decision to acknowledge Israel’s terms *after* the war in no way contributes to the success Major General Moshe Dayan’s *Sinai Campaign* achieved. Israel secured passage through the Suez Canal.
15. Lustick claims that “Joe Biden is learning that there are excruciating trade-offs between the risks and human costs of allowing an Israeli military campaign to continue and the political consequences of stopping it. When he decides the

- former concerns outweigh the latter, he will give that order. Then and only then will this war really end.” This is clearly flawed thinking.
16. Saying that Biden, as Lustick claims, is in charge of ending the conflict now represents an extreme perversion of the real processes at work in Israeli politics. The sum total of Israel’s politics results from its liberal bourgeois democracy—not “Fascism Everywhere,” as Slavoj Zizek claims, and no matter how racist its ethnocentricity may be. Netanyahu, as Turkey claims, is not Adolf Hitler; he does not have a mass party of Nazis, and the IDF is not the second coming of *Wehrmacht*.
17. Biden’s sway over Netanyahu and Netanyahu’s resistance to that sway are based on political constituencies and these political constituencies are more influential than Biden for their hold on the ultimate power over the Israeli government, a government that Biden, if not anyone seeking an ally’s preservation, must preserve, albeit under new leadership, to ensure ‘normalization’ in the Middle East with Saudi Arabia. This idea that Biden has the power to eliminate Netanyahu and put an immediate end to the war in the
- Gaza Strip is without any basis in the constituencies.
18. Lustick groups together 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 as though these were identical. These wars, however, are unlike the modern day military conflicts in the Gaza Strip and certainly far in a way different from the most recent Israeli ‘operations’ there from 2008 onwards. These are totally different military conflicts and are generally less like the epic geopolitical struggle of the previous four major wars, as the elements of the dispute differ substantially. In those four wars, Israel fought against modern states in conventional warfare and expanded upon the principles of military warfare from WWII. In the Gaza Strip ‘operations’ Israeli launched from 2008 onwards, Israel is fighting a political party in a country under blockade whose primary means of opposition are almost exclusively terroristic. None of those elements of the Gaza Strip ‘operations’ Israeli launched from 2008 onwards apply to 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. These very wars are very different wars. They cannot be lumped together, as though war is war. This “very situation” has not “existed in almost every Israeli war since 1948,” as Lustick states. No war is ever the same war and no war in Israel is ever the same war.

19. In all reality, the 2023 Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip is over and it was over before it even began for lack of a clear military strategy. Israel flattened the Gaza Strip. Hamas, however, is still operating throughout the Gaza Strip, indicating that Netanyahu's two military goals—to eradicate Hamas and to eliminate Islamic terrorist activity—failed; and furthermore, flattening the Gaza Strip and Khan Younis could not have ever achieved either one of these goals. The result has been a catastrophe and one that has changed the State of Israel forever. Israel is now under an order to prevent genocide.

20. Israel cannot win against the Palestinians not merely because the problem of Palestine is a



Description

قراءة عسكرية.. الجزيرة تحصل على صور أقمار صناعية تظهر دمارا هائلا في خان يونس

AlJazeera Arabic قناة الجزيرة

5.6K
Likes

199,530
Views

Jan 31
2024



تطور غير مسبق.. بليكن يأمر مستشاريه بعمل تصور لاعتراف أميركا الرسمي بدولة فلسطين المستقلة
Alghad TV - قناة الغد
New 7.2K views


political problem. Palestinians, which have died *en masse*, during the current crisis in the Gaza Strip, have demonstrated a willingness for sacrifice that the Israelis more than likely have less a reason to imagine than their forefathers. It is the Palestinian willingness to die, to witness the destruction of the Gaza Strip, or the annihilation of their society that makes the Palestinians a less than congenial, formidable, or fatiguable enemy. The Palestinians are willing to sacrifice more than the Israelis are for statehood.

21. In a recent development within the wider context of the 2023 Israeli invasion, it appears as

though Saudi Arabia may have taken a step back from its earlier preconditions for normalization. The call for a *Palestina* appears to be on a lower priority than the normalization of Israel's relations with Saudi Arabia rather than a precondition. [8]

22. Nonetheless, the end of the war in the Gaza Strip of *Palestina* appears to be the beginning of a new war in northern *Judaea* near the border with Hizbollah.

According to a recently published article by Haaretz (i.e., "הארץ"), Israel's northern border has recently become the subject of a series of attacks. On January 23rd, 2024, the *Journal* published an article, outlining how "A War in All but Name Simmers at Israel-Lebanon Border," indicating how Israel's advanced preparations include staging troops, tanks, or long range artillery piece pointed at targets deep within Lebanon.



STOP THE WAR IN ISRAEL!

JOIN THE DISTRICT ASSEMBLY NOW!

[1]- [Israel's Prime Minister at War, *WSJ*, January 27th-28th, 2024]

23. Hizbollah recently began to deploy Anti-Tank Guided Missile Teams (ATGMTs) to Israel's northern border which have targeted Israel's communication infrastructure with Iranian reverse engineered clones of American BGM-71 TOW missiles, as reported by Alma on October 24th, 2023.

[2] - المتحدث باسم الجيش الإسرائيلي لسكاي - نيوز عربية: تم تفكيك كتائب حماس العسكرية في شمال قطاع غزة، لسكاي نيوز عربية، ٠٢.٠١.٢٠٢٤]

[3] - وزير الدفاع الإسرائيلي: حماس خسرت ١٠ آلاف قتيل و ١٠ آلاف جريح وتمكننا من تفكيك لواء خان يونس، قناة الجزيرة مباشر، ٠٢.٠١.٢٠٢٤]

[4] - [مشاهد لالتحام مقاومي كتائب القسام مع] - [قوات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي في خان يونس، قناة الجزيرة، ٠١.٢٩.٢٠٢٤]

[5] - [آليات وجزافات عسكرية تم تدميرها.] - [شاهد لحظات حاسمة من معارك غرب مدينة غزة، صوت بيروت إنترناشونال، ٠١.٣١.٢٠٢٤]

[6] - [Sanctions on Hamas Expanded, *WSJ*, January 23rd, 2024]

[7] - ["How the War Will End," *Time*, February 12th, 2024]

[8] - [מדינה פלסטינית ירדה מהפרק?] - [הדרישה הסעודית החדשה לנורמליזציה, מעריב, 02.02.2024]