



Some Thought's On the Reactions to William Burn's Essay in *Foreign Policy*

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1. In a recently published essay in the magazine, *Foreign Affairs*, William Burns made a series of remarks regarding the Ukraine war. In particular he notes the following in his closing statement. He writes: “Ukraine’s challenge is to puncture Putin’s arrogance and demonstrate the high cost for Russia of continued conflict, not just by making progress on the frontlines but also by launching deeper strikes behind them and making steady gains in the Black Sea.” [1]
 2. The debates over whether or what weapons to send to Ukraine to achieve a change of state in the war (i.e., ‘progress on the frontlines’) appear to share a common cause. They have been resurfacing with frequent regularity throughout the entire duration of the Ukraine war following Russia’s invasion on February 24th, 2022.
- “Blame Biden’s Hesitancy for Stalling Ukraine's Offensive,” in the *Wall Street Journal*. Bolton’s column represents one of the recurrent themes occurring within the debates over whether or what weapons to send to Ukraine.
 4. In the column Bolton claimed that Ukraine’s offensive (i.e., the Ukrainian ‘Spring’ counteroffensive) and Russia’s defensive successes “[shared] a common cause: the slow, faltering, nonstrategic supply of military assistance by the West.”
 5. What is a ‘strategic supply’ of arms? Bolton outlines a culmination in the ‘non-strategic supply of military assistance by the west.’ Bolton is correct “Security Assistance” (c.f., 1/26/23) is non-strategic. What can 31 Abrams do for Ukraine? A military force cannot be fed from without but only from within.

John Bolton’s Critique from 2023

3. An example is an earlier column by John Bolton. On Monday, August 14th, 2023, John Bolton, one of the oldest proponents for the expansion of America’s Wolfowitz doctrine, published an insightful column entitled,
6. Since the war began, Ukraine has received \$113 billion in military aid, a sum unparalleled in the history of mankind for a foreign war chest. Although Ukraine has received foreign

tanks, Leopards, Challengers, or Abrams do not combine as arms on an ad hoc basis.

7. Bolton's claim of hesitancy defies the eight years prior to the war the West enjoyed to prepare the Ukraine for NATO's expansion. It is already widely acknowledged that the Central Intelligence Agency (*henceforth* CIA) has been operating in the Ukraine since 'regime change Karen,' Victoria Nuland, successfully executed a *coup d'état* against the democratically elected pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich in 2014.[2], [3]
8. As an aside, Bolton criticizes lax enforcement of sanctions but he himself provides no example of the effective use of sanctions, let alone against Russia. Lack of enforcement is a reflection of their weakness. The sanctions have only hastened Saudi Arabia's willingness to peg oil in a gold standard, an alternative currency, or something other than the dollar like Chinese weapons such as a fleet of WL-10B drones.
9. Biden has never claimed "the war is about Wilsonian

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abstractions.” He openly advocated regime change but couldn't. The group of Brzezinski extremists appear to be without a plan for a Russian *coup d'état*.

10. Bolton claims: “There are compelling arguments that assisting Ukraine serves our strategic interest, but the president isn't making them.” But Bolton makes none himself. “NATO has seemed unwilling to fulfill its commitment to restore Ukraine's full sovereignty” but NATO fully funds Ukraine as a dependent vassal whose able bodied countrymen it deploys as

a proxy force against Russia so that no Member State is required to enter the war.

11. The Russians have lost ships, planes, manpower but Russian continues to maintain control over Crimea together with the remaining territories in the east. Accordingly, the project for a new American century with a Ukrainian proxy force confronts a Clausewitzian misfortune. Politics is an extension of policy. If the policy is ‘to inflict pain,’ the Ukrainian ‘Spring’ offensive succeeded, if only upon the blood and guts of Ukrainians.

Technology and Tools

12. In a recently published article from the *Journal* entitled, “Why Ukraine Is Stuck,” the authors are undoubtedly alluding to how overgrown hesitancy stalled Ukraine’s failed ‘Spring’ counteroffensive. [4]
13. The authors noted how the “biggest problem may be that Ukraine is insufficiently armed to penetrate Russian defenses.” It is true. The U.S.-led NATO proxy forces need to be armed with new tools such as lawn maintenance, landscaping, or

yard tools to push back the “overgrowth” British intelligence cites as the cause of the failed Ukrainian “summer” counteroffensive.

14. “Ukraine’s top military officer says it needs **better technology** to defeat an enemy with a population three times larger, but support from the U.S., Ukraine’s most critical ally, is wobbling amid domestic squabbles.”
15. In one comment from the article, the author quote a Ukrainian security official as saying: “This isn’t World War II and Guderian,” describing how the official was “referring to German Gen. Heinz Guderian, a pioneer of Blitzkrieg.”
16. “This is World War I and trenches.” Since lawn maintenance, landscaping, or yard tools are the only way to push back the “overgrowth,” none of the WWII solutions military artists conceived in an analysis of “no man’s land” apply to the WWI situation facing Ukraine.

Five New Browder Bulletpoints

17. In another column published in the *Journal* shortly after “Some Thoughts on Burn’s Essay” appeared on *LeftOpposition* [5], White House national security advisers opined with what are essentially ‘five Browder bullet points’ in a column entitled, “A New Strategy Can Save Ukraine.”
18. Bill Browder is famous throughout the Western world for his concerted effort to undermine the current Russian regime for his removal from the country in the 90s, one of the most turbulent times for the country. Browder’s famous ‘five Browder bullet points’ refers to a column published in the *Journal* in December, 2023 where Browder provided five bullet points corresponding to five books he recommends readers read to better understand Russia. [6]
19. In line with the ‘five Browder bullet points,’ the White House national security advisers, faithful Brzezinski strategists, lay down five claims on a ‘strategy’ for Ukraine. [7]
20. The first claim is that Ukraine’s military effort should focus ‘more on defense.’ Written shortly before Russia launched a massive eastern Winter Russian counter-offensive, along five axes, that began with the fall of Avdiivka on February 16th, 2024, the column’s emphasis on defense likely could not have been more timely in that it literally could not have been much more timely than it was. There is the problem with the armchair strategy. At first US officials encouraged the Ukrainian armed forces to launch a ‘Spring’ counteroffensive but for lack of area knowledge regarding the *распутица*, undergrowth or mice the weather changed seasons. The ‘Spring’ counteroffensive became a ‘Summer’ counteroffensive. The emphasis on offense at that time likely could not have been more timely in that it literally could not have been much more timely than it was.
21. The author notes how “Ukrainian forces should establish fortified defensive lines” but he does not detail where these ‘fortified defensive lines’ should have been, on the

front or in the rear of one of Ukraine's existing battlefields in early February. In that regard the author's words are echoed in a Tweet immediately following the fall of Avdiivka that the *Institute for the Study of War* (henceforth the ISW) issued. On February 18th, 2024, the ISW posted a tweet of a map entitled, "Assessed Control of Terrain near Donetsk City as of February 18th, 2024 3:00PM ET," where the authors mentioned how Ukrainian "forces will likely be able to establish new defensive lines not far beyond Avdiivka, which will likely prompts the *culmination* of the Russian offensive in this area."

22. No less than ten days later Ukraine's defenses in the areas 'far beyond Avdiivka' have fallen to advancing Russian forces. The villages outside of Avdiivka such as Stepove, Berdachi, Semenivka, Tonenkoe, Severnoe have all fallen in quick succession with Russia already on the doorstep of Orlovka.
23. Bill Browder bullet point number two is a request for Ukraine, whose economy is entirely dependent upon foreign

aid, "needs to reduce its dependence on foreign assistance." Although the author mentions multiple vectors for an expansion of Ukraine's 'robust defense industry,' none of these vectors appear to be calibrated towards a war economy. A war economy is one whose industries seek outperform its competitor. It does not appear as though Ukraine can outperform its competitor, especially given its dependence upon foreign aid, the sum total of which is literally is dependent upon donations together with a monetary contribution "on the margins" of the defense budgets of supporting nations.

24. Bill Browder bullet point number three is for Ukraine to build "enhanced an air defense network." It is not clear from the recommendation how Ukrainians could build an enhanced air defense network, especially after Ukraine's most successful week with air defenses on February 19th to 25th. Ukraine's air defense network shot down multiple Russian aircraft including but not limited to one of the seven last remaining Russian A50U

Mainstays, an Airborne Warning and Control System.

25. Bill Browder bullet point number four is in terms of Ukraine's 'targeting,' the likes of which an AI startup from California, dubbed the "AI arms dealer of the world, 'handles' for the Ukrainians.[8] The author recommends 'targeting' "Russian supply lines in eastern Ukraine or western Russia," as though the multiple factories in Russia's rear such as Novosibirsk Aviation Plant, where Russia is producing new Su-34 fighter jets on or around the same level as the rest of Russia's military industrial complex, the vast majority of which is located beyond Moscow. What supply lines in the eastern Donbas has Palantir not recommended Ukraine target? Which of these targeted supply lines have led to a substantial change in the change of state on the battlefield?
26. Bill Browder bullet point number five is an invocation to attack Crimea. The author writes that "Ukraine should step up the threat to Russia's vulnerable military position in Crimea? The author mentions both long-range

strikes as well as 'special operations against Russian forces' as a way for Ukraine to step up. The Kerch bridge, which Ukrainian 'special operations' have blown up twice, has been twice rebuilt. Long-range strikes have only 'eroded' Russia's military power over the Black Sea.[9] It is unclear how either one of these things, both of which have been deployed numerous times already, can be a part of a new strategy, let alone lead to a change of state on the battlefield.

27. At the end of these five Bill Browder bullet points point to no 'new strategy' for Ukraine. These bullet points reflect an attempt to expand upon previous ideas. The opinion for a 'new strategy' essentially advocates in place of a strategy new weapons, technology or tools, just like the earlier articles published in the *Journal*. It is clear that these recurrent debates over whether or what weapons, technologies or tools to send to Ukraine appear to share a common cause, resurfacing with so frequent a regularity throughout the entirety of the war as to be nothing but a broken record.

The Poor, Defenseless, Gullible Ukrainians in a ‘Wrecked’ Country

28. No one in the West needs an algorithm trained to summarize news articles with the words Ukraine is “Bound to Lose” in the headlines to count just how often area specialists, political pundits, or military analysts have tried to persuade the West to acknowledge the impossibility of Ukraine’s victory. Ukraine is already a ‘wrecked’ country with millions of refugees spread throughout Europe, sprawling cemeteries, dead, wounded or missing continuing to accumulate daily.

29. It might be the poor, defenseless, gullible Ukrainians who do need an algorithm, especially according to recent polls compiled by associates close to the *New York Times*. In an article published on February 27th, 2024, entitled, “Weary but Hopeful, Ukrainians Are Unbowed,” *New York Times* mentions how “[in] a recent opinion poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the overwhelming majority of respondents, nearly 90 percent, said they still

believed in Ukraine’s victory, as long as Western aid continued.”

30. The article notes how “[the] Russians now stand less than two miles from [a farmer’s] village [in Kharkiv province]. [The farmer] sees little hope of being able to return. “[The Russians] are advancing.”

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[1] - [“Spycraft and Statecraft Transforming the CIA for an Age of Competition,” *Foreign Policy*, January 30th, 2024]

[2] - [A Spy War: How the C. I. A. Secretly Helps Ukraine Fight Putin, *NYT*, February 26th, 2024]

[3] - [“The CIA; a covert army of mayhem across the world,” *Al-Mayadeen*, February 13th, 2024]

[2] - [A New Strategy Can Save Ukraine, *WSJ*, February 5th, 2024]

[3] - [Absence of US Strategy, Middle East & Ukraine, *The Duran*, February 3rd, 2024]

[4] - [Why Ukraine Is Stuck, *WSJ*,
January 11th, 2024]

[5] - [“Some Thought’s On William
Burn’s Essay,” *LeftOpposition.com*,
January 30th, 2024]

[6] - [“Five Best: Books on Russia,”
WSJ, December 14th, 2024]

[7] - [A New Strategy Can Save
Ukraine, *WSJ*, February 5th, 2024]

[8] - [The War Lab, *Time*, Volume
203. NOS. 5—6, February 26th,
2024]

[9] - [Kyiv Erodes Moscow’s Naval
Edge, *Wall Street Journal*,
September 21st, 2023]