

*Communal toothbrush - personal property*

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March 2007*

## MARX AND MISOLOGY

*Keeping the logos alive in the face of stoicism and the fatal my power of the positive sciences*

The two warring and incompatible philosophic traditions which laid claim to the legacy of Socrates were (and are) that of Stoicism on the one hand, and that of Plato and Aristotle on the other. The Stoic way of life: impregnable to the ravages of opinion and emotion, seemed exemplified by Socrates to the degree that moral precepts and spiritual exercises could employ his image to mold a postulant's guiding function – his hegemonikon. The Socrates of the Phaedo warns us, not against emotion and opinion, but against hatred and contempt of speech; that is of accounts or arguments (logoi) as the greatest danger. The life which is able to be examined and able to examine must accept the need for eternal vigilance against the sophistry of others and of oneself. The result of artlessness in the realm of speech is cynicism and a misanthropy concomitant upon misology, which seems the first step in the weaponization of speech: its instrumentalizing into the conveyer of messages and public relations.

It is now evident that the Renaissance was the rebirth of Hellenistic philosophies, but of Stoicism above all in the hands of the 17<sup>th</sup> century creators of modern science, perceiving the need for a framework which Aristotelian Physics could not provide. This preparation of the world as positivity, to be mastered by the axioms of positing and positive science, was quick to ignore the universals and four causes of Aristotle for the monocausal fields and functional nominalism of Stoicism. This knowledge is power, not the empowerment of deliberations as to whether to strive for power, or not; or whether mastering nature is either good or possible.

Two immiscible and incompatible philosophies emerge, differing in their displays of the relationship of speech to consciousness: of logos to phantasia (representation-imagination). Aristotle's man who has logos (as distinguished from the slave, who merely senses logos) reflects on advantage and disadvantage, on to questions of justice and injustice. He has the capacity of deliberative choice to develop (prohaeresis) as opposed to other animals. In the Eudemian Ethics, he writes "For the deliberative function is the soul's function of theorizing a certain cause. For the 'for-the-sake-of-which' (the "final" cause) is one of the causes. Anything through which something exists is a cause, so that-for-the-sake-of-which something comes about is causal; for example, the getting of things is cause of walking, if someone walks for this purpose. Hence, those who have no aim or target are not deliberators (1226b21). The choice of a regular dodecahedron as opposed to an icosahedron is a different target or aim for inscribing in a sphere, and the choice isn't deliberated, but the analysis leading to the steps of the proof is a model of deliberation, with the principle (arkhe) being the good or apparent good represented by the inscribed solid as final cause. This reasoning is carried on under the auspices of the good and has a natural end-point (or telos). ?

For Stoics there are no universals or ideas presented the mind by whatever genus of speech in which it finds itself. There is no final cause and all deliberation is an illusion. Universals are, thus, a pathology of speech, leading

away from that acknowledgement of the total materialist determinacy of the mental and physical cosmos which Stoics pose as the only alternative to those tugs-from-the-future which the Platonic Aristotelian approach mystifies as the good as final cause: tugs from the 'tugaton'. Rather than as the animal having logos, Stoics view man as the animal having signs: individuals pointing to individuals. Modern logicians bow to this, allowing Aristotelian syllogistic only in so far as universal quantification is reduced to "Universal Instantiation": 'All men are mortal', becomes for Stoic propositional logic, 'If it is a man (read: 'a token of the type man') it is a mortal'(token). The presupposition behind this asserted relationship of speech to mind joins the Stoics to the whole tradition of positive science, ideologized as the totality of science, of Descartes to Denett and Dawkins. There would be no point to the demand that positive sciences include in their posited axioms also a 'final cause' which the laboratory is based on excluding. But it is legitimately rational (or mindful) to remind any Josef Mengeles of the mind that, whereas dissecting a living brain to track that calcium ion which elicits a new axon proceeds without the auspices of a final cause, the deliberations from a dialectical science may decide against such a procedure on the basis of the common good as principle (arkhe).

The controversy between Stoics and Aristotelians can be formulated as one over the priority of logos over phantasy (representation). (I thank Prof. Arbogast Schmitt of Marburg for this precision.) The Stoic naturalistic account of speech posits logos as the way nature is, and the sage lives in accordance with a logos which is similar to that of nature. Human phantasy is merely another determinate part of nature, with a propositional content (in the case of a human phantasy) conveyed by an impulse to which the human being says 'yes', or does not say 'yes'! The behavior that is elicited depends on the state of the individual's hegemonikon. The same impulse from the same phantasia will produce one kind of trajectory in a hegemonikon which is like a roller at the top of a hill, and another kind of (perhaps) cycloidal roll in a hegemonikon which is like a top. The sage will have the roll which is in accordance with the nature of the hill, having the easy-flowing style (eurhoia) of life. This attempt to render materialistic determinism compatible with free will by bringing causality inside the agent (compatibilism) runs into the problem that the internal phantasia was itself caused. So unless there is mental space where a proposition can really be entertained with no determinacy regarding its acceptance as deliberation proceeds there can be no rational, mindful freedom. The priority of logos over phantasia of Plato and Aristotle entails that a representation or phantasia be interpretable by being brought under some idea or universal. Charmides has a representation or phantasia of moderation; Laehes, one of courage; Thrasymachus, one of justice. Until they are brought to give an account, a logos, of their representation (phantasia) they may perceive a logos, but do not have logos, secure from sophistry.

Euripides' Medea seems so much a play about deliberation, even if Medea is correct that her deliberations have been bested by her self-assertion, "which is precisely what is the cause of the greatest evils for mortals." So important to the Stoics was it to deny deliberations to her that Chrysippus was

famous for citing virtually the entire text in explaining away Medea's self-interpretation. But the struggle between the Stoic and the Platonic-Aristotelian traditions can be posed as one over the relation of logos to phantasia, in their respective claims to account for the soul of Medea. For Stoics, the representation of herself as avenger achieves decisive status, whereby everything becomes a means to be mobilized, because of the kind of hegemonikon (or 'guiding function') she is. In rapidly reviewing alternative scenarios she says 'yes' to this representation of herself as 'grimly heroic cautionary icon' rather than 'desperate housewife of South Corinth'. Every aspect of her ostensible indecision is determined, and deliberation over different means is illusory (e.g., whether to kill Jason.)

For Plato, such representations can be subjected to dialectical inquiry, and may be dissipated by the effect of a conversation which pursues the definition implied by the representation. Courage may be imagined in the representation of standing firm in battle, but bringing the representation into speech requires including the representation of retreating in a disciplined manner like Socrates at Delium. To Medea we would appeal to her representation that childbirth is standing firm in battle times 3. Perhaps she should confront a representation of a grimly heroic mother retreating to save her sons. There would be, whatever the result, a discourse to unfold which would refuse the brute givenness of the representation as prior to logos and unavailable to it.

She needs a genuine dialogue of her soul with itself to free herself from her self-image, but that dialectical freedom to review the genus, properties and definition of her action is what Stoics (and neuroanatomists) cannot grant. It is the realm of Aristotle's Topics, as the precondition for invention. For the Stoics, this "context of discovery" (as the Positivists used to speak of) is the drug, hellebore, rather than methamphetamine, but there is no rational freedom, in the sense of Plato and Aristotle, made possible by the interconnectedness of reality. Neither in the atomic ontology of the Epicureans, nor in the cosmic broth of Stoics is there the basis for Socrates's inquiry into meaning, so when Stoics praise Socrates it is not as an inquirer, (since wonder in a sage could only be a weakness) but only as an inflexible rejector of opinions, as if that were a way of life.

The most important contradictors of this Platonic-Aristotelian tradition and its revival were the Stoics. We can say that the Renaissance was the rebirth of those Hellenistic philosophies: Stoic, Epicurean and Skeptic, since if previous philosophy had been footnotes to Plato, it was as whole commentaries on Aristotle. And it had been Stoicism which had represented the most total incompatibility with Aristotelian teaching: physical, ethical but (above all) logical, and that was of primary concern to scientists breaking with the Aristotelian philosophy of nature, to which neither Skeptics nor Epicureans had more than trivial contributions to make.

The choice of an ancient philosophy was not much like the choice of a graduate school's philosophical faculty: Thomism here, Analytic philosophy there. It involved the choice of a way of life, which was presented as total, consistent, and incommensurable with competing paths to horizontal salvation. In this

role within term-logic, they have nothing to do with addressing Socrates' legacy: finding the linguistic vehicle for expressing a knowing that something must be so, because of its reason. Aristotle casts his net to catch all accounts, all logoi, that count as causes, and excogitates conversations with those who have struggled to produce the most meaningful of such accounts, which are not mere mental pictures, as of atoms such as the Epicureans pick up, or the total mixture of everything with everything which satisfies the Stoics, claiming a certain lineage from Heraclitus.

I should like to sketch out some of the conclusions towards which I am aiming. Stoic logic requires a unitary conception of causality which must be stipulated externally to the implication. To assert, "If this is an instance of poultry, it is healthy" says nothing causal yet: "Whenever it is eaten it produces health", or "It's structure necessarily is found with health." A number of other interpretations may suggest themselves, but the whole point for Stoics is to exclude the Final cause, as if it were a tug from the future, entailing the causal but immaterial effect of universals. The kind of science which embraces such a logic may be called a 'positive' science, one which seeks a deductive rigor from axioms. The stipulated causality of gravity and the experimental template suggested by the "if...then" format recommends it to a Newtonian model, wherein a deterministic ontology allows for predictive power, the immediate purpose of such knowing.

Another science emerges on the basis of term logic, which might rather helplessly be named 'indeterministic' or even 'deliberation-based.' This Aristotelian concept of science declines to presuppose just what particular meaning of cause may be most appropriate to a particular inquiry, seeks for informing principles rather than posited axioms, - and is prepared to find a context of processes which require bringing in the final cause in order to express how they differ from other realities. So it was the school of Aristotle in which such disciplines as Botany, Comparative Anatomy and the like biological inquiries could be developed, whereas the Stoics made as little a scientific contribution as skeptics and Epicureans. An Aristotelian principle is like a Euclidian definition: never explicitated as a step in a proof.

The Stoics evidently needed to propose a counter-Organon to Aristotle's "tool", and put forward an elaborate semantics to replace the "Categories" and "On Interpretation", with their axiomatically-based propositional calculus obviating Aristotelian syllogistic. But the largest text of the Organon, the Topics, is one with which they could do nothing at all. It is the clearest expression of the origin of logic in speech, as much as of speech in logic: philosophy without presuppositions other than that of speech itself. It unfolds the realm of rational freedom enabled mankind by its capacity of deliberation - which comes to define human beings against animals, in Aristotle's eyes.

But these realities are precisely what Stoics (and certain neurobiologists) cannot allow, without overthrowing their entire model of deterministic cognition=representation, followed by impulse and the affirmation or rejection of the impulse. "Deliberation" counts as a mystification created by those magic "universals", so Medea may have thought she was deliberating, though unsuccessfully as her need for self-assertion proved stronger than her

deliberations. But Chrysippus (the Stoic who copied the entire play in his treatise) detected only a rapid oscillation within her judgment faculty as it sought out the verbalizations with which to rationalize her appetite. There is no divided soul struggling against incontinence, but a set of faculties—the five senses, the generative function, and the phonetic or logos function which has no more to do with the eighth hegemonic or leading function than with the other six functions. To review the differences between Aristotle's term logic and the propositional logic of Stoics, the following considerations are relevant for us: Aristotle's are quantified to yield at least one universal claim in one of two propositions, which are interlaced by a middle term in such wise that a new proposition emerges out of the disposition of terms necessarily, and without the need of anything in addition for a "complete" (or perfect) syllogism, and every syllogism can be reduced to such a complete one. In sum, the Aristotelian syllogism is self-sufficient and may employ any of the causes as middle term.

The Stoic syllogism uses argument templates that were in abundant evidence in Socrates' tracking of the implications of opinions, but he never claimed that knowledge of cause was being achieved. He often expressed satisfaction that some progress was being made towards the clarification of meanings. Stoic inference forms presuppose the achievement of meanings and constitute a group of five axioms (if A, then B; but A, hence B and the like). What the connexion "if...then" signifies must be determined externally: it could be a mere temporal relation, a causal relation, or a strictly formal one, admitting different interpretations. Nor is there a natural end point of propositional arguments: they can go on stringing implications until the deducer gets tired. There is no end and therefore no good connected with such rationality. Nor is it a human functioning more than that of a machine or of the famous Stoic dog who, in following a rabbit to a division of the road into three. The disjunctively empowered dog smells two of the routes, but then charges off after the rabbit on the third, having grouped the two as one of a disjunction, and then performed 'either A or B. Not A.B'. Whereas individuals count in Aristotle's logic only as counter examples and in no positive cognitive context, they are the only thing that can be signified for Stoics.

The Topics in Aristotle express the free motion of the mind scanning the realm of accidents, genera, properties and definitions for relationships that may yield the propositions needed for a conclusion: an act of invention, which Kant represents as the searching of judgment in its reflective mode for a universal, guided in the case of its teleological activity by principle; and "at play" in the case of aesthetic appreciation – which may never find the universal (except in the case of hack-work which has been cranked out by a law-governed routine, and not by the genius nature has granted the inexhaustible works of art.) At stake is according the free life of the mind cognitive dignity, incompatibly with Stoic's life, defended against wonder and awe.

How does this help to locate Marx? The philosopher who picks up the demand for a presuppositionless beginning is Hegel, whose "Science of Logic" is just such an expression of the origin of logic in speech as of speech in logic, as Aristotle expresses. It presents itself as a doctrine of rational freedom, though

p. 5

reason as well as freedom may be attained only at the end of a development, but such particular processes are specified by their end, their final cause.

Marx grasps Reason in history as it is expressed in the logic of the processes of production, as they pass from the cycles of commodities – sale thereof- for new commodities. The logic here is in the final cause of the end commodities being of more value than the original ones. As the accumulation proceeds to the point that money is sufficiently available to begin an investment process, the new logic which starts to subsume the older one is one of production. Money is invested in a special new commodity, Labor Power, which is used up in producing commodities for sale. The final cause rendering this process rational is the increment in money which the sale of the produced commodities provides. However strong the “animal spirits” of the investor may be, the rationality of his calculations will be judged by the rate of profit which his sales effort confronts. This process may have nothing to do with the common good, nor is that the claim of Capital. The capitalist’s investment deliberations are free, however constrained by the need to satisfy the demands of the version of deductive, calculating rationality in presence. The worker is stuck back in the old cycle, as he seeks to embody his commodity, Labor Power as well as he can, sell it at the Labor Market, and replenish his commodity sufficiently to return to the process, whose final cause for him is survival, not rational freedom – but that category cannot even be thought of within the model of rationality Economics has picked up from the Stoic tradition of positive science.

Whereas Aristotle could content himself with rendering ethics internal political science and politics external ethics, he didn’t need to discover “society” as a special new factor, between state and citizen. But that is Hegel’s achievement, followed and deepened by Marx.

The achievement of Marx can be most readily seen in his display of capitalist investment decisions as irrational regarding the common good precisely in their rationality from the perspective of Economics as a positive science, modeled after Physics or Statics, and of that Political Economy which he confronted coming from the Empirical tradition. Though Marx did what he could to maintain his Hegel connection, that was unavailing in the historical context of Neokantianism and Positivism, so the history of Marxism has been an incessant struggle against Revisionism, (so called), which is the ongoing effort to turn his critique of Political Economy into some sort of determinism or positive science, along the lines of a physicalist linear production.

But the point of displaying the inner logic of capitalism through the critical display of its political economy is to show its totality of production and distribution as transitory, to obviate any utopian hopes that one could take away the bad parts. Only the free association of producers will be able to deliberate the means to the end of maintaining society. Such an agency is neither the individuals of Libertarian utopia nor the state of collectivist dystopia, but a minimal basis for survival and flourishing, especially since social assets need to be apportioned regarding not merely the sustaining but the repairing of nature.

So the history of philosophy presents us with two logics – the term logic brought to completion by Aristotle; and the propositional logic of the Stoics.

Aristotle's is a tool (organon) of inquiry open to all meanings of cause, as well for the presentation of scientific knowledge as for deliberation leading to action. So is man the deliberating animal, as Aristotle would have it, or is all deliberation an illusion, (as per the Stoics) and assent, rather than the weighing of possibilities becomes "the locus of rationality and responsibility" as Brad Inwood (Ethics, p.44 Oxford, 1985) puts it.

Such assent is to the representation of individuals, which this Stoic "signing" animal relates with signs to other signs. No indeterminacy and no rational freedom. For Aristotle, this nominalistic world not even elicit human speech; only through the interconnexions provided by universals could recollection or conversation take place – there could be no giving and taking of account (logos) that could distinguish itself from sophistry. The causes of coming into being and departing from it as a source of wonder (rather than of fear) remaining the source of philosophy was turned by Stoics into the task of living an unimpededly flowing life, unruffled by wonder or by the problem of reconciling practical and theoretical ways of life in the polis, since the Stoic sage is a cosmopolite.

This Stoic approach has turned up through the history of Catholicism. The very term 'catholic' is a Stoic term constructed in opposition to Aristotle's *katholov* (universal), and turns up first in Tertullian, referring to God's catholic goodness in raining on good and bad and making the sun rise over just and unjust men: goodness is distributed to each, but there is the reduction of any universal; so if a man is just or (disjunctively) unjust, he is rained on. And Paul's imperatival Christianity (and Luther's) is based on molding assent in order to form communities. However decisive in the economy of salvation it may seem that God fall from the optative mood (or Latin's subjunctive fiat lux) into the imperative of Paradise, leading to Adam's indicative mood for the question and answer of dialectic, the political task is to defy the weaponization of speech into message – sending and public relations by maintaining the preconditions for giving and receiving logos.

Marx claims to present the anatomy of that civil society discovered and displayed conceptually by Hegel, an anatomy that expresses the metabolic process where man in nature works on nature, changing both it and himself socially: in unity and conflict with nature. The molecular process where man sells something for the money to buy something qualitatively different (C-M-C) brings money into pre-capitalist societies and remains the process for workers under capitalism, selling their labor power for its exchange value in the money they will employ to return with undiminished labor power to sustain the cycle.

Capitalism takes off from the money phase as an investment aiming for a quantitative increase: M-C-AM, as a commercial capitalist selects a commodity as a means to attain the increase in money, with no attention to the quality of the commodity beyond its marketability. When the commodities selected yield a process of production, we get the metabolic relation to nature, sustaining civil society to the extent that these molecular processes create the context of investment at large. The relevant commodities are labor power to be set into unity and conflict with resources, both raw and manufacturing. The capitalist

must deliberate freely (if one will), but not on the basis of those 'animal spirits' alleged by Keynes. At least, the survival of his piece of capital depends not on spirits but on his ability to adapt his deliberations to the rate of profit in presence. The embeddedness of society in history is expressed in the ongoing concentration of capital as the process of accumulation proceeds, and the centralization of failing capitals by a capital which has survived the business cycle. This development leading to corporations renders a decision-making on the basis of the needs of civil society impossible, since the corporation functions as a cost-externalizing apparatus, handing to society at large as much of its cost of doing business as possible, and handing to nature as much detritus as possible. The unsustainability to society appears in the declining rate of profit, built into the logic of capitalist development, and making it impossible for capitalism to produce its way out of the increasing social traumas of imperialist war and unemployment. The unsustainability to nature needs no argument since the required reparation (and not mere sustaining) is beyond only market-wise trade-off schemes (pollution credits). A society which has no agency which deliberates about its common good must fall into ever greater enslavement to the bottom-line feeders whose version of rationality is that of deducing from the axioms of accumulation for accumulation. That is the law. That is the prophets. Marx waxes Biblical, and he didn't come to abolish just non- title of the law of capitalism, but to reveal the totality of its anatomy whereby the reform of just one part is utopian: of distribution but not production, and the like.

This ongoing triumph of the positivization of the world, with the rational reduction of speech to public relations and the sending of messages as it becomes weaponized as a mere means of communication – of power relations, is not something of which the Marxist tradition has been any more immune than the Catholic tradition, appearing as revisionism in the former, and (undigested) Stoicism in the latter. It cannot be a question of some war on positive sciences, a campaign which could only be obscurantist at best, but to affirm the dependence of positive science on the knowledge of the good which can only come from free deliberative association. "No one gives what he doesn't have." And the logic which excludes the universals which reveal final causes cannot be faulted for its concern to establish consistency, but consistency is not yet truth. Social policy requires a deliberation about whether the piece-meal mastery of nature enabled by such science contributes to human flourishing or to the accumulation of capital at any social cost: a policy of any individual rationality and social irrationality which must appear the very triumph of reason to those who have said to capital, 'In thy will is my peace.' But the ultimate irrationality is to truncate speech into its message-giving function, which is a truncation of human capability. Such a death of the logos is the ultimate danger and misology.

Capitalism tries to grasp its rationality through the "positive science" of Economics (as Larry Summers termed it.) Marx displays the enslavement of investment decisions by the deductive rationality imposed by the absolute requirement to accumulate or perish under a selective pressure as great as that on any living species. Better for a capitalist, who must guide his ship of capital in the raging waters of competition, not to represent to himself what the results of



his investment are with respect to the Common Good! He must alienate himself from the social consequences of his action. As Dame Thatcher put it, "Society doesn't exist." Only atoms: no molecules for this chemist! Marx proposes the restoration of community by way of investment decisions being made by freely associated producers who must give an account in respect to the Common Good achieved. This entails – not a destruction of Stoic positivism – but, the embrace of all deductive sciences by the higher reflexion of dialectic. As the first immigrant workers, Adam and Eve, left their zoo, they left with the indicative mood with which to carry on a dialogue of their souls with themselves: empowered to ask and answer in the freedom enabled by deliberation.