


The Battle of Khan Younis: II

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





1. In regards to war, Leon Trotsky wrote in his book, *Bolsheviki and World Peace*, the following: “[war] proclaims the downfall of the national state.” Alongside the downfall of the “national state,” Trotsky wrote, war also “proclaims the downfall of the capitalist system of economy.” [1]
2. The capitalistic order the United States sought to preserve throughout the world in the immediate aftermath of WWII for the further division of the divided Ottoman Empire continues to collapse.
3. The battle of Khan Younis is but a reflection of the continuous
- collapse of the geopolitical order of the further divided Ottoman Empire that followed the preservation of great power relations the United States projected throughout the world in the immediate aftermath of WWII.
4. Recently, *Wall Street Journal* reported that “the military is close to completing intense fighting in the south, around the city of Khan Younis,” the southernmost stronghold of Hamas in the embattled Gaza Strip. The article, however, made no mention of any indication that the 2023 Israeli invasion is coming to a close or stopping. More than 100 days

have already lapsed since its beginning on October 7th, 2023.

5. In regards to indications for the war's end, the Israeli Defense Forces recently noted that "[in] North Khan Younis, in South Khan Younis, in East Khan Younis, in all of these places, the battalion structure [of Hamas] has been dismantled." No reports yet confirm Israeli activity in all of the sectors mentioned in the article. [2]
6. The author, however, provides no evidence of any aspect of a "dismantled" Hamas. Although Hamas appears to be uploading fewer documentaries detailing ambushes with the Yaseen 105 mm artillery rounds against Israeli tanks, these continue to appear on major Arabic speaking channels, indicating that Hamas is far from dismantled.



7. These documentaries have established a fact that the *Journal*, let alone any Western newspaper or news media, would never be allowed to admit openly. It is the following: the Yaseen 105 mm artillery rounds have dispelled the illusion that superior technology like an Iron Dome, which neutralized the



threat of Kassam rockets presented in 2008, has the power to overcome any or all resistance Palestinians or their weapons present to the IDF. The dynamic armor on the Israeli Merkava tank, for instance, is no Iron Dome for the Yaseen 105 mm artillery rounds. The destruction of more than 850 units of Israeli armor certifies the effect. The recent figure places the number of destroyed Israeli units of armor at 1000.

8. The Turkish Arabic channel, which produced a worthwhile

- documentary on the Yaseen 105 mm artillery rounds, details the role the weapon has played in Palestinians' resistance. However, the documentary makes no mention of the three aspects that have distinguish the weapon as the battle in Khan Younis continues to rage.
9. Generally, the weapon is itself a major innovation over the Russian Tandem 2 artillery round for three reasons. The first is that the rocket is a work of manual labor. The Palestinians apparently produced the rockets from scratch. The second is that the Yaseen 105 mm artillery round represents the *first modular* (i.e., "AR style") two stage rocket. The components, which are easily assembled, disassembled, or reassembled, may be used separately on the ignition projectile. The third is that the primary and secondary charges are entirely different dimensionally from the Russian Tandem 2 rockets, being less conic than trapezoidal with a much wider circumference along a much longer horizontal than Russian Tandem 2 rockets.
 10. There are multiple videos demonstrating how dismembered Yaseen 105 mm artillery rounds have been fired seemingly for different purposes. At least one video on YouTube shows how a dismembered Yaseen 105 mm artillery round may be fired without the primary charge. In another the secondary stage is fired but with no primary stage. Although there appear to be no videos detailing how the modularized components may contain chemically different substances for different purposes, the possibility that the Palestinians may change the charge in the primary or secondary charges may not be ruled out altogether. The modularity of the weapon surpasses anything that the Palestinians have sought to deploy against the IDF in the past three wars.
 11. Moreover, the Yaseen 105 mm artillery round is significant not just for Palestinian resistance in the battle of Khan Younis but within the much wider context of Middle Eastern warfare. In the classic *Survey Towards Combined Arms Warfare*, the Lieutenant Colonel House noted how the famous Israeli tank general Tal argued, for instance, that "in the open spaces of Sinai, Israeli tanks needed less infantry security against short-range

enemy anti-tank weapons,” indicating how enemy anti-tank weapons influenced the dynamic separating infantry from tanks on the battlefield in the Middle East.[3] Now it would appear that new “short-range enemy anti-tank weapons” are not only a problem for the “open spaces of Sinai” but within the tight spaces of urban warfare in the Gaza Strip.

12. Nothing certifies the point more thoroughly than the high cost of the damage Hamas has caused the IDF with that weapon. The Yaseen 105 mm artillery rounds have been so effective that it has significantly stalled the establishment of Israeli control over Khan Younis, resulting in significant damage.
13. The latest figure, as mentioned above is 825 units of Israeli armor. If Israeli units of armor are no less than a million dollars, whereas a few such as the Merkava are more than 6



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million, the overall damage Hamas has managed to cause to the IDF is nearly 1 billion or more dollars, or, in terms of overall American aid, 1/130. In terms of the recent aid, 1/30th. It is a significant sum of money. It is likely that Israel's tank fleet cannot be redeployed North to the border with Lebanon, or, if so, only as a fleet diminished by several degrees of combat effectiveness.

14. Hizbollah, on the other hand, has certainly taken note of the effectiveness of the Yaseen 105 mm artillery rounds in urban combat operations, as many

articles published on Mayadeen (i.e., الميادين), the Lebanese newspaper, have detailed.

15. Moreover, many Arabic speaking channels have noted that intense fighting is occurring throughout the city. It therefore appears that there is no basis for the *Journal's* claim that “[The] Khan Younis brigade in practice is slowly coming apart as a fighting force.” [2]

Strategy

16. During the first day of Israel's operation “Cast Lead” (i.e., “عوفרת יצוקה”) from 2008, the newspaper for new Hebrew language learners (i.e., “שער” למתחיל) raised a perennial

question on the Prime Minister's or the State of Israel's aim for its missions in the Gaza Strip. It asked, “What is the aim of the operation in the Gaza Strip? Is the aim to eliminate the Hamas regime or to stop the firing of the Kassam rockets” (i.e., “מהי המטרה של המבצע: להסיל את שלטון (החמאס - או להפסיק את ירי הקסאם)? More than 16 years later, the Israelis continue to struggle with strategy in the Gaza Strip.[4]

17. Given the duration and the intensity of the fighting in Khan Younis, its intensity, and its strategic location ahead of Rafiach, and Israel's inability to establish clear control over the city and its lines of communication such as the





geopolitically significant “Salah-a-Deen causeway,” the battle of Khan Younis, in which the Yaseen 105 artillery round has played a significant role against Israel’s “broadest deployment” of soldiers in the Gaza Strip, appears to be a decisive battle in the 2023 Israeli response to Typhoon Al Aqsa. What is Israel’s strategy for this battle, if not the war?

18. The *Journal* notes how the battle of Khan Younis exposes the “thorny issue” of what “constitutes a strategic military victory.” [5]
19. A curious inconsistency in wording from the

aforementioned article suggests extreme confusion with strategy. At first Gallant, whom the *Journal* quotes, describes a dismantled “battalion structure” but later a disintegrating “Khan Younis brigade.” It is unclear which is the focus, especially in the absence of a discussion of the underlying basis for cohesion within militant Islam throughout the Gaza Strip. While the Defense Minister makes no reference to the military objective he seeks to achieve with the dismantled structure, the idea that he seeks to advance is the destruction of the “vast tunnel network built” in Khan Younis. The destruction of the

- “vast tunnel network,” however, falls short of strategy.
20. The concentration on “tunnels” rather than the source of tunneling shifts the focus from the reason for which the tunnels are built or used in the first place. The tunnels are harmless. What is the significance of the tunnels? The reason for which they are built or used is their significance. The destruction of the tunnels, however, applies a solution to their purpose but to their existence. Destroyed tunnels, for instance, have been rebuilt throughout the Gaza Strip more than three times already anyway. What is the obsession with the tunnels?
 21. The tunnels are built for or used to produce weapons or weaponry. The tunnels play no part or no part different from buildings in the production of weapons or weaponry. Where do the raw materials, chemicals, or equipment come from?. These three items cannot come from but a single source: The Philadelphia Corridor. There is the problem for Hamas militancy *per se*. Since the invasion focuses on tunnels rather than the Philadelphia Corridor, the invasion is a failure, as the strategy focuses on the existence of tunnels rather than the purpose for which they’re built or used.
 22. The Philadelphia Corridor, however, is a major political problem but not the political problem that the Israelis confront with the Palestinians. The problem the Israelis confront with the Palestinians is a struggle for control over self-determination, the Gaza Strip, its economy (i.e., to circulate the Shekel as in the West Bank), its important trade routes (i.e., Philadelphia Corridor), or Palestinians as a source of cheap labor—in a word, hegemony over the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians exercise *de facto* control over the Philadelphia Corridor. The Israelis do not. Israeli control over the Philadelphia Corridor, however, might have or may resolve one but not all of the problems in the struggle for hegemony between these people.
 23. In at least one article published by one the more right wing elements within Israeli society, Israel Today (i.e., ישראל היום), on January 12th, 2024, there is at

least an inkling of an idea of the underlying basis for Israel's failed invasion. In a map that dissects the Gaza Strip into three parts, the lower most part displays a security corridor separating the Rafiach Crossing from the city of Khan Younis, where intense fighting continues in a struggle over the Salah-a-Deen causeway, the extension of the Philadelphia Corridor. It is important to mention here that the Arabic name for the corridor is actually the Salah-a-Deen Corridor. It is depicted below to the right.

24. Had the Israelis sought to establish a southern security corridor between the two cities, there is a much higher likelihood that the Israeli war could result in the attainment of a militarily feasible goal. It would have at least resulted in the implementation of a military strategy directed at a political solution or the implementation of a political response.

25. Had Israel sought to establish a southern security corridor separating Rafiach from Khan Younis, Israel could have 1) accomplished that goal without invading the northern or central

Gaza Strip, 2) destroying more than 80% of the Gaza Strip's housing, 3) causing the displacement of more Gazans than those in Rafiach or the death of more than 25,000 Gazans, or 4) losing Israeli soldiers, units of armor, or a massive amount of armor.

26. Of course, the militant wing of Hamas would have sought to prevent the establishment of a southern security corridor but in contradistinction to the current state of the war Israel would have been in a position to wage a defensive rather than offensive war (i.e., a war designed to defend the southern security corridor). Hamas at that time could very well have been perceived as the aggressor, if Hamas attacked a southern





security corridor designed to prevent a future October 7th attack.

27. These considerations, however, would have at least granted Israel's Israeli Defense Forces the opportunity to realize the attainment of strategy. Of course, the establishment of a southern security corridor would have caused as much of an outcry as the current Israeli invasion but the situation would

have at least resulted in exercisable options.

28. Israel's exercisable options are now exhausted. Israel's relationship with Turkey, for instance, is undermined not least of all for Erdogan's statements against Netanyahu but for the war. In an article written by one of the geopolitical scientists at Maariv (i.e., מעריב), the author notes how Israel's lack of exercisable options in the Middle East, if not in Turkey, is driving a wedge into relations throughout the

region. She writes that "the price may be very high for Turkey, its influence not only on Israel but the United States, NATO, or Western governments." (i.e., "המחיר" שלו עלול להיות גבוה מאוד עבור טורקיה, והשפעתו רחבה — לא רק על מהיחסים עם ישראל, אלא גם עם ארה"ב, חברות נאט"ו וממשלות. Turkey is one of the few predominantly Islamic states in the Middle East prepared to cooperate with Israel politically, economically, or diplomatically. Jordan, whose king is a long

time ally of the United States, dispatched tanks to the border with Israel before the beginning of the New Year. Egypt, different factions of whose government have made statements denouncing Netanyahu's call to take control of the Philadelphia Corridor, appears to be entering into a state of crisis over Netanyahu's call to take over control of the Philadelphia Corridor. These actions call into question Israel's relations with its closest Islamic and Arab allies, many of whom are few and far between.

29. With the effective exploitation of Yaseen 105 mm artillery rounds in the Gaza Strip against Israeli Merkava tanks, there is no reason to think that Israel would be in a position to prevent a loss in armor at a rate two to three times greater than that in the Gaza Strip. Thus the rising threat from Hizbollah in the north, for which Israel diverted significant military resources as early as January 7th, 2024, together with multiple threats emanating from Iraq, such a cruise missile falling in Haifa, further complicate any extension of the current operation. The

2023 Israeli war could become a wider, regional war.

30. The Iraqi Prime Minister's request for American ground forces to leave threatens America's ability to project power not just in Iraq but throughout the eastern Fertile Crescent.
31. The International Criminal Court's expedited schedule for a hearing on the accusations of genocide severely limits Israel's shortened time. These accusations, however, have a stronger basis for "sociocide" than "genocide." [8], [9], [10], [11] An article published in the *Wall Street Journal* details what has been done. [14]

Low Intensity War

32. The attempt to portray the Israeli invasion as entering into a new phrase of "a lower intensity war campaign in Gaza" is part of a much wider propaganda campaign to placate ever intensifying cries within many layers of the left petit bourgeois, the Biden bureaucracy, or left-leaning elements of the American military or intelligence establishment upon

which Biden depends to advance the myth of opposition the Democratic Party requires to keep voters in the dark about the realities America faces.[6]


33. The phraseology tends to evolve over time. As early as December 15th, 2023, the *Journal* reported that “a senior U.S. official discussed military options with Israeli leaders on moving toward a targeted military operation.” [7]

34. Most recently, the term used to describe the military posture the Biden administration would like the Netanyahu government to assume is “surgical.” These changes in terminology represent profound differences of opinion within the Biden administration, as bureaucrats continue to encounter frustration from the ever widening backlash the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip continues to cause for American foreign policy throughout the wider Middle East.

35. The terms—“targeted military operation,” “lower intensity war”, or “surgical”—represent an attempt to convince the Israel’s ruling factions to return



to the “day before” (i.e., “יום שלפני”) as it is described in Hebrew. The situation, however, is fundamentally different from any previous pre-war situation. The October 7th, 2023 attack together with the Israeli invasion represents a significant turning point in Israel, if not throughout the Middle East, with many discussing that Israel is on the cusp of a chance to establish a ‘greater Israel’ with its borders reaching from “the river to the sea” like no time before. But nothing could be farther from the truth. The way the Netanyahu regime has



conducted the 2023 Israeli invasion has diminished the State of Israel's standing throughout the Middle East, if not the entire world. The ICC criminal complain is an example of its diminished standing.

36. Within the Biden administration, which is one of the most catastrophic for American foreign policy in the Middle East in the history of the United States (from its relapse with geopolitically strategic American partners such as Saudi Arabia, whose affinity for China may evolve from BRICs to the consecration of a contract to settle oil contracts in the Yuan, to its handling of the 2023 Israeli invasion), the sudden awareness that the war is beginning to undermine American interests on

the Arabian Peninsula has allowed members within Biden's administration to exploit the global cries as a convenient excuse to quit.

37. In an poorly written article by *Time* on Anthony Blinken, the author notes how "Blinken has fielded multiple internal dissent cables [inside the State Department], decrying U.S. support for Israel." [Can America lead? *Time*, January 22nd, 2024] The careful use of the word "fielded" suggests that the fallout over the catastrophe





arising from the Israeli invasion caused an extreme internal crisis within the Department of State over the overwhelming challenge leaders in Arab countries have brought in retaliation against the United States for its Israeli support.

The Arab Spring

38. The Netanyahu regime enjoys two great historical milestones in the history of Israel. In 2011 Israelis protested *en masse* against the Netanyahu regime. The newspaper Haaretz (i.e., הארץ) published a front page spread on July 24th, 2011 detailing how Israelis marched in Tel Aviv, calling for Netanyahu to resign. It was called “the 400, 000 protest” (i.e., “הפגנת ה-400 אלף”), describing July 23rd as a historic night about that Israelis would one day tell their children about.

At the time no leader in the history of the country had ever achieved such a thing within the history Israel.

39. Netanyahu is therefore truly remarkable in that respect. But he exceeded himself last year. In the protests that occurred in response to his regime, masses of Israelis from all walks of life protested in the largest ever protests. These protests, which far exceeded the protests from 2011, reached more than half a million people overall.

40. Whereas in the 2011 protests many elements from the petit bourgeois left forbid the Palestinian flag, the Israelis from the protests in 2011 actively adopted the slogans of the Arab Spring, calling for Netanyahu to resign in Arabic. These Israelis yelled: “Get out!” (i.e., ارحل)

41. The way forward for Israelis is to return to the Arab Spring, uniting with Arabs in an independently unified mobilization of the working class against tyranny not just in the Israel but throughout the Middle East.

[4] - [גיליון 1523, שער למתחיל, 12.30.2008]



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[1] - [(Leon Trotsky, *Bolsheviki and World Peace*, [New York: Boni and Liveright, 1918] p. 20)]

[2] - [Israeli Military Plans to Shift Gaza Fighting, *Wall Street Journal*, January 16th, 2024]

[5] - [Israel Reduces Forces in Gaza, *Wall Street Journal*, 1.18.24]

[3] - [*Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization*, House, pg. 174]¹

[6] - [Israeli Military Plans to Shift Gaza Fighting, *Wall Street Journal*, January 16th, 2024]

¹ Since the “coned shape” of the Yaseen 105 mm artillery rounds are based on the designs of the Tandem 2, any innovation deriving therefrom may be attributed to the latter. On pg. 111 House discusses using field artillery in an anti-tank role as a solution that “concentrates the effects of a relatively small amount of explosive on one particular point of the enemy’s armor.” In a footnote in Chapter Four on page 83, House initially introduces the “coned shape” charge whose center concentrates the blast’s effect “within [a] hallow” that produces a “shock wave in one direction, [namely] towards the wide end of the cone.” It would appear that the dimensions of the Yaseen 105 mm artillery round are designed to exploit the blast effect of the secondary charge.

[7] - [U.S. Presses Israel To Wind Down War, *The Wall Street Journal*, 12.15.23]

[8] - [“US officials guilty of “sociocide” in Iraq must be held account,” *Bill Van Aiken*, May 24th, 2007]

[9] - [“The US war and occupation of Iraq—the murder of a society: Part I” *Bill Van Aiken*, May 19th, 2007]

[10] - [“The US war and occupation of Iraq—the murder of a society: Part II,” *Bill Van Aiken*, May 21st, 2007;]

[11] - [“The US war and occupation of Iraq—the murder of a society: Part III” *Bill Van Aiken*, May 22nd, 2007]

[12] - [“Gaza’s Destruction Stands Out In Modern History,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 20th, 2024)