


# The Battle of Khan Younis: III

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Updated Month Day, Year.



1. The battle over Hamas' southern stronghold, the city of Khan Younis, is a part of the earliest part of the 2023 Israeli invasion. Although set aside for completion only in the last phase, otherwise known as phase "g," the Israeli Defense Forces (*henceforth* IDF) began to lay siege to the city as early as the beginning of December before the New Year amid calls by the Biden Administration for the government headed by Benjamin Netanyahu to scale his military operation back.

2. On December 3rd, 2023 the *New York Times* wrote how "[the] Israeli military said in a statement that it had struck more than 50 locations in and around Khan Younis, the largest city in southern Gaza, where hundreds of thousands of displaced people have been sheltering." [1] It appears to be the first instance the newspaper made to the city on its front pages, indicating for the first time the city's appearance within the annals of Israel's war on the Gaza Strip.

3. No sooner than a couple of days later, the newspaper began to circulate reports that the IDF began to "[widen] its military



مشاهد تظهر أصوات إطلاق نار وتصدي المقاومة  
لمحاولات الاحتلال التقدم ووسط خان يونس  
قناة الجزيرة AlJazeera Arabic  
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assault against Hamas in the southern part of the Gaza Strip, with armored vehicles rolling closer to its main city," indicating how many residing "in Khan Younis [saw] no way out." [2] On the next day, "Israeli soldiers pushed into the heart of the largest city in the southern Gaza Strip." [] - ["Fears for Gaza's Grow as Fighting Gets Fiercer Yet," *New York Times*, December 6th, 2023.]

4. Given the duration of the battle, beginning as early as the beginning of December, a little more than a month after the beginning of the 2023, ground invasion, the fighting there takes a deeper significance than in the northern or central Gaza Strip. With the recent fighting at a pitch, the struggle to contain

- Hamas in Khan Younis is reaching its final stages. Multiple reports in the Israeli press have indicated that the siege of Khan Younis is coming to close.
5. On January 24th, 2024 the Israeli press began to publish celebratory articles such as the one published by Maariv (i.e., “”) with a “victory pose” (i.e., “תמונת הניצחון”). These articles contain summaries of the events that occurred up until the current stage, which appears to be coming to a close. [3]
  6. While the Israeli daily, the Land (i.e., “הארץ”), reported how the IDF began to operate in the west of Khan Younis, just after the Salah-a-Deen causeway, “areas in which the IDF had not yet fought” until this point in the war. The author noted how no less than fifty people died as a result of the intense fighting in that area. [4]
  7. The IDF secured noteworthy points on a series of metrics vis-a-vis the battle of Khan Younis. According to the newspaper Maariv (i.e., “מעריב”), the IDF “closed more than 200 tunnel openings, destroyed more than 130 “terror factories”, 10 TMS launchers, and eliminated anti-tank groups and many terrorists” (i.e., “לוחמי צוות הקרב של יחידת” 636 מחיל הגנת הגבולות בשיתוף פעולה עם חיל האוויר וכלל האוגדות והחטיבות המתמרנות איתרו במהלך פעילותם בח'אן יונס כ-200 פירי מנהרות, השמידו מעל ל-130 תשתיות טרור, הפציצו כ-10 משגרי תמ"ס”). (והיסלו חוליות נ"ט ומחבלים רבים [5]
  8. The Israeli newspaper Latest Notices (i.e., “ידיעות אחרונות”) echoed these points, stating how the IDF “announced today that during the past few weeks a battle team in the area of Khan Younis has been fighting and that during the process of its fighting the forces killed dozens of terrorists, raided dozens of terror factories, and took over Hamas control centers” (I.e., בתוך כך, צה"ל הודיע היום כי “בשבועות האחרונים פועל צוות הקרב של חטיבת כפיר באזור חאן יונס שבדרום הרצועה, וכי במהלך הלחימה הכוחות היסלו עשרות מחבלים, פשטו על עשרות תשתיות טרור והשתלטו על מפקדות של חמאס. בצה"ל מציינים כי זו הפעם הראשונה מאז הקמת חטיבת כפיר שלוחמיה פועלים בשטח הרצועה”). [6]

9. In one of the more noteworthy events, the IDF secured a point on its metric for Integrated Air Defenses Systems. The IDF eliminated a group of three Hamas militants preparing to attack one of the IDF's tanks with a rocket. According to the IDF, the IDF attacked a group of Hamas militants with three rockets (i.e., “במסגרת פעילותם, במרחב ח'אן יונס, זיהו הלוחמים חוליית הלוחמים, RPG מחבלים עם 3 טילי הכווינו את כוחות חיל האוויר שחיסלו אותם”).

10. It appears as though this is the first time the IDF has published a report on its IADS cooperating to prevent anti-tank attacks during the course of the battle for Khan Younis, if not during the entire course of the war. The fact that this comes well after the 100th day of the expansion of the 2023 Israeli ground invasion into the Gaza Strip indicates that the IDF is operating behind the clock to update its combined arms forces to reconnoître, identify or target continually evolving threats on the battlefield. It is important to emphasize the shocking delay in its appearance for supporting

infantry accompanying tanks in urban warfare.



11. Nonetheless, the IDF's IADS continues to struggle. Reports have surfaced that Hamas militants have successfully downed Israeli surveillance drones. In addition, Hamas militants, for instance, continue to upload videos, detailing ambush after ambush.



اشتباكات بين المقاومة وقوات الاحتلال في منطقة البلد وسط خان يونس  
AlJazeera Arabic قناة الجزيرة • 180K views • 1 day ago

12. The Arabic press continues to publish story after story on the

latest “ambush” (i.e., كمين) in its headline. The Turkish press is following suit. European news media with Arabic channels like the BBC or Euronews do not publish these headlines; these channels general lack news commentators dedicated to an analysis of the situation on the ground.

13. While not receiving much press in non-native Arabic media, the ambush story is at the point now where there is no longer any need for commentators on Qatari or Turkish news channels to lay claim to its success. It is already a forgone conclusion by now.
14. While the battle of Khan Younis has already been raging intensively now since the beginning of December, Hamas’ militant wing continues to upload videos, documenting its successful ambushes against Israeli soldiers throughout the embattled city of Khan Younis.
15. On January 27th, 2024 Hamas militants uploaded a video detailing no less than five successful ambushes. In a video posted by a white-labeled clone of the Qatari Al-Jazeera channel called Al-Araby (i.e., “العربي”),

Hamas militants can be seen firing Yaseen 105 mm artillery rounds at Israeli tanks (i.e., “فيديو جديد لاشتباك مقاتلي القسام مع جنود الاحتلال في خان يونس”).

16. On January 28th, Al-Jazeera reported two more ambushes. It reported that Hamas militants targeted a pair of Israeli Merkava tanks in an eastern neighborhood of Khan Younis (i.e., “استهدفنا دبابتي ميركافا بقذيفتي” الياسين ١٠٥ في جورة العقاد خان يونس”).



القسام تنشر.. معارك بين كتائب القسام والجيش الإسرائيلي في خان يونس  
Al Jazeera Mubasher قناة الجزيرة مباشر 74K views • 6 hours ago

17. It also reported that Hamas militants targeted a pair of Israeli Merkava tanks in another eastern neighborhood of Khan Younis (i.e., “استهدفنا دبابتي ميركافا بقذيفتي” الياسين ١٠٥ في حي الامل غرب خان يونس”). Both of these attacks involved Hamas’ new weapon, the Yaseen 105 mm artillery round. These attacks were

apparently carried out by  
 Hamas' militant wing.



18. The Islamic faction Jerusalem (i.e., “القدس”) carried out similar attacks in those neighborhoods, targeting three Israeli units of armor (i.e., “استهداف ٣ اليات عسكرية”, صهيونية بقذائف ار بي جي في حي الامل “وجورة العقاد تفجير عبوة برميلية شديدة الانفجار”, (i.e., “في محور التقدم بمنطقة حي الامل or firing mortars on soldiers of Israeli units of armor in the neighborhood of Tel-Hawaa (i.e., “اطلاق قذائف الهاون على جنود”, “واليات العدو في منطقة تل الهوا

19. It is important to note that Al-Jazeera, increasingly now far more than in any previous period of time, has begun to employ clearly racist terminology for its description of the events occurring during the 2023 Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip. While prior to the intensification of the battle of Khan Younis, Al-Jazeera appeared to be less

prone to adopting the normalization of racist terminology in its reporting, there appear to be occurring with great frequency instances of the use of such terms “enemy” (i.e., “العدو”) or Zionists (i.e., “صهيونية”). Generally speaking, Al-Jazeera often employs interpretative phrases to describe Israeli forces, calling the IDF the “occupation army” (i.e., “الجيش المحتل”). It often employs the term “occupation soldiers” (i.e., “جنود الاحتلال”) to describe Israeli soldiers.



20. The more radical terms are frequently used throughout Syria's Arabic press following the established practice in the Persian language newspapers. Syria's Arabic presses employ these terms exclusively with no exception, almost as according to an unspoken Syrian law. Although not always, Lebanese newspapers, especially those originating from the southern strongholds held by Hizbollah, frequently use the terms. Only recently has Al-Jazeera begun to adopt these terms with greater frequency than usual.


21. If you compare the two descriptions of the IDF, there is a noticeable difference in "occupation army" (i.e., "الجيش المحتل") and "Israeli army" (i.e., "الجيش الاسرائيلي"). It may be for Al-Jazeera's use of these more interpretative terms that the current situation regarding Netanyahu's disagreements with Qatar have begun to surface

publicly. [] - [Tensions Rise Between Israel and Qatar, WSJ, January 26th, 2024]

22. While the *Journal* mentions nothing more than unspecified "disparaging remarks," Netanyahu's declaration that he has no "illusions" about Qatar may be a result of the complicated linguistics required to discuss the extremely sensitive, decades old, Israeli Palestinian conflict, if not the right wing, ultra nationalist "uncompromising" political stance Netanyahu continues to assume.

## Deaths Reported in Gaza

15,000 deaths



Source: Gazan officials THE NEW YORK TIMES

23. Apart from the further radicalization of the Arabic press in support of the Palestinian cause, undoubtedly a result of the rising Palestinian death toll, the war is beginning to take a toll on more than merely the Palestinian lives. While the death rate for Palestinians continues to accrue at a steady rate, nearly doubling from November 22nd, 2023 to the present day, many Israelis are becoming weary.

24. The Israeli daily, the Land (i.e., “הארץ”), published an article

outlining the fact that Israelis soldiers in particular are already beginning to show various signs of fatigue. the author expects Israelis to begin showing signs of fatigue, should the war continue, as Gallant or Netanyahu would like.

25. The author notes how the war is expected to begin taking a toll this year when “soldiers are expected to be called up again for another, extended period of service” (i.e., “העומס הצפוי השנה, כשלחיילים נאמר שהם צפויים להיקרא במהלכה לתקופת מילואים נוספת וממושכת, עומד במרכז הדאגה. ולמרות ההתלהבות ורוח ההתנדבות שהופגנו מתחילת המלחמה, ישנן גם תופעות של נפקדות “שקטה”, כשחיילים אינם חוזרים מחופשה אל היחידות ברצועה, בטיעונים שונים”). The author mentions a situation in which soldiers do not return from leave for “different reasons.” [7]

### Responsibility

26. Many within the Israeli press, however, have begun to express doubt about the future of the war. In at least one article from the Israeli newspaper, The Land (i.e., “הארץ”), the author notes how the 2023 Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip no longer has a



- future, raising concerns about “responsibility.”
27. The author writes: “The war has no point; it has no future, while its extension is a way to suppress raising the question of responsibility” (i.e., “למלחמה הזו אין תכלית ואין עתיד, אבל הארכתה היא הדרך שלו לדחות את העיסוק בשאלת האחריות”, אמר ל"הארץ" אחד המשתתפים בישיבות הקבינט מקור בקבינט: [8] - [8].” (והממשלה למלחמה אין עתיד, נתניהו פשוט מושך זמן כדי לברוח משאלת האחריות, [הארץ, 01.22.2024]
28. Responsibility, as raised by the author, could mean many things, depending upon context. On the one hand, responsibility could mean responsibility for the leadership of the war; on the other hand, responsibility could mean responsibility for the mistakes arising from the war. In terms of Netanyahu the authors most certainly mean responsibility for the future government.
29. The author centers on Netanyahu’s motivation behind any discussion of the hostages. Hamas continues to hold more than 136 hostages, many of whom are women, children, or elderly. “It may sound horrible to say but this is the reality. So long as the protests continue to demand the return of the hostages, the longer the protest he fears, the one against the government, is delayed” (i.e., “יותר מזה, וזה נורא לומר את זה אבל” זאת המציאות - כל עוד המחאה עוסקת בהשבת החטופים, מתעכבת המחאה שממנה הוא חושש, נגד הממשלה. אני מתקשה להאמין שהוא יסכים לעסקה להחזרת החטופים תמורת הפסקת” (הלחימה ושחרור אסירים כבדים).
30. However, the author focuses almost exclusively on Netanyahu. Netanyahu’s Minister of Defense, Gallant, deserve to be scrutinized equally so. Gallant’s strategy, to lay siege to the entire Gaza Strip, is a major contributing factor to Israel’s further isolation. In the recently announced ICJ ruling on an application for a temporary injunction, the Court specifically mentioned the words Gallant used to give expression to his strategy.
31. ICJ’s decision to mention Gallant’s words suggests its willingness to adopt South Africa’s request for the Court to find Gallant in violation of the clause against intentional

genocide. At least part of the responsibility authors seek to explore within the decision making processes of the Netanyahu regime ought to be focused on Gallant's military strategy.

32. Gallant's military strategy played into Sinwar's strategy. Sinwar sought to strike an immediate reaction within Israel's ruling elite to solicit an immediate ground invasion. Sinwar, whom the *New York Times*, claims prepared at least one year ahead of time for the October 7th, 2023 attack, sought to lure the Israeli military into intense urban combat. Hamas, an inherently dismantled political organization, operates cells with two to three men. These cells, equipped with rocket launchers, unleashed rocket after rocket in the densely built areas of the invaded Gaza Strip, leveraging Israel's immediate reaction for revenge against Hamas' most powerful military strength.

33. The longer that Netanyahu regime prolongs the siege of the Gaza Strip, the longer Sinwar's strategy of luring the Israeli's into urban warfare continues. These concerns apparently

figure less prominently than the discussion over the 'hostages,' despite being relevant to the current overall situation.

34. Nonetheless, other publications from the Israeli press, portray responsibility, apart from a discussion of political or military leadership, as a recognition of the primary challenges the future of the country faces not just in terms of the political viability of a single candidate but within the context of the wider social, political, economic, or military processes demonstrating shifts in geopolitics.[9]



## צה"ל מתקדם בחאן יונס. נתניהו לקרובי חטופים: "אין הצעה של חמאס - יש יוזמה שלנו"

עשרות מחבלים חוסלו בקרבות עזים בחאן יונס, טנקים תועדו במערב העיר והמוני פלסטינים בורחים: "ההפצצות מטורפות, 50 נהרגו" | נתניהו נועד עם נציגי משפחות החטופים ואמר שיש...

35. The author, who believes the current shift in geopolitics require “Israel to prepare for much greater missions in the face of a global arms race,” mentions how both Russia as well as China have demonstrated exceptional economic and military power within the last year alone (i.e., “על ישראל להתכונן” למשימות גדולות בהרבה לנוכח מרוץ החימוש העולמי”).

36. He writes that Russia is creating today “weapons in at an alarming rate.” The current rate of production exceeds the same period of time by 60%. The author notes how Russia’s current rate “has not been as heavy, since the ‘great patriotic war.’” The author is keen to point out that the Ukraine war hardly affected the Russian economy, since capital continues to rise in parallel with that of weaponry and the expansion of Russian army. Alongside his discussion of Russia, he mentions how China’s defense budget is expected to approximate that of the United States (i.e., “ההערכות מדברות על השקעה ריאלית שכבר מתקרבת לזו של ארה"ב כ-800 מיליארד דולר”).

37. In response to these concerns, the author notes how responsibility within the current geopolitical context takes on the meaning of a conscious recognition. The current generation, he argues, neither knows how to conduct war nor build military forces (i.e., “מדובר בדור שלא יודע לנהל מלחמה ולא כשיר לבנות כוח למלחמה”).

### Tunnels

38. The vast tunnel networks in the Gaza Strip remain a focal point of the last stage of the 2023 siege of the Gaza Strip. In an article published by Maariv, the authors discuss how one of the next steps is to determine how deeply to root out the more than 160 kilometers of tunnels dug underneath the besieged city (i.e., “לאחר שלב הלחימה העיקרי על האן יונס, יישאר עוד שלב הטיהור ובו ההחלטה כמה עמוק עוד יכנסו לוחמי צה"ל למבוך המנהרות של האן יונס, שנמתח על כ-160 ק"מ של מנהרות שנחפרו במפלסים ועומקים שונים [מתחת לאדמה]” [10])

39. It appear as a focal point on the destruction of the vast tunnel network underneath the Gaza Strip is no longer a primary military objective for the IDF. In

- an article published by the Saudi news agency, Al-Arabiya (i.e., “العربية”), the authors highlight how attendees at a recent meeting of Israel’s top-secret National Security Council (i.e., “הקבינט מדיני-הבטחוני”) concluded that only “strategic” tunnels would remain the object of a focal point on the destruction of the tunnel network.
40. The author noted that the “destruction of ‘non-strategic’ tunnels in the Gaza Strip is not within the objectives of the current war on the Strip, and will not be dealt with at this stage,” as according to the the Head of Israel’s National Security Council (i.e., “قال رئيس مجلس الامن”، القومي الاسرائيلي تساحي هنجبي؛ اليوم الاحد، ان تدمير الانفاق ”غير الاستراتيجية“ في قطاع غزة ليس ضمن اهداف الحرب الحالية على القطاع، ولن [11]
41. It is worthwhile to mention how the article’s title is one of the more curious titles among the headlines on the Saudi news agency. It reads in Arabic: “The destruction of the tunnels is important to whomever rules over Gaza later.”
42. The vast sprawling tunnel network in the Gaza Strip is insignificant. The tunnel networks have been rebuilt more than three times during the past three military engagements in the Gaza Strip. Warfare in the Gaza Strip is renowned for tunneling.
43. The author of a recently published book advertised on Al-Jazeera (i.e., “الجزيرة”), *Gaza: A History* points out how tunneling warfare in the Gaza Strip dates to as far back as Alexander’s conquest of Alexandria in 333 B.C at the beginning of Western history.
44. In his book, Jean-Pierre Filiu notes how “Alexander’s conquest of Alexandria in 333 B.C. preceded the first historical reference to tunneling in Gaza.” In the event of a siege of Gaza, Alexander commissioned no less than a “100 days of fruitless attacks and tunneling.”
45. Filiu’s explanation, which is as relevant today as Gaza is located next to the sea, emphasizes how Alexander’s campaign marked “the first historical reference to the loose subsoil of Gaza, with the construction of tunnels and



- contains significance only insofar as the nexus of relevance for the geopolitics of the Gaza Strip figure prominently into its implementation. The Biden administration's debate, for instance, with Netanyahu, or, vice-versa, Netanyahu's debate with the Biden administration over a Roman solution, derives primarily from the significance of the wider geopolitical significance of the Gaza Strip.
50. The wider significance of the Gaza Strip is as at its nexus of relevance for the Rafiach crossing, the Sinai desert, and the Red Sea shipping lanes. In as early as 1956 when Israel fought a war against Egypt, Israel fought a war against the Soviet Union, on the one hand, in the form of Egypt for its control over the Suez Canal, while against the Anglo-French for their control over the Suez Canal. The seige of the Gaza Strip mattered not so much for its own land but only insofar as a gateway to both the Sinai Peninsula on its way to the Suez Canal on the commercial shipping lane for the Red Sea. On March 29th, 1954, the Soviet Union, for instance, vetoed
- Israel's request to discuss a complaint against the blockade.
51. In his famous war diaries written in English, the Major General Moshe Dayan, one of the greatest military commanders in the history of the State of Israel, wrote how "[one] of the basic issues in the conflict between Israel and Egypt was the freedom of Israeli shipping through the Red Sea."
52. What is even more significant for Dayan, however, is the following. "Israel is not a rich in natural resources, and among the few minerals she does possess, potash and phosphates take first place, and are exported primarily to countries of the Far East." [*Ibid.*] At the end of his book, Dayan explains how his "Sinai Campaign" was not intended as a preventative war but to cure a situation already sick—to breach an existing blockade of Israel's southern waters." [*Ibid.*, pg. 207] Israeli's southern waters, for instance, stand at the center of the competition for markets in Asia or Africa.
53. While the struggle over the Red Sea may not have been one of the primary contributing factors

to the 2023 Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip, Israel, if not the United States, nonetheless, confront a “situation already sick” on the Red Sea shipping lane that recalls with stunning alacrity the words the great Major General Moshe Dayan evoked in the conclusion to his *Sinai Campaign*.

54. The primary significance of warfare in the Gaza Strip therefore cannot be anything but a result of the the wider geopolitics at the nexus of relevance for the Gaza Strip such as control over commercial shipping lanes on the Red Sea, the Sinai Peninsula, or the Suez Canal. By extension, the Philadelphia Corridor, which the treaty Israel signed with Egypt settled, is one aspect of this nexus of relevance. Although settled by treat, the Philadelphia Corridor continues to figure prominently into the concerns over the actuality of that nexus. The Middle East’s article makes no mention of any of these things, let alone Moshe Dayan’s everlasting contribution to the elucidation of modern day struggle for hegemony within the provinces of the former Ottoman Empire.

### **The Houthis**

55. In one of the more disturbing developments arising from the continuation of the 2023 Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip, Yemen’s Houthi rebels have begun to upload videos in Arabic, demonstrating how to fire rockets at targets. In the most recently published video, a company of Houthis can be seen shooting at buildings, a tank *in situ*, or a fully decommissioned MRAP towed on a chain down a desolate highway in a barren, arid desert. The Houthis are clearing imitating Hamas militants, shouting phrases similar those Hamas militants shout in the videos posted online.[12]

56. Both Russia and China have voiced opposition to the Houthi’s decision but to no avail. Only recently the United States asked China to intervene to bring a stop to the attacks. To date no single or combined response to Houthi aggression in the Red Sea appears to have persuaded the Houthis to stop attacking on the crucial commercial shipping lane.

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STOP THE WAR IN ISRAEL!

JOIN THE DISTRICT ASSEMBLY  
NOW!

[1] - [Israel Launches 'Intense'  
Strikes In South Gaza, New York  
Times, December 3rd, 2023]

[2] - [Israeli Military Near Major  
City in Southern Gaza: Residents in  
Anguish:, The New York Times,  
December 5th, 2023]

[3] - [תמונת הניצחון מחיאן יונס: העזתים] -  
01.24.2024, מעריב, [נוהרים לרפיח, מעריב,

[4] - [צה"ל מרחיב את הלחימה בחאן יונס:] -  
בעיר מדווחים על עשרות הרוגים, בהם  
01.25.2024, הארץ, [ילדים, הארץ,

[5] - [פירי מנהרות הושמדו, חוליות 200] -  
מחבלים חוסלו: נמשכת כתישת מחאס בחיאן  
01.26.2024, מעריב, [יונס, מעריב,

[6] - [התקדמות בחאן יונס: קרבות עזים] -  
בקסבה, עשרות מחבלים חוסלו; פעילות  
מתחת לאדמה, ידיעות אחרונות,  
01.27.2024 ]

[7] - [אחרי יותר ממאה ימים ברצועה,]  
הלוחמים מגלים סימנים של שחיקה, הארץ,  
01.22.2024,]

מקור בקבינט: למלחמה אין] - [8]  
עתיד, נתניהו פשוט מושך זמן כדי לברוח  
01.22.2024, הארץ, האחריות, הארץ,

משקר: הסבירות למלחמה עולמית] - [9]  
[הולכת, מקור הראשון, 12.31.2023]

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