A mobilized anti-air defense system is a standalone system. The integration of these systems, however, is far in a away different from a standalone system. An integrated system is a system whose cooperation with fellow standalone systems contributes a net effect to its combination with fellow arms.  A key component of a Mobilized-Integrated Air Defense Systems is that these systems leverage artificial intelligence to control its responsiveness to battlefield developments. 

One can imagine, for instance, that two or more standalone systems in a Mobilized-Integrated Air Defense Systems detect, track, or target an identical threat. The artificial intelligence driving the integration of these standalone systems must compute deference. The deference must be a factor of an equation in which the comparatively relative distance of standalone system one to that of two, the munition, embedded firepower (AAA, HMG, Igla) is weighed against the identified threat’s characteristics (i.e., a missile, a drone of a size, speed, direction, trajectory). The deference must lend a score that allows the two systems to defer responsiveness from one to the other. 

This is in terms of the immediate threat. A Mobilized-Integrated Air Defense Systems, however, must compute threats over time. It must be built using Python data science in which the data from automated detection, tracking, or targeting is assessed against strikes, successful or otherwise, over time during a given battle. These datapoints should be mapped to a battlefield map together with time series analyses. In addition, the Mobilized Integrated Air Defense Systems must play a role in procuring the origin of incoming attacks. While these should focus primarily on aerial attacks from missiles or drones, a system might be trained to detect the origin of any or all incoming threats such as the location of a battery for artillery or a dugout for a tank. Soldiers, who are involved in the analysis of these data in real-time, must be trained in Python data science to hold the system accountable to its expressed goals.

If possible, Mobilized Integrated Air Defense Systems should be accompanied by an operator whose accompanying drone is able to relay identical data to an integrated systems control center. The integrated system control center should be the point at which data is synthesized for production. It should be with full redundancy at any or all standalone systems that the integrated system control center resides, ensuring its continued operability in the event that any one standalone system is destroyed.

Notes from September 13th, 2024:

[] – [“The Once-Dominant Tank Is Getting Humbled on the Battlefield,” WSJ, September 13th, 2024] 

The article confirms my analysis that 1) tanks are not obsolete but 2) require both 2a) passive as well as 2b) active defense mechanisms 3) embedded on the tank itself to ensure 4) an armored spearhead may breakthrough enemy defenses under the 5) auspices of AI driven, multi-mechanized, mobilized anti-air defense systems. Moreover, the appearance of TOW drones thoroughly negates the emphasis on ‘electronic warfare,’ which is never a substitute for direct strikes. A laser pointer does not yet make the same impression that bullets do.  In terms of 5) the transformation of naval systems (through miniaturization such as with the navy’s C-RAM) is the identifiable pattern (i.e., from sea to land), the Turkish HAVELSAN, an advanced defense “Combat Management System,” is thus required to establish the underlying technology for an AI driven, multi-mechanized synchronized, mobilized anti-air defense systems. 

– GNU cryptographically sound mesh network secures a command control cycle with disassociated amnesia (where the localized systems transit field data back to the command centre for storage every 24 hours so that only the last 24 hours of field data remains on the local mesh network);

– immediate field resource management (i.e., which embedded system still has x number of munitions); 

– multi-mechanized threat surveillance system centralizes targets with sensor data fusion from the ground to the air, providing a unified operational picture across the pre-formatted battle map with vertically integrated horizontals from accompanying aerial surveillance drones 

[] – [“WSJ узнала о смене стратегии США из-за «унижения» американских танков,” РБК, September 13th, 2024] 

The Russian articles on the subject are extremely shallow, seeking to subvert the admission of tank weaknesses as a ‘revelation’ on the weaknesses of Abrams tanks. 

[] – [“ВСУ потеряли за полгода 20 американских танков Abrams из 31 поставленного,”АиФ, 23.08.2024 20:40] The article also fails to note that the 47th Mechanized Brigade lost the more than 20 Abrams. Oryx’s claim that Ukraine has lost only 1/5th is therefore a lie.