If the Russians seek to advance on the so-called ‘third’ scenario, the Russians’ most opportune moment would be after the seizure of Kharkov for two reasons.
The ‘third scenario’ comes from one of the six scenarios the independent news agency, Stratford, published on March 9th, 2015 in an article entitled, Wargaming Russia’s Military Options in Ukraine.
The first reason is that “One of the potential constraints to this scenario is the fact that lines of supply would extend for quite some distance along a thin, difficult to defend, stretch of land.” Under the ‘third scenario,’ a line of communication is encumbered by the mighty Dnipro river.
The second reason is that Ukraine likely cannot fight on both banks of the Dnipro, while the Russians, who have the power to supply an advance with its nearly completed sub-Surovikin railway, do.
The Russians could wait, however, until an invasion on Kharkov is well underway. With Ukrainians pinned down in Kharkov, Pultova, or Kyiv, literally tied to the eastern bank of the Dnipro, the Russians would be in a position of strength with the power to leverage the mere threat of a drive on the capital, Kyiv, to divert Kyiv’s manpower, materiel, or energy away from Odessa. In such a scenario, the Russians would be leveraging Ukrainian expectations against the fulfillment of Clausewitz’s “Akt der Gewalt.”
In his book Vom Kriege Clausewitz writes, “Der Krieg ist also ein Akt der Gewalt um den Gegner zur Erfüllung unseres Willens zu zwingen.” Accordingly, “Der Krieg ist nie ein isolierter Akt.” It comes about in much the same way as Newton’s third law of motion from his book, Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica: “Actioni contrariam semper et qualem esse reactionem: sive corporum duorum actiones in se mutuo semper esse quales et in partes contrarias dirigi.”
With its manpower, materiel or time diverted away from Odessa, Kyiv would not be in a position of strength with which to strengthen its defenses against a Russia attack on Odessa or the consummation of Russia’s execution on the ‘third scenario.’ Ukraine would be in a position of weakness, where the stronger Russian forces would be dictating its range of military options.
Russia would be able to walk into Odessa with little to no resistance. The ‘third scenario’ is thus by far the most difficult of all the scenarios on account of the width of the great Dnipro river precisely because of its dependence upon a geopolitical control over the Kharkov direction.
The seizure of Odessa can therefore be either an «яблоко раздора», or, as I have explained with respect to the Kharkov direction, a «жемчужина». Therein lies the significance of these terms, as they relate to the «военный подход».
