The Struggle for Κολχίς, as the Ottoman Empire Continues its Collapse


The Caucasus region is becoming a flashpoint on the horizon of the Ukraine war, as the United States begins to intensify its years long struggle to substitute Russia’s control over a dominating influence in the former Caucasian commonwealth countries, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan. 

Critical to the Black Sea region, these three countries in the Caucasus have witnessed profound changes in domestic social, economic, or political policies as a result of the current struggle. 

The uneven and desperate conversions of Georgia, Armenia[] or Azerbaijan[], undoubtedly unexpected maneuvers on the Grand Chessboard, have not resulted in a checkmate on Russian power in the Black Sea, let alone the Caucasus, however. It has only “[underscored] Moscow’s warning power over events in the region,” as the Journal notes. It is important to note just how waning Moscow’s power is becoming with respect to these three countries. 

Russia’s loss of control over a dominating influence in these three Caucasus countries comes as many aspects of the Ottoman Empire continue to collapse, from the Black Sea to the Red, from the Caucasus to the Levant. 

Brzezinski writes: “As the Ottoman Empire declined in vitality, the Russian Empire pushed southward, along the shores of the Caspian Sea toward Persia. It seized the Astrakhan khanate in 1556 and reached Persia by 1607. It conquered Crimea during 1774-1784, then took over the kingdom of Georgia in 1801 and overwhelmed the tribes astride the Caucasian mountain range (with the Chechens resisting with unique tenacity) during the second half of the 1800s, completing the takeover of Armenia by 1878.” 

Within the ambit of the Caucasus, Azerbaijan remained one of the aspects of its of control over the region. 

Brzezinski writes: “For Russia, Azerbaijan has to be a priority target. Its subordination would help to seal off Central Asia from the West, especially from Turkey, thereby further increasing Russia’s leverage vis-a-vis the recalcitrant Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. To that end, tactical cooperation with Iran regarding such controversial issues as how to divide the drilling concessions to the Caspian seabed serves the important objective of compelling Baku to accommodate itself to Moscow’s wishes. A subservient Azerbaijan would also facilitate the consolidation of a dominant Russian position in both Georgia and Armenia.” 

With Azerbaijan no longer a “subservient” facilitator for the consolidation of a dominant Russian position in Georgia or Armenia, Armenia appears to be breaking away now. 

One way to gauge the breakaway in the geopolitical shift occurring throughout the power relations on the areas of the former Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus relates to Russia’s continued military presence in Armenia. Russia’s continued military presence in Armenia contains significance for Brzezinski’s Grand Chessboard. He describes Russia’s continued military presence in the country in the following way: 

“A clue to Russian geopolitical intentions is provided by the insistence with which the Kremlin has sought to retain a Russian military presence on the territories of the new states. Taking advantage of the Abkhazian secession movement, Moscow obtained basing rights in Georgia, legitimated its military presence on Armenian soil by exploiting Armenia’s need for support in the war against Azerbaijan, and applied political and financial pressure to obtain Kazakstan’s agreement to Russian bases; in addition, the civil war in Tajikistan made possible the continued presence there of the former Soviet army.”

In regards “to exploiting Armenia’s need for support in the war against Azerbaijan,” Azerbaijan’s annexation of Nargorno-Karabakh is aimed at settling the dispute between the two countries. Nonetheless, the Journal noted how the Russia continues to maintain a military base in Armenia.  

The most recent reports about Armenia, however, seem to indicate that Armenia is operating on advanced plans to remove any or all Russian military presence in the country. In a recently published series of articles, the Armenian president, Pashashniyan, announced that Armenia no longer finds its military relationship with Russia viable. 

The article, entitled, “Пашинян: Россия не может быть ключевым партнером Армении в военной сфере,” indicates that for at least the Country’s military contracts, Russia may no longer enjoy the dominating influence it once wielded, excluding Russia from any opportunity to become the Country’ key partner for military affairs.[]

Another aspect of the geopolitical shift is the relatively weak weight Georgia’s coast plays in the overall power dynamics of the heavily contested Black Sea. With its coast cover no more than 2% over the overall coastline of the Black Sea region, Georgia’s relatively small amount of coastline plays a far less significant role in determining the power relations on the Black Sea than Russian controlled areas formerly a part of the Ottoman Empire (i.e., Chersonesus).

There are three important conclusions to make. 1) Russia is no longer able to assert control over Azerbaijan; 2) Russia’s continued military presence in Armenia demonstrates the unevenness of the process; 3) these countries are continuing to advance towards “European connections,” while 4) the struggle over Georgia, whose relative political instability is still a focal point of struggle, indicates that no single competing great power yet wields a dominating influence over these critical spheres of influence in the Caucasus. Furthermore, 5) Turkey has not re-established its rule over these former aspects of the Ottoman Empire. 6) Russia continues to maintain a dominant, although eroded, position on the Black Sea. 

In terms of Brzezinski’s thoughts on Russia’s dominant position on the Black Sea, he writes the following: “Russia’s loss of its dominant position on the Baltic Sea was replicated on the Black Sea not only because of Ukraine’s independence but also because the newly independent Caucasian states— Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—enhanced the opportunities for Turkey to reestablish its once-lost influence in the region. Prior to 1991, the Black Sea was the point of departure for the projection of Russian naval power into the Mediterranean. By the mid-1990s, Russia was left with a small coastal strip on the Black Sea and with an unresolved debate with Ukraine over basing rights in Crimea for the remnants of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, while observing, with evident irritation, joint NATO-Ukrainian naval and shore landing maneuvers and a growing Turkish role in the Black Sea region. Russia also suspected Turkey of having provided effective aid to the Chechen resistance.” 

The continued competition among great powers for a dominating influence in spheres of influence throughout the three geo-strategically significant countries in the Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, continues to intensify, as the Ukraine war, whose battles have been focused primarily in the north such as in the direction of Kharkov and Donetsk around Vuhledar [2a], and Avdiivka [2b, 2c], and Synrivka [2d], Kupiyansk[2i, 2ii, 2iii, 2iv, 2v], and Marinka (where Russia raised the Red Banner on Christmas Day), continues to rage. 

While these battles are removed from Crimea, many arch American reactionaries, such as Trotsky’s biographer, have argued for Ukrainian armed forces to lay siege to Crimea. [2] – [A New Strategy Can Save Ukraine, WSJ, February 5th, 2024]  The geopolitical struggle for dominance on the Black Sea thus continues to be one of the areas in the world where the great powers, the United States, Europe, Russia, and increasingly more so now than ever before, Iran, continue to edge closer and closer to a cataclysm. 

Within the geopolitical struggle for dominance on the Black Sea Georgia is expected to the greatest flashpoint. In 2008 Russia engaged in a war against Georgia over the contested territory of Abkhazia, located along the coastline of the Black Sea but to Georgia’s north. Georgia lost the war. The Russian press, already aware of the consequences of a shift in allegiance Georgia may cause, is reporting that Ukraine is attempting to open a ‘second front.’  [] [Кандидат в премьеры Грузии: Киев пытается открыть второй фронт против России, РТ на русском,  01.06.2024]

Should a ‘second front’ in Georgia open, there is a chance that the Ukraine war, contained primarily to the eastern front in Ukraine, may become a regional war with more than merely Russia becoming one of the regional warring parties. The resumption of the 2008 Georgian war in the Caucasus merging with the 2014—2022 Ukraine war may become far more than a regional war. It has the potential become the catalysts for a cataclysm.

[] – [Armenian Separatists Capitulate, WSJ, September 21st, 2023]  

  • “The speed at which Armenian separatists agreed to abandon their armed struggle underscores Moscow’s warning power over events in the region as its force are stretched in Ukraine.” 
  • “Russia which still has a military base inside Armenia, has seen its influence steadily wane in the South Caucasus, a territory crisscrossed by pipelines where the U.S., Turkey, and Iran all vie for influence.” 

[] – [Early Results Show Leader Re-Elected, WSJ, February 8th, 2024]

  • “Preliminary results of Azerbaijan’s presidential elections showed a landslide victory for incumbent president President Ilham Aliyev, whose re-election was widely expected following his government’s swift reclaiming of a region formerly controlled by ethnic Armenian separatists.” 
  • “With 55% of the ballots counted, Aliyev, 62 years old, has won with 92.1% of the votes, the head of the country’s Central Election Commission, Mazahir Panahov, said several hours after the polls closed. Other candidates on the ballot so far have won less than 3% each, he said.” 
  • “Aliyev has been in power for more than 20 years. The next presidential vote was set for 2025, but Aliyev called an early election after Azerbaijani troops retook the Karabakh region from ethnic Armenian forces who controlled it for three decades.” 

[] [Кандидат в премьеры Грузии: Киев пытается открыть второй фронт против России, РТ на русском,  01.06.2024]

[2i] – [MO: бронегруппа 3ВО сорвала ротацию подразделения ВСУ на Купянском направлении, РИА Новости, 12.15.23]

[2ii] – [“Генерал Кривонос заявил, что у ВСУ серьезные проблемы на Купянском направлении,” Газета.Ru, 12.23.23] 

[2iii] – [“Бойцы группировки «Запад» уничтожили группу пехоты ВСУ под Купянском,” RT на русском, 1.2.24] 

[2iv] – [“«Запад» отразили на Купянском направлении атаку ВСУ,” РИА Новости, 1.29.24] 

[2v] – [“Шойгу: ВС России в январе уничтожили более трех тысяч единиц техники ВСУ,” РИА Новости, 2.1.24] 

[] – [28 декабря глава МИД РФ Сергей Лавров заявил, что Армения меняет надежный союз с Россией на туманные обещания, поддаваясь на уговоры Запада, Известия, 02.01.2024]

[ ] – [По словам Пашиняна, Армении нужно понять, с кем развивать военное сотрудничество. РБК, 02.01.2024

[ ] – [По мнению Пашиняна, Армении нужно изменить концепцию развития армии. РБК, 02.01.2024]

[ ] – [В том же интервью Общественному радио Пашинян заявил, что Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности, (ОДКБ) якобы в самый решающий момент оставила республику «один на один со своими проблемами». Фонтанка.Ру, 02.01.2024]

[ ] – [28 декабря глава МИД РФ Сергей Лавров заявил, что Армения меняет надежный союз с Россией на туманные обещания, поддаваясь на уговоры Запада. Известия, 02.01.2024]

“An association or even some form of membership for Russia in the European and transatlantic structures would in turn open the doors to the inclusion of the three Caucasian countries— Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—that so desperately aspire to a European connection.” 

The Radicalization of Lenin’s Concept of Redivision in the Caucasus

The redivisions are not merely within the scope of territory, as the sole envisioning of that concept from Lenin’s Imperialism outlines in his popular brochure, but from within the very activity of the economies of interest within spheres of influence.

In Georgia, Armenia, or Azerbaijan, the apple, mulberry, or plum in the eye of Brzezinski fanatics, the struggle to take over and monopolize its export market represents an extreme radicalization of the drive for global hegemony, as the activities, imports or exports, military contracts, or otherwise, come into view for plunder, exploitation or Brzezinski ‘shaping operations,’ designed to advance the tactical or strategic schemes of the advancing great power nation.

The effort to supplant a satellite nation’s older dominating influence with an advancing great power nation’s is centered on commodity circulation. The concept of imperial redivision is thus undergoing a historic transformation under Aufhebung, an extreme radicalization, where the actual commodities in circulation—supplanted from one source to another—are targeted more so or rather as a means of laying siege at the cracks and seams of the inherently weaker satellite nation than within, on or in reference to the territorial borders.

It is important to note that the sprawling, almost irretrievable contradictions, derive ultimately from the breakdown within the internal contradictions of the capitalist system, the leader of which is the United States. The United States, habituated as the long leading leader of the globe as the unrivaled superpower, now meets with resistance everywhere on the Black Sea, the Rea Sea, or the South China Seas.

The United States, as the world witnesses, has exhausted its reliance upon gold to shore up the dollar’s waning influence in a protracted, extremely complex historical process, rooted closely in a matching historical process following five phases of mergers and acquisitions from 1873 to the present day. The series of mergers and acquisitions—the first between 1873-1895 climaxed in 1898 – 1904, the second between 1916 – 1929, the third between 1965 – 1969, the fourth between 1984 – 1989, which arose out of and deepened the “essentially parasitic, destructive, criminal modus operandi” of financial parasitism, and the fifth wave, which began in 1992—led ultimately to the 2008 global crisis. During the course of these processes, several high points delineate the high points. These are Jay Gould’s request to Ulysses S. Grant to suspend gold sales (c.f., The St. Louis Commune of 1877, pg. 43), Franklin Delano Rosevelt’s Executive Order 6102 from May 1st, 1933, the Bretton Woods treaty on December 27, 1945 or the end of the Bretton Woods treaty on August 15, 1971. The future turning point is likely to be the day that BRICS (i.e, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) announces an alternative to the dollar based on a gold standard, a day that may come any day now.

[“How China Manages Its Currency Matters,” WSJ, January 2nd, 2024]

[“The Dominant Dollar Faces Competition in the Oil Market,” WSJ, December 25th, 2024]

With America’s increasingly deepening Federal debt exacerbating the decoupling of the dollar from a gold standard, as its position as the world’s reserve currency continues to face challenges the sanctions it imposes through it for economic force accelerate, the United States, which cannot but act, spend, or think as though in its old unipolar world, reacts to the startling realizations of the multiple polar world with force. The force with which the United States acts is at first economic.

The attempt to supplant the imports from one country, less closely allied, with those of another, more closely allied, at once packs with explosive powder kegs the local, regional, or continental alliances. The drive to subsume one sphere of influence with another is not merely economic but aims to subsume rivaling great powers, whose undermined influence the advancing great power subsumes in its old sphere of influence, not only disabling the rivaling great power’s old order with the new but the rivaling great power itself.

In the case of Κολχίς (i.e., Georgia, Armenia, or Azerbaijan), the last of which is the leading Russian importer, the great power rivalry seeks not only to supplant a Russian source of export but to exploit its supersedence to such a degree that the rivaling Russia becomes economically disabled without any direct military conflict. These countries in Κολχίς are becoming redivided accordingly. The redivision within the very activity of the economies of interest within spheres of influence constitutes an extreme radicalization in the latest, last stage of capitalism. It is clear that from such an extreme radicalization in the latest, last stage that the imperialist epoch is but upon the Caucasus, if not the world.