The Ukrainian seizure of transnitria is one of the ideas circulating on the Internet in regards to recent calls for negotiations. The idea is that Ukraine seize Transnitria for leverage in negotiations with Russia. In terms of Clausewitz, who believes that war is best fought for politics, appears to be sound. The seizure of Transnitria is a purely political objective. The seizure is not for the sake of Transnitria but to exploit Transnitria as a means to an end. The exploitation of a territory as a means to end accords with the Clausewitzian idea of war as a continuation of policy by other means.

What is Transnitria? Transnistria is a sliver of land that runs between the Dniester river in eastern Moldova on the border with Ukraine. Covering about 4,160 square kilometers (1,600 square miles), or about 12% of the territory of Moldova, one of Europe’s poorest countries, Transnitria is just shy of the amount of territory Russia has seized in the Donbas. Russia has purportedly seized no less than 6,000 square kilometers. Transnitria thus measures up well territorially speaking. An eye for an eye, as the old saying goes.

There are, however, various complications. Both the Ukrainian Donbas as well as the Crimea are incomparably more valuable from a geopolitical standpoint than Transnitria. Transnitria is host to far less valuable minerals, raw materials, or deposits of coal, gas, or oil, if at all. The Donbas, however, is home to more than 36 trillion dollars worth of rare earths. Transnitria’s territory on a kilometer by kilometer basis is therefore far less than anything computation for territory in the Donbas. Crimea, as one of the few warm water ports in the Black Sea, is incomparably more valuable than the Transnitria. Transnitria, a land locked sliver of land, has no ports. It is completely disconnected from the sea. It offers nothing in the way of access to the Black or Azov Seas. These are geopolitical significant bodies of water.

Two inherent dangers lie with the idea of a Ukrainian seizure of transnitria. The first is that any attempt to lay seige to Transnitria would eliminate any claim Ukraine might like to advance on the basis of ‘international law,’ since Ukraine’s invasion of Transnitria could be nothing but an act of aggression. Ukraine’s claim to require Russia to negotiate within the confines of ‘international law’ would be, therefore, no longer valid. It is likely that Ukraine’s stance is merely rhetorical anyway, at which point the first danger would be less significant than the second.

The second is the most dangerous. Ukraine’s ability to lay seige to territories, most especially its own, is historically less viable than its ability to defend. The Ukrainian ‘Spring’ counteroffensive, for instance, is an example of its inability to lay seige to territories. Even in terms of Clausewitz, there more complications. While there are significant differences separating an attack on Transnitria from an attack on the Surovikin lines in the Russian controlled Donbas, the Clausewitzian principle that defense is superior to offense holds. Offense exhausts manpower at a rate three times that of defense. Should Ukraine prepare an offensive on Transnitria, Ukraine would have to prepare losses in the amount of three times the amount required for Transnitria’s defense.

If Ukraine were to fail, then Ukraine would not only lose the ability to leverage Transnitria’s seizure against Russian proposals for a negotiated settlement, Ukraine would be in a less advantageous position as a military power than any time before an unsuccessful seizure.

Based on these complications, the idea that the seizure of Transnitria may provide significant leverage for negotiations with Russia is unlikely. Transnitria’s barren territory, landlocked borders, or the relative risk its seizure poses make the idea of a Transnitrian seizure more fortuitous than beneficial.