Russia’s retreat to the Western bank of the Dnipro, which, at the time Sergey Shoigu raised the call in a live televised meeting with his general staff, averted an imminent bloodbath over the capital city, Kherson.

It is important to note the distinction that Russia retreated from the city. By retreating to the Western bank of the Dnipro, Russia has averted what one Arabic daily has described the impending battle, Khersongrad. The battle is averted.

The New York Times on Monday and Tuesday published articles celebrating Ukraine’s return to the capital as a major victory for Ukraine. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Ukraine’s return to the city was not the result of a rout like the one Ukraine achieved in Kharkiv during its first September counteroffensive. 

The right bank of the river Dnipro provides a clearly delineated landmark separating Russian from Ukrainian forces. The requirement to traverse the river, especially during the winter, for a continued advance on Russian forces adds a magnitude of difficulty to the execution of the Ukrainian war effort’s strategy in southern Ukraine. 

Ukrainian forces cannot immediately traverse the river without great danger, as the Dnipro is within range of Russia’s various weapons’ system such as mortars, artillery, missiles, drones, cannon fire from ships in the Sea of Azov, or its Air Force and must over come a stretch of land longer than 1,000 kilometers in width to maneuver around the Dnipro.  

The seizure of the capital city of Kherson on the eastern bank of the Dnipro by Ukrainian forces resolves none of the key territorial points of military significance in the region and does not disrupt Russia’s ability to continue maintaining control over the Khakova dam, the Dnipro, or the gateway to Crimea, as Ukrainian troops under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency and the leading decision makers of NATO seek to expand its reclamation of territory West of the capital, confront not just the dam or the river but the gateway. 

In terms of propaganda, however, the retreat, which various factions within the ruling elite have sought to exploit for their own purposes, appears to be surfacing objections to Putin’s command. Dugin, a reactionary who mythologizes the return of a czar to Russia, has derided Putin for the loss of territory, writing, “The limit has been reached. The authorities in Russia cannot surrender anything else.” [1]

The silver lining within these objections appears to be the misconception that Russia’s stake in the war is primarily bound up with territory in Ukraine. With the rearmament of NATO nations on the border with Ukraine such as Poland, Romania, or Moldova, the United States, which is leading the major decisions of strategy for Ukrainian armed forces, provoked the war in February not for the sake of ensuring Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty but for the sake of achieving its own geopolitical aims in Eurasia, of which the disintegration of Russia is the key objective. 

While territory is certainly a part of Russia’s stake in the war, Russian military leaders such as Shoigu and Surovikin, who have no choice but to delay the war effort for a number of reasons, are now much more aware of the evolving threats rearmed nations such as Poland, Romania, or Moldova present in the Ukraine war. With Polish mercenaries already fighting on behalf of Ukraine, while American troops are deployed far beyond the embassy in Kiev, there are aspects of the war for which the territory in Kherson is not the primary concern. The preservation of the regime’s ability to defend itself from a combined military attack of multiple NATO appears to be. 

A longer war is much more advantageous for Russia now than for Ukraine. Although Europeans have sought to fill reserves of oil, gas, or coal to capacity in advance of the winter, the price of fuel for industry remains high. Without cheap fuel from Russian European industrialist, including Rheinmetall for which the supply of weapons to Nazis played a critical role in their development as transnational corporations, European industry cannot operate at the prewar pace. The result is a significant drop in productivity, especially during winter. A drop in Europe’s industrial productivity makes an already cold European winter altogether freezing.

Ukraine’s dependence upon handouts from European countries limits its operability to the generosity of its donors, many of whom are among those freezing in winter. In addition, Ukraine’s armed forces do not appear to have accumulated the headway necessary for celebrating a clear victory in its battles in and around the areas of Luhansk and Donetsk, especially as its infrastructure fails.

Despite their retreat from Kherson, Russian forces conducted the largest set of missile strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure since the start of the war. Ukrainian Air Force Command spokesperson Yuriy Ignat reported on November 15 that Russian forces launched about 100 Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles at targets in Ukraine, primarily against Ukrainian utilities. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian forces struck targets in Kyiv as well as in Rivne, Zhytomyr, Lviv, Khmelnytskyi, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Vinnytsia, Odesa, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Volyn, and Kharkiv oblasts.[2. 

[1] – [“Breaking Russian Taboo, War Hawks Aim Anger At Putin Over a Retreat,” New York Times, November 14th, 2022]