Libya is the site of an intensified struggle for a dominating influence on the African continent.[1a] Split from east to west with significant sources of energy on both sides, the great powers, Russia, China, the United States, Italy (although to a lesser extent than the others), have begun to compete openly. In a most recent act of open competition, Italian authorities laid siege to a Chinese vessel destined for Libya’s Haftar government.
The mainstream press in the United States did not cover the issue. Newspapers such as the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal or the Washington Post, whose editorial board the Central Intelligence Agency recently reprogrammed[2], [3], did not run stories on the seizure. The one newspaper that did is an English newspaper, The Sunday Times. Along with the Financial Times, the Telegraph, which is a mouthpiece for pro-Ukrainian propaganda or false bravado from the American defense industrial base, The Sunday Times is one of the newspapers most closely associated with the intelligence community, especially the conspiratorial, anti-Democratic, pro-NATO ‘five eyes.’ Often referred to as the Anglo-Saxon polygon, these newspapers routinely focus public attention towards one or more issue at hand with ‘humanitarian’ gestures of good will, invocations in support of the ‘rule-based order,’ or the Western order.
In that regard, the Times stated: “Three containers packed with the weapons were impounded on June 18 by officials at Gioia Tauro port in southern Italy after they were unloaded from a cargo vessel, the MSC Arina, sailing from China.” Although the article did not specify exactly what the containers contained, Italian authorities most likely acquired what appears to be Chinese Chengdu GJ-1. These are Chinese drones designed to establish a zone for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.
Part of the struggle for a dominating influence over Libya rests on the ability of a particular state or states to establish a zone for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance. One of the ways that countries like Libya can do so is with the use of Chinese drones. Libya’s decision to import Chinese drones together with ‘control stations’ is therefore most likely designed to establish a zone for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance in two parts of the country.
Although the most obvious part of the country Libya would likely seek to monitor is the east, the vast network of informants, spies, or embedded agents together with a large source of information from newspapers, journalists, or reporters is already sufficient.
The more important areas are in the south or the north. In the south where the zone may overlap with areas of interest for both China as well as Russia. These areas are areas like Ethiopia or Sudan. The other area is in the north. Libya’s ability to establish a zone for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance in the Mediterranean is designed to cover a large maritime area off the coast of Libya. There is reason to believe that the large maritime area would have covered a significant portion of the sea, including places like Malta or Cyprus. These areas are significant as U.S.-led coalitions such as NATO or others involving Great Britain or France often utilize these countries or parts of these countries as stage grounds for missions in the Mediterranean.
With an Israeli invasion of Lebanon to start on or around Netanyahu’s July 24th address to the United States’ Congress together with Russia’s warm water port at Tartus, the Mediterranean is becoming one like one of the contested seas like the Black, Red, and South Chinese Seas. In the Black Sea, for instance, Russians frequently clash with the United States over its use of M-Q9 Reaper drones. It is within the context of these clashes that the Chinese drones receive a heightened significance in regards to a maritime
In contrast with the Times, social media bloggers, who reported the event less than four days after its occurrence, appear to have taken account of its overall significance. One of the bloggers, Jalel Harchaoui جلال حرشاوي, is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. Although Jalel’s initial tweet occurred on June 22nd, his updated tweet, which contained more details, stated the following: “This article by #TheTimesUK’s @tomkington uncovers the direct connections between the #Haftar family’s attempts to import advanced weapons from #China, the #NOC, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s arrests of Libyan citizens in Montreal last April.” While these arrests are important, they are less so for the overall significance of the event.
The Italian newspaper, on which the Times‘ article is based, provided more details regarding the overall context in which the Chinese ISTAR drones were seized, although with slightly less details than one might expect. It stated: “Di certo gli americani e l’intelligence europea sospettano che il Cremlino voglia costruire un proprio porto militare a Tobruk, nel territorio libico controllato dagli Haftar: sarebbe un punto di accesso per far sentire la presenza armata russa fino in Sudan, in Mali, in Niger, nel Ciad e nella Repubblica centrafricana.” The newspaper emboldened the sentence regarding America and European ‘intelligence’ suspecting the Kremlin of wanting to build a military port on Tobruk but the port is already an extremely well known foreign policy objective for the Kremlin. The Wall Street Journal, for instance, published multiple articles on the port. [4a, 4b]
Tobruk, which the famous Nazi German general, Erwin Rommel, tried to seize twice during the legendary African campaigns, is one of the most geopolitically significant maritime coastal cities in northern African. It is a widely held belief among military historians that Rommel’s unfulfilled dream for fuel cut short his ability to hold the besieged city, especially during its last battle.
Today the city is important not only for that reason– its historical significance for the battles of Tobruk during World War II–but its location in the Mediterranean together with its ability to supply Lybian oil to the rest of the world. One of the most current estimates from the London based Arabic daily, The Middle East, for instance, claims that Libya now occupies the first place among African nations in the shipment of oil. It has become Africa’s largest oil exporter. Given Tobruk’s significance in these terms, the establishment of a Russian military base in the city would augment the city’s own geopolitical relevance in the struggle for a dominating influence.
The idea of a Russian military port at Tobruk, however, is not necessarily as significant as the spread of dominating influences within Africa, especially the Sahel region. Although the Italian newspaper hints at a wide spread in Sunda, Mali, Niger, Chad or the Central African republic, the real danger the U.S.-led coalitions fear in Africa is the establishment of an Iron Cross connecting the Maghreb to the Sahel with maritime bases at each tip of the cross in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Red Sea that would be sufficiently robust in logistical support, transportation or manpower to empower either Russian or Chinese interests–which are competing at a lower level than the one at which the United States or its would-be followers are competing with them–to expand without impediment across the entire 54 African countries.
Russo-Chinese Sharing Agreement
One of the more important processes the analyses from Italian or English sources fail to mention is the development of a Russo-Chinese sharing agreement. The Russo-Chinese sharing agreement is both a result as well as a response to the the Ukraine war. After the West began to deepen its unification around the imposition of sanctions on Russia in response to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia began to deepen its ties with Eurasian neighbors such as China.
With both Russia as well as China competing in Africa on a much lower level than the United States or its followers, the overlapping security concerns the two countries face with respect to the preservation of African regimes with whom Chinese or Russian contracts remain valid lays the basis for a ‘sharing-agreement,’ in which China, which is not at war with any nation, supplies Chinese weapons to African countries whose influence Russia dominates.
The sharing agreement comes as a result of the shortage in stockpiles of Russian arms. The Journal, for instance, notes that “Moscow could struggle to retain its status as the biggest supplier of munitions to African nations given the enormous demands the Ukraine conflict is placing on the Russian arms industry.”[1a] In an earlier article, the Journal noted how “Russia’s War in Ukraine Hurts Its Arms Industry, Creating Openings for Rivals,” but the competition Russia maintains with China is on a lower level than ‘rivalry.’
In the case of Libya, the result is not that ‘rivals’ have supplied one of the African country’s regimes with weapons but a competitive partner, namely, China.[1b] Libya, whose influence Russia not only dominates but favors above all other Russian influenced African nations, is certainly one of the first nations to become a beneficiary of the Russo-Chinese sharing agreement. While countries such as Burkina Faso have received large shipments of Chinese Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Libya is the first African nation to receive a set of non-Turkish ISTAR drones from China.
Libya’s contract with China under the Russo-Chinese sharing agreement stands out. In the two previous shipments to Libya in 2023 and 2024, Russia first supplied the Haftar regime with T-64 tanks. Secondly, Russia supplied the Haftar regime with an unspecified type or number of artillery munitions. Aside from the ISTAR in south or the north, the Chinese drones would have provided the eastern Haftar regime with a Chinese ISTAR to complement both the tanks as well as the artillery. Had Libya received the Chinese drones, the Libyan government would have likely become the first African nation to combine Russian arms under a Chinese ISTAR, a global first in combined arms warfare.
Political commentators on Russo-Chinese relations have completely avoided the subject of cooperation in Africa. In a recent report published by the RAND Corporation the authors address Russo-Chinese relations. Entitled, “Future Scenarios for Sino-Russian Military Cooperation,” the report purportedly sought “to [identify] the prospects and pitfalls for future Russian and Chinese military cooperation in conflict — and explores implications for U.S. policymakers, commanders, and planners.” However, the authors make hardly any mention of Africa, if at all. [5] Out of the 14 references to Africa, none appear to address Libya, Russo-Chinese relations with the Haftar regime, or the Tobruk’s geopolitical significance.
With the seizure of Chinese ISTAR drones destined for Haftar’s eastern Libyan regime, the beginning of the battle for Rommel’s Iron Cross of Oil in Lybia begins. It is the first time, since the beginning of the Ukraine war that a U.S.-led coalition or U.S.-led coalition partners such as Italy intervene directly into the social, political, economic, or diplomatic affairs of the Russo-Chinese sharing agreement on the African continent, disabling one or more these relations in pursuit of its interests on the continent.
Washington together with its allies in Rome are committed to ensuring that the eastern Libyan Haftar regime cannot 1) consolidate its combined Russian arms under a Chinese ISTAR, 2) allow for the development of a fully protected port in the northern Maghreb’s Mediterranean, 3) permit either Russian or Chinese interests to expand a robust logistics supply network from one end of Libya to the south-east in the Red Sea or the south-west in the Atlantic, or 4) enable the Haftar regime to expand westward, as it did previously with Russian help in 2020.[6], [7], [8], [9]
The Haftar regime, whose power both China as well as Russia seek to expand, is in opposition to Washington’s determined efforts to reduce its power. Given the contentious nature of these opposed forces, the battle for Rommel’s Iron Cross of Oil is destined to become more open, more direct, more conflictual than in any previous period of time, as the battle continues to rage.
References
[1a] – [“In Need of Allies, Putin Courts African Leaders in St. Petersburg,” WSJ, July 27th, 2023]
[1b] – [“Russia’s War in Ukraine Hurts Its Arms Industry, Creating Openings for Rivals,” WSJ, March 13th, 2023]
[2] – [“Who is the new Washington Post editor Sally Buzbee?,” WSWS, May 19th, 2024]
[3] – [“Shakeup at the Washington Post signifies shift by corporate media to the right before 2024 elections,” WSWS, June 3rd, 2024]
[4a] – [“Russia seeks to Expand Naval Presence in the Mediterranean,” WSJ, September 15th, 2023]
[4b] – [“Russian Navy Wants Access to Libyan Port,” WSJ, September 16th-17th, 2023]
[5] – [“Future Scenarios for Sino-Russian Military Cooperation,” RAND Corporation, June 18th, 2024]
[6] – [“Russia Sends Warplanes to Libya, Escalating Its Involvement, U.S. Says,” WSJ, May 20th, 2020]
[7] – [“Russian Fighters Help Tighten Rebel Control of Libya’s Largest Oil Field,” WSJ, June 26, 2020]
[8] – [“Russia Reinforces Foothold in Libya as Militia Leader Retreats,” WSJ, June 29th, 2020]
[9] – [“Russian Oil Grab in Libya Fuels U.S.-Kremlin Tensions in Mideast,” WJS, July 26th, 2020]