Hitler’s failure in Operation Barbarossa stems from two levels of indecision. The first level is that politically Hitler failed to understand the overall objective of three axes of advance for lack of a clearly defined prioritization (i.e., Is sacking the Kremlin in Moscow more important than the centre of revolutionary Russia in Petrograd (i.e., ‘the cradle of the Revolution’) or is the seizure of the oil fields in the Caucasus the most important political goal?)

The second level is that Hitler’s failure to prioritize the three axes of advance according to the most important political aim the axis sought to achieve compelled Hitler to become a victim of his own indecisiveness, choosing at once one goal, at another time another goal. (Turney, 1970 : pg. 27) Hitler’s decision, for instance, to revert Guderian’s Blitzkrieg into Moscow from August to October in order to prioritize the Army Group South’s advance onto the oil fields in the Caucasus over Army Group Center’s advance onto the the Kremlin in Moscow necessarily paralyzed both axes indefinitely but most especially Army Group Center’s (Guderian’s Blitzkrieg).

The paralysis from indecisiveness resulted primarily from Hitler’s inability to pursue decisively the aim for which Army Group Center became the ‘dagger at Stalin’s throat.’ Hitler’s decision to withdraw the dagger—a decision that reveals the depth to which he failed to pursue the previously understood purpose for which he constituted Army Group Center in the first place—led by necessity to a dull knife. The dull knife cut nowhere in October. Bock announced in a call to Halder, upon whose testimony the majority of American army manuals is based, quite rightly before the Nazi’s ill-fated November counteroffensive Army Group Center’s inability to fulfill its mission. “The objective that Army High Command has assigned to Army Group Center can no longer be attained, because of diminishing troop strength and a critical shortage of supplies.” (Turney, 1970 : pg. 137)

Similary, Stalingrad—the Leichtpunkt for Kursk—is further proof that indecisiveness obliterated the combat effectiveness of the Panzer divisions, not a single one of which was up to strength. Reinforced to a strength of 78 divisions, with 7 Panzer and 4 motorized divisions in addition to the 7 and 5 of these divisions already in the group, “these unites were hardly up to strength” by October. (Chant, 1996 : pg. 192) Overall the failure to prioritize or, rather, the refusal to pursue the previously understood purpose for which he constituted the Army Groups—according to a political motivation the preassigned axis sought to achieve by design—may be summarized as an abject failure to understand war, for war is but an extension of policy mit anderen Mitteln.

The manifestation of Hitler’s reaction to his own failure to understand war is no where more evident than in the attempt to subvert Army Group Center’s command structure—primarily the two commanders who objected to Hitler’s decision to procrastinate Guderian’s advance on Moscow by more than three months—right after the Disaster at Moscow, the ensuing consequence of which compound the Disaster at Moscow. Zhukov, who is unconsciously aware of Hitler’s mistakes, is the first to declare the Disaster at Moscow—rather than Stalingard—the beginning of the end of Hitler’s Wehrmacht in famous memoirs from 1964 on the decisive battles in World War II. (Zhukov, 1969 : pg. 102) Zhukov’s assessment is unconscious without any analysis of the political objectives the Army Groups pursued per axis, despite the clairvoyance his assessment at the time relayed about the internal livelihood of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. (Zhukov, 1969 : pg. 75) Zhukov rightly celebrated Guderian’s dismissal as but a confirmation and a clearly undeniable jewel in the crown of his stunning defense and everlasting victory at Moscow. (Zhukov, 1969 : pg. 75) “Most significantly, [the German failure at Moscow] resulted in Hitler’s assumption of operational command of the German Army, an event that sounded the death knell for German professional militarism.” (Turney, 1970: pp. xv-xvi)

It is likely that Zhukov, whose spurious objections about the weather defy its historic role, would have faced a more difficult time during the battle for Moscow in August than October. The initial success the Nazis enjoyed at the launch of its operation on October 2nd certainly suggests the Russians had no chance. “With their static defense plan,” the Russians contributed to the ‘resounding victory’ Bock achieved in the first five days. “The Germans estimated that the Vyazma and Bryansk pockets had yieleded 663,000 prisoners from 67 infantry divisions, six cavalry divisions, and various armoured units, as well as 1,242 tanks and 5, 412 guns.” By the time Guderian reached the Moscow’s outer limits, however, winter hit. Had Guderian reached Moscow’s outer limits before winter, he would have been able to put the spires of the Kremlin’s citadels under Nazi Germany’s fire control, assuming the Wehrmacht operated under conditions equal to those in Operation Typhoon (i.e., a lack of supplies, fuel, or munitions) and the Russians operated under conditions equal to or less than those at the outset of the operation, a likely scenario given the circumstances. Guderian, however, would have been hardly able to hold just such a position for an extended period of time for two reasons.

The challenges the Russian strategy presented to a Nazi advance presented few opportunities for resolution without supply, stalling any advance. Sooner or later the winter would have taken its toll on the Wehrmacht, since the army made little to no preparation for the harsh realities on the Ostflanke. When Zhukov arrived around October 7th, “Bock had become temporarily boggged down in the reduce of the Vyazma/Bryansk pockets, chiefly because the rasputitsa had set in.” (Chant, 1996 : pg. 192)

Had Hitler thought to subordinate aspects of Army Group North or South—an altogether different military objective—to ensure a line of supply to Army Group Center in August, then there is more reason to believe in the possibility that the Wehrmacht could have overcome Russia’s strategy. “The drive against Moscow, which was favored by Guderian and which we abandoned temporarily in August to seize first the Ukraine, might have been successful if we had always regarded it as the principle offensive that would decide the outcome of the war. Russia would have been wounded at the very heart.” (Mellenthin, 1956).

Russia’s strategy, at least in part, depended upon a railway network extending deep into Russia’s strategic depth. The Nazis contemplated an “attempt to encircle Moscow and cut its railway links to the east” rather than occupy the capital as Napoleon had done to no avail. But Hitler rejected the plan. Bock would later lament as early as December 1st: “To remain outside the gates of Moscow, where the rail and road systems connect almost the whole of eastern Russia, means heavy defensive fighting for us against an enemy vastly superior in numbers.” (Chant, 1996 : pg. 195 Even Zhukov’s comment denigrating the Nazi’s reliance on Panzer formations betrayed his recalcitrant disregard for the powerful Russian winter. “To gamble entirely on Panzer formations in the given situation, proved in practice to be erroneous, as they became worn out, suffered heavy casualties, and lost their ability to break through.” (Chant, 1996 : pg. 196) Zhukov’s December 1st comment stands is sharp contrast with that of the one from October 7th just before winter set.

Similarly, the situation regarding supply in The Disaster at Moscow provides no element for a recommendation that a sudden increase in supply for the Nazis could have countered Russia’s own or resulted in a different outcome. (Turney, 1970 : pg. 128, 129, 133, 137, 138, 141) Even before the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, Bock complained ad nauseam about deficiencies, a disproportionately lacking measure of supply, a logistical evaluation for the operation incommensurate with its military objective (which he frequent sought to center unsuccessfully on the campaign at hand). The Panzer divisions, battered by both “dust and heat” and the “poor condition of the roads,” suffered from a lack of supply, especially replacement engines, many of which were “worn out.” On the road to Moscow “inadequate communications with the west, based largely on a few overstretched railway lines, meant that insufficient spares had reach the front.” (Chant, 1996 : pg. 193) There is no reason to believe that the Nazi war machine, almost thoroughly extended, could exceed the ‘limit of strategic consumption’ reached well before Hitler even procrastinated the beginning of Operation Typhoon. There was nothing left from which to suddenly increase supplies for Bock on the Ostflanke.

Since there is no reason to believe that the situation with supply could have been any different, there is no reason to believe that under an Augustan scenario prior to Operation Typhoon Guderian would have been able to maintain fire control over the spires of the Kremlin’s citadels past the brutal Russian winter.

Despite Zhukov’s disingenuous counterargument in his description of the four most important battles against Nazi Germany, the Russian winter played a significant role in Army Group Center’s destruction. (Turney, 1970 : pp. 105-107, 112, 113, 128, 132-38, 141, 144-45, 147, 151, 153, 154, 156) “The mud, cold, and deep snow” may not have beaten the Germans but the “harsh Winter climate” played a significant role, as far as the German’s own lack of preparation is concerned. (Zhukov, 1969 : pg. 75) As Zhukov notes quite rightly, “a lack of preparation for winter conditions,” inter alia, “all affected the enemy’s fighting capacity.” (Zhukov, 1969 : pg. 78)

In many senses, Nazi supplies exceeded Napoleon’s. “Army Group Center,” for instance, became “the largest military force, under the command of one officer, ever assembled in the annals of military history.” (Turney, 1970 : pp. 37-38). Unlike Napoleon, Bock, however, never entered Moscow, despite “all roads to Moscow [being] in essence open,’ as Zhukov noted in his diary on October 7th, five days after the Nazis launched their operation. (Chant, 1996 : pg. 192) “Yet von Bock was sufficiently close to the Soviet capital to see with his field glasses the outlines of the city. That was a close as Bock himself ever got to Moscow.” (Turney, 1970 : pg. 141) The fact that Napoleon, who sought to enforce his Continental sanctions against the Czar, planned his Road to Moscow meticulously with the greatest amount of supply ever amassed not only for the Le Grande Armée but the history of Western warfare indicates that the difficulty of supply on the Ostflanke is an insurmountable challenge for a single military machine. Nothing changed a century later.

Bibliography

Chant, Christopher. 1996. Warfare and the Third Reich: The Rise and Fall of Hitler’s Armed Forces. New York, New York: Salamander Books, Ltd.

Turney, Alfred W. 1970. Disaster at Moscow: Von Bock’s Campaigns 1941-1942. New Mexico, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press.

Mellenthin, 1956. Panzer Battles.

Zhukov. 1969. Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles. New York, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated.