In a war witnessing rapid innovation in nearly all areas of warfare, the obsoletion of the Iranian Shahed 131/136 one-way attack uninhabited aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs) is no less surprising than a Ukrainian Magura V5 sea drone striking a Russian Mi-8 transport helicopter with a modified, infrared-guided, air-to-air, short range R-73 ‘Sea Dragon’ missile near Cape Tarkhankut on the Black Sea on the last day of last year.

In recognition of the Magura V5’s strike on the Russia Mi-8 transport helicopter, the Army Recognition Group called the event a “landmark achievement mark[ing] a significant turning point in naval warfare, demonstrating the transformative potential of unmanned systems in reshaping military dynamics.”

In no less of turning point in air warfare, the obsoletion of the Shahed 131/136, whose deployment to the battlefield Russia implemented in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s failed defense against Ukraine’s Kharkiv counteroffensive in September of 2022, demonstrates the transformative potential of unmanned systems in reshaping military dynamics.

The Obsoletion

In its initial deployment of the Shahed 131/136, Russia enjoyed an airspace without more of a challenge for uninhabited aerial vehicles than the one traditional anti-air defense systems provide. These systems, such as the Patriot, or Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target, with its MIM-104 SAMs (i.e., mobile interceptor missile 104 surface-to-air-missiles), are highly impractical. The missiles, which Ukraine cannot produce, are, for instance, not only expense but in short supply, require a great deal of effort for reloading. The foreign system itself is extremely complex, requiring years of training to understand, operate, or exploit in an effective manner on a high paced, modern, AI-driven battlefield like the ones in Ukraine. It is not readily deployable. It requires a massive effort to move from one point to another, ruling out any hot pursuit of the highly elusive Shaheds by default. Russia’s deployment of the Iranian Shahed 131/136 thus left the Ukrainians with no choice but to innovate.

Ukraine’s vulnerability to the Shahed 131/136s became so open that a special team of Americans assembled with the expressed purpose of finding a solution to the problem. In an article published by Israeli news website called תיק דבקה, the author explained how “כמה מקורות מודיעין אמריקנים מדווחים, בשבת 22.10, כי המודיעין האמריקני פועל עתה במאמץ עליון להשיג דגם של מלײַט המתפוצץ האיראני שאהד Shahed-136, במטרה לפתח מערכת נשק נגדו.” The Ukrainians developed a system of weapons to counter the drone. The system consisted primarily of two components. On the one hand, the Ukrainians developed a network of acoustic sensors, whose sensitivity to sounds easily enabled Ukrainian operators to triangulate Shaheds merely based on the sound their propellers made in flight. On the other hand, the Ukrainians created groups of soldiers, trained to target Shaheds from the back of Hilux pickups with ZU-23-2 heavy machine guns. The untraditional system, which is far more mobile than the Patiot but operational at a surprising fraction of it’s cost, attacked Russian Shaheds, closing Ukraine’s open vulnerability.

The Ukrainians, however, immediately began to optimize this system. Statistically, the results were nothing short of stunning. Ukrainian results began an upward climb. Initially, Ukrainians shot down less than half of the Shahed drones. Later the Ukrainians began to shoot more than half. In the second quarter of 2024, however, things changed dramatically. The Ukrainians began to shoot down nearly 80 to 90 percent of all Russian Shahed 131/136 model drones. On some nights, the Ukrainians shot down all of the incoming Russian Shahed 131/136 drones, completelying eliminating the threat. More importantly, however, the Ukrainians not only demonstrated their ability to defend but to thwart completely a Russian threat.

Moreover, these statistics indicated that for all intents and purposes, the Russian Shahed 131/136 drones no longer enjoyed an unchallenged airspace. These drones could no longer achieve a military objective on the battlefield either individually, in a group, or in a swarm planned by Russian types of data-driven, iterative or AI approaches (which characterize the most recent deployments in 2025). It is a long held truth of warfare that a weapon or a weapon system that can no longer achieve a military objective on a battlefield is obsolete. Since Russian Shahed 131/136 drones could no longer achieve a military object, the Russian Shahed 131/136 drones became obsolete; of course, the Russian Ministry of Defense under Belousov continued to field these drones but only with the hope that Ukrainians could not effectively deploy their own anti-drone weapon system (ADWS) with unregulated consistently. In many cases, the Russian hope prevailed, as Ukraine has never been able to deploy its ADWS, or any weapon system for that matter, with any degree of consistently. Yet the Russians acknowledged that the Russian Shahed 131/136 no longer enjoyed a competitive edge of Ukraine’s anti-air defense systems.

The Shahed 238

The acknowledgement led to the advent of the Shahed 238. The Shahed 238 is three times as fast as the Russian Shahed 131/136 with a jet propulsion motor rather than a propeller. The Russians developed the Shahed 238 in close proximity to the site where the famous Russian gun designer, Ivan Kalashnikov, developed the AK-47 in Izhevsk, a city southeast of Kazan, the great capital of the multi-confessional city of autonomous region of Tatarstan.

Many commentators have claimed that Izhevsk factory is ‘second’ factory for the production of ‘additional’ Russian Shahed 131/136 drones. A report by one of the most intelligent centers of analysis in the West, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, whose studies exceed the quality productions at the Royal United Service Institute or the Chatham House, makes just such a claim. It writes:

“There is evidence to suggest that Russia has established a second production line for Shahed 136 copies in the city of Izhevsk. In late 2023, Reuters reported that Russia was producing a new OWA-UAV that is externally almost identical to the Shahed 136 but which uses a Chinese copy of the Limbach 550 engine rather than the Iranian original. According to the report, this production line is operated by IEMZ Kupol, a subsidiary of Almaz-Antey that was previously involved in developing target drones. Shahed assembly at an undisclosed facility matches the unique design features of the OWA-UAV described by Reuters. The structure also corresponds with the layout of a newly acquired and refurbished Kupol facility in Izhevsk. Vehicle presence at the facility, coupled with Ukrainian Military Intelligence reports linking new Shahed UAV serial prefixes to Izhevsk, suggests that the IEMZ Kupol plant is not only operational but may already be engaged in high-volume production.”

It is unlikely that the Izhevsk factory is for ‘high-volume’ production for several reasons. The population in Izhevsk is not suitable for an immediate transfer of personnel; many of the aspect of the Alabuga factory, such as foreign student workers, are not available in Izhevsk; Izhevsk is a rather desolate city on the outskirts of larger populations. The establishment of a ‘high-volume production’ factory for Shahed 131/136s could be feasible only in the face of an urban transformation. What is more likely, however, is that personnel, who specialize in different areas of weapon manufacture, design, or optimization, have joined forces with specialists from around Russian to transform the Shahed.

The result of that transformation is the Shahed 238. The introduction of a jet propulsion engine accomplishes much the Shahed 131/136 left to be desired. The engine is not only three times faster than the original Shahed 131/136 motor. It is also much quieter. The faster, quieter Shahed 238 is now far more elusive than than its predecessor.

Conclusion

These two new aspects of the Shahed affect not only Ukraine’s ability to deploy its ADWS to identify, track or target the new model of drone but it’s ability to engage in hot pursuit. It is likely that Russia intends to combine its types of data-driven, iterative or AI approaches with the new Shahed to further complicate, prevent, or stop Ukraine in its relentless pursuit of obsoletion. In this respect, Russia’s new Shahed 238 represents the latest, newest, greatest shape in the military dynamics of air warfare in the Ukraine war.