In the aftermath of the BRICS 2024 Summit in Kazan, Tatarstan, the world is witnessing profound changes in the distribution of power throughout the leading national economies. The leading members of the BRICS alliance report higher growth in GDP than the G7, both individually on a country-to-country basis, as well as collectively on average of all the nations.

The center of gravity for global social, political, or economic power is shifting, as the struggle for “the subjection of the world embracing economic system to the profit interest of the bourgeoisie of each country” ruthlessly pursues the displacement of currencies, payment systems, or commodities contracts to the extremities and extremes of this earth.

Against the backdrop of shifting economic power, the situation in Ukraine takes on an altogether different significance than merely the struggle over the reclamation of territory both sides seek to champion. Ukraine’s defense of its reclaimed territory in all directions is beginning to dwindle. Russia is chipping away at the vast swaths of the Ukrainian steppes its ill-fated full-scale invasion failed to secure on the first day against repeated Ukrainian counterattacks.

While the battlefield is lined by incremental gains here or there in what is largely a territorial stalemate in real terms over the course of the entire war, the fall of long-held Ukrainian strongholds like Avdiivka or Vuhledar, Ukraine’s two greatest losses this year, heralds an altogether different measure for a unit of territory or Ukrainian village. The significance of these strongholds for the duration of the war makes both far more than merely a net advance or withdrawal or the seizure of a fallen village. These setbacks delimit the actuality of Ukraine’s defense in depth from heavy to light.

It is clear that within a certain period of time Ukraine’s defenses in the villages still standing cannot hold out for much longer than Avdiivka or Vuhledar. It is only a matter of time before the Donbas itself falls in its entirety to the Russians. A rich source of goods, which is a subject unto itself, the Donbas contains roughly $12 to $36 trillion dollars in many of the most coveted minerals, deposits, or raw materials.

The fact that Ukraine has not been able to hold either Avdiivka or Vuhledar indefinitely can be chalked up to generalship, manpower, matériel or any factor in which pro-Ukrainian analysts, Ukraine’s own war planners, or Ukraine’s leaders linearize in configured equations of variables for explaining, propagandizing on behalf of this or that aspect of the Defense Industry Complex, or dismissing an unpleasant fact of the war. The individualized variables in these linearized equations do not affect the outcome of the matrices. The calculus of the matrix, however, dictates the reality.

The reality is that Ukraine’s lost Donbas signals NATO’s end. Brzeziński-ist to the core, the NATO project, whose crosshairs for political intrigue, reaction, or subversion focus on perpetuating the disintegration of the great landmass called the Heartland of the pivot area, has not succeed on the outer, inner or marginal crescents. Neither Georgia nor Ukraine have fallen within its ambit.

NATO’s leaders, from small or large countries, do not appear to be altogether enthusiastic about either Georgia or Ukraine falling within its ambit. In a recent announcement, Robert Fico, who resurrected himself from five deadly gunshot wounds an assassin motivated by the Ukrainian HUR lodged almost fatally throughout his body, declared: “Ukraine will never join NATO on my watch.”[1]

“As long as I am head of the Slovak government, I will direct the MPs that are under my control as chairman of the [ruling Smer] party never to agree to Ukraine’s joining NATO,” he said on the weekly “O päť minút dvanásť” (5 Minutes to 12) program.

In a response to Fico’s remarks, Olaf Scholz, whose most recent achievements in his career as a puppet for Washington include the deindustrialization of Germany into a recession, echoed these remarks. Speaking to German public broadcaster ZDF on Oct.24, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz dismissed Kyiv’s appeals for an immediate invitation to join NATO, stating that “a country at war absolutely cannot become a member of NATO.”

Following a meeting in Berlin with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on Oct. 24th, Slovakian President Peter Pellegrini repeated Olaf’s echoed remarks that Ukraine’s immediate accession to NATO was “not realistic.”

Since the admission of new countries to NATO requires unanimous agreement by alliance members, the lack of agreement between NATO members necessarily entails its preclusion.

The central problem, these decision makers note, is not necessarily Ukraine but the Ukrainian war. Or, perhaps, the central problem is not necessarily the war but the fact that the underlying strategy for its prosecution as outlined in a white paper published by George Soros in 1993 has not failed in its entirety but has succeeded only partially, where far more is needed for its realization to perfect the outcome NATO must achieve in its application to countries in the outer, inner or marginal crescents of the pivot area.

Published by Open Society Foundations on November 1, 1993 with the title, “Toward a New World Order: The Future of NATO,” George Soros envisioned “the combination of manpower from Eastern Europe with the technical capabilities of NATO” not only for the reducing “the risk of body bags for NATO countries” but to enhance greatly “the military potential of the Partnership.” While the risk of body bags for NATO countries is not greatly enhanced, the “military potential of the Partnership” has been reduced.

The reduction of the “military potential of the Partnership” has achieved the opposite of the ulterior motive membership seeks to solicit. Had Ukraine succeeded in its Kharkiv counterattack, the 2023 “Spring” counteroffensive, or the Kursk campaign to effectuate a change in the regime in the Russian Federation, the now heavily reduced Clausewitzian aim of war as an instrument of policy might have unfurled a colorful banner of inspiration for aspiring countries to pick up in a rush to the fore of geopolitics. A wrecked Ukraine, however, is horrifying. What country would like to emulate Ukraine after what has happened to Ukraine?

Ukraine is exceptional in this respect. There is really no way countries like Moldova (outer), Georgia (inner), or Uzbekistan (marginal) can imagine an emulation on a scale comparable to that of Ukraine, any more than the leaders of countries like Slovakia or Germany consider that emulation ‘realistic.’ It is not that the Ukraine war has failed. Neither Germans nor Slovakians have died; the only people in body bags are Ukrainians. It is that the underlying strategy for its prosecution has not reached the level of a paragon or a paradigm. Soros says, “It is imperative to create a structure that obviates danger.” Ukraine, however, elicits only peril.

References

[1] – [“Ukraine will never join NATO on my watch, says Slovakia PM Fico,” Politico, October 6th, 2024]