Ukrainians who live in Dnipropetrovsk usually speak Russian but with a much stronger Ukrainian accent than those in the Donbas. 24 kilometers from Dnipropetrovsk, Selydove, which the Russians have encircled from two sides, stands to fall within the coming days, opening up the way to the great bend at the Dnipro.
Building on lightening advances in villages like Горняк from the north close to the М-04, the Russians expanded the area of control around Цукурино shortly before severing Ukraine’s Ground Line of Communication in the south, preventing the encircled Ukrainians from receiving supplies. The GLOC is especially important. The southern railway line serves to connect Курахово from the south to Selydove and to Покровск from the north.
In eastern Selydove Russian troops have already entered the territory of Selydove’s Reinforced Concrete Products Plant, which the Russians may potentially utilize as a bridgehead for further attacks in the direction of the closed mine.
It is alleged that the Ukrainians sought to leverage as protection the infrastructure of the closed mine in the name of D. S. Korotchenko, whose waste heaps are a form of cover [1]. These strongholds, however, have not stopped Russia’s encirclement.
Newsweek reported Russia striking the closed mine, stating: “[On Sunday] Russian forces are starting to use armored vehicles in assaults and had struck the Korotchenko Mine on the eastern outskirts of Selydove with a Kh-38ML air-to-surface missile.” [2]
Selydove is an important bridgehead on the way to Покровск (Красноармейск). 20 kilometers from Покровск (Красноармейск), Selydove’s elevations provide the Russians with one of many vantage points for an assault on Покровск (Красноармейск).
Pitched battles are erupting throughout the lines of contact. In at least one of the posts Ukrainian bloggers following Ukraine’s 15th Brigade called Kara-Dag, Ukrainians are seen blowing up a BMP-2 with a drone cage.[3]
In a measure of the intensity of Russia’s further advances on Selydove, the Ukrainian blogger, Хортицький вітер, announced that the Ukrainian armed forces repelled more than 40 Russian attacks.[4] Describing these attacks as storms of varying degrees of intensity, the blogger noted that attacks are occurring in nearly every direction around Selydove in the following villages: Миролюбівка, Промінь, Мирноград, Лисівка, Селидове, Гродівка, Новотроїцьке та Новопавлівка.
The Russians have issued an ultimatum to surrender or die to the Ukrainian troops continuing to fight in Selydove. An Arabic language blogger stated the following: الجيش الروسي يدعو كافة جنود الجيش الأوكراني ومرتزقة حلف الناتو في مدينة سيليدوفو إلى الإستسلام وتسليم المدينة فورًا، والا فسيتم محاصرة المدينة ولن يكون هناك أي مفر.” https://x.com/id7p_/status/1846249597221617834
“The Russian army calls upon the Ukrainian army and its mercenaries from the NATO alliance in the city of Selydove to lay down their arms and surrender immediately or else the city will be surrounded without escape.”
Several bloggers have described the encirclement in which the Russians have captured Selydove as similar, if not identical, to the one in which the Russians captured Ugledar. In a demonstration of its restoration of maneuver warfare, the Russians have left left only one way out of the city, just as the encirclement of Ugledar had. Ugledar fell shortly after encirclement. Accordingly, one can safely estimate that within a few days, Selydove will fall, as Ugledar had.
The fall of Selydove opens the door to Pokrovsk, Ukraine’s last Donetsk stronghold before the Dnipro. Pokrovsk is located 66 kilometers to the north-west of Donetsk. The city is at the center of a major railway junction of Константиновка, Курахово, and Павлоград, and Днепро. It is also the city through which the M30 (E50) highway (i.e., Покровск — Карловка — Донецк) and the roadways Т-0504 и Т-0515 pass.[5]
It is important to emphasize that many of the reasons provided thus far for Russia’s advances beyond Syrsky’s claim of “no single kilometer” fly in the face of current reporting on Pokrovsk. In as early as the end of August, 2024, when, according to Ukrainian bloggers, the Russians began storming Pokrovsk in earnest, the Economist published an article outlying Ukraine’s excuses for failure in the Pokrovsk direction.
These are a) an insufficient number of shells, b) a parity in the rate of fire for artillery, c) Russian tactics, or an d) insufficient number of troop rotations. Finally, the article states: e) “Ukraine’s problems are compounded by “idiotic” orders.”[6] The first two reasons are disputable per articles the Kyiv Independent published together with the Czech republic’s guarantee to provide Indian ERFB-BT 155 mm artillery shells.[7,8] While Russian tactics have evolved to restore maneuver warfare, the insufficient number of troop rotations (d) are related to “idiotic orders (e) such as the decision to redeploy Ukrainian brigades from Pokrovsk to Kursk for the invasion. The invasion failed.
The primary problem for the current situation in Pokrovsk is therefore generalship. It is a crisis of generalship that is leading the Ukrainians to lose Pokrovsk.
Home to one of Ukraine’s last remaining coalmines, both Foreign Policy as well as The Economist, two major pieces of print work in the United Kingdom, have sounded the alarm bells over what the potential loss of the Pokrovsk mine (i.e., ЧАО «Шахтоуправление „Покровское“») might entail.
Foreign Policy stated of the potential loss the following: “The city is the source of most of the coal used for the country’s steel and iron industry.” [9]
“The Russians do not even need to take the mine,” an analyst quoted in the Economist‘s article explained, “to throttle Ukraine’s remaining steel industry.”
“As they advance, [the Russians] will try to cut its power supply and shell the main road that takes its coal west to the remaining steel plants. They will then do the same at another smaller coking-coal mine 18km north of Udachne at Dobropillia,’ the analyst claims. [10]
The authors of these articles, which focused primarily on the losses Metinvest would suffer, did not mention whether the accent in Dnipropetrovsk might change, if the Russians advance beyond Pokrovsk.
[1] – [“Селидово: что это за город и почему он важен для армий Украины и России,” РБК, 10 Октября, 2024]
[2]- [“На Покровському напрямку ворог продовжує спрямовувати сили і засоби для продовження просування до Селидового.” https://t.me/karadag15brop/70]
[3] – [“Ukraine War Map Shows Kyiv Troops ‘Regain Lost Positions’ Near Pokrovsk,” Newsweek, October 14th, 2024]
[4] – [На Покровському напрямку наші захисники відбили 40 ворожих штурмів різної інтенсивності в районах населених пунктів Миролюбівка, Промінь, Мирноград, Лисівка, Селидове, Гродівка, Новотроїцьке та Новопавлівка. https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/1392]
[5] – [“FP назвала риск для экономики Украины в случае потери Покровска,” РБК, 12 Октября, 2024]
[6] – [“The Kremlin is close to crushing Pokrovsk, a vital Ukrainian town,” The Economist, August 22nd, 2024]
[7] – [“Zelensky: No reports of artillery shortages for first time in full-scale war,” Kyiv Independent, May 17th, 2024]
[8] – [Ukraine fires 2 times fewer shells than Russia, reducing gap, Syrskyi says,” Kyiv Independent, September 9th, 2024]
[9] – [“Ukraine Faces a Double Threat if Russia Takes Pokrovsk,” Foreign Policy, October 11th, 2024]
[10] – [“Why Russia is trying to seize a vital Ukrainian coal mine,” The Economist, October 13th, 2024]
