The fall of Vuhledar carries a significance no less profound than the fall of Avdiivka or Bakhmut-Artemovsk. One of Ukraine’s strongest fortified strongholds in the eastern Donbas, Vuhledar is one of the most hotly contested bulwarks against Russia’s advance on the Donbas to fall. Ukraine can no longer stop:

• Army Group South or Center from advancing towards the Dnipro.[2]
• Army Group South or Center from the coalescing on a single point before an advance on the Dnipro.
• Army Group South or Center from having to defend a Ukrainian counterattack through Vuhledar towards the Sea of Azov or Mariupol.
• Army Group South or Center from controlling the major ground lines of communication to the neighboring Ukrainian villages.
• Army Group South or Center from focusing its combined efforts on Pokrovsk, which is the last Ukrainian fortification before the Dnipro.[2]
• Ukraine’s military has lost the ability to disrupt a flanking maneuver under the Kourakhove (i.e., Курахово).[1]
• Ukraine’s military no longer within artillery range of the annexed regions.[1]
• Ukraine’s military is no longer capable of inducing the Russian armed forces to engage in ‘mass frontal attacks’ (i.e., “к осуществлению лобового штурма” или “штурмовать Угледар «в лоб» “), as is clear here[1], [2], [5], [6] but also elsewhere (i.e., Selydove)[3], in so much as Russia has changed the way it attacks so as “to bypass enemy centers of resistance” [4] in an immediate application of the lessons it learned from the initial phases of Ukraine’s defeated Kursk operation and its ephemeral storm capabilities during that operation.
• The fall of Vuhledar, which is now called Ugledar, comes now as a third demonstration of Ukraine’s inability to hold back the Russians in the Donbas.
• It has been predicted that Russia’s next, most immediate target in the Vuhledar direction is Novoukrainka and Bohoiavlenka, for a direct attack on which there is no reason; the Russians do not need to attack Novoukrainka and Bohoiavlenka directly, since Ukrainians in these two villages are in the same position as those between Nevelske and Vovcha.[7] Under the new Russian storm doctrine, the Russians will bypass those centers of resistance to encircle both on the flanks after control over over the N15 is established on or around Kourakhove, exploiting the Kourakhove resevoir as a natural barrier.[1] The author of an article on the fall of Ugledar suggests this scenario: “Конечно, у противника еще осталась вторая линия обороны, но теперь выход к таким селам, как Новоукраинка, Богоявленка, Екатериновка и Елизаветовка, для нас будет значительно облегчен. Войска будут активно прощупывать степень их защиты. В перспективе также открываются возможности для начала атаки на Курахово с юга».”[1]
• The next target for Russia in the Vuhledar direction is Blahodatne, the nameless village the Ukrainians captured during the failed 2023 ‘Spring’ counteroffensive on Tokmak.

The fall of Vuhledar is one of the major, years long, bloody, hard-fought, armored, drone specific battles in the Ukrainian war. Although less significant than the fall of Avdiivka or Bakhmut-Artemovsk (during which the battle of Vuhledar reached an extremely high point for Ukraine’s defense[11], [12], [13], [14]), the outcome at the battle of Vuhledar sets Ukraine’s ability to defend the Donbas back ever further than any point since Avdiivka or Bakhmut-Artemovsk. It represents a major turning point in the Ukraine war.

References

[1] – [“Потеря Угледара заставит ВСУ забыть про обстрелы Донецка,” Взгляд, 1 октября 2024] ~ “Военкоры сообщают о взятии Угледара. По их данным, противник покинул большую часть территории города. Эксперты отмечают, что быстрое освобождение города стало возможным благодаря качественной подготовке российских войск к штурму.”

[2] – [“«Дальше — степь до Днепра». Российская армия освобождает Угледар,” Regnum, 26 сентября 2024]

[3] – [MilitarySummary: 1841111984567153105] ~ “Russian Armed Forces are Taking Selidovo in Pinzers. On southern Flank, Russian armed Forces entered Tsukurine. On Northern Flank, Russian armed Forces captured additional positions.”

[4] – [ADA528264, pg. 34, 35, 54, 115, 174, 178]

[5] – [“Не штурмовать, а «душить». Российская армия выдавливает ВСУ из Донбасса,” Regnum, 23 сентября 2024]

[6] – [“Кольцо для ВСУ сжимается. Российская армия подошла к Покровску и Угледару,” Regnum, 16 сентября 2024]

[7] – [“Якщо це стабілізація, то я балерина“: військовий заявив, що час вивести бригади без втрат із зашморгу між Невельське і Вовчою втрачено.”]

[8] – [“Ukraine’s east buckling under improved Russian tactics, superior firepower,” Washington Post, October 2nd, 2024] ~ updated ~ on 10/2/24, 10/3/24 with quote confirming author’s analysis ~ “Enemy troops are storming the battlefields in small teams that minimize detection and make return fire difficult, backed by superior quantities of artillery and drones.” The WP barely scratches the surface of the fundamental shift in tactics the Russians have implemented recently. It says nothing about the ring (i.e., “кольцо” ) or claws (i.e., “клещи”), advanced training, or Russia’s implementation of its analysis of the lessons learned from Ukraine’s Kursk operation. The word “кольцо” is significant, since DeepState_UA mentioned the city’s encirclement as early as August with the same word in Ukrainian. DeepStateUA wrote: “Останні дні противник активізувався на двох ділянках — західніше Павлівки та біля Водяного. Ціль даної акції зрозуміла — обійти Вугледар і взяти його в кільце, бо кількість невдалих спроб ворога штурмувати у фронт вимірюється вже сотнями разів.” ~  [“The Donbas to Unravels like Tymoshenko’s Braid,” LeftOpposition, September 1st, 2024]

[9] – [“Russia takes strategically important town of Vuhledar in eastern Ukraine,” Financial Times, October 2nd, 2024] ~ updated ~ on 10/2/24 with quote confirming author’s analysis on maneuver ~ “Russia has lost hundreds of thousands of men in eastern Ukraine, according to western intelligence, largely due to the so-called “meatgrinder” tactic it employs for relatively small territorial gains, sending “human waves” towards Ukrainian front lines with little regard for their lives.” -> [“Kremlin’s war in Ukraine ‘a stunning Russian military failure,’ British diplomat says,” Kyiv Independent, September 18th, 2024 ] ~ “At the military level, Ukraine’s effective use of maneuver warfare stands in stark contrast to Russia’s ‘meat grinder’ tactics,” Nicholas Aucott said.” ~ Russia’s flanking is maneuver.

[10] – [“‘We Simply Had Ho One and Nothing Left to Fight With’ — a Representative of the 72nd Brigade Battalion Headquarters on Leaving Vuhledar,” Слідство Инфо, 2 Жовтня 2024] ~ updated ~ on 10/3/24 with quote confirming author’s analysis on maneuver ~ The claim that the article’s author advances is fallacious. The author advances the claim that Ukrainians did not have enough artillery: “Then we had a lot of artillery, shoot if you want, but now we don’t, they have parity in the air due to the larger number of FPV drones.” By “then” the author is referring to the defeat of Russia’s 155th Marine Brigade in February 2023, when the NYT published articles marking the “extremely high point for Ukraine’s defense” of Vuhledar (see above); however, Zelensky himself announced in May how there were no reports of “artillery shortages for the first time in full-scale war,” as published in the Kyiv Independent. ~ [Zelensky: No Reports of artillery shortages for first time in full-scale war, Kyiv Independent, May 17th, 2024] There do not appear to be reports of artillery shortages in the Vuhledar direction in the months leading up to the city’s fall (i.e., June, July, August, September) on the social media sites or channels connected to the Ukrainian GUR (i.e., DeepStateUA, Tatarigami_UA, etc…) Hence there is little to no reason to accept this claim and it is fallacious. The author’s admission of Russia’s ‘ flanking attacks that exhausted the defences of the Ukrainian Armed Forces‘ are the ultimate cause of the city’s fall, indicating that the offense, as Clausewitz’ says, later outperformed the defense. Following the collapse of the defeated Kursk operation, Russia restored maneuver and storm and implemented these with lessons learned from the Ukrainians. The flexible and forward leaning Russian general staff have consistently demonstrated their ability to analyze and implement successfully lessons learned from the war and with an astounding rapidity. ~ [“Russia’s Army Learns From Its Mistakes in Ukraine,” WSJ, September 24th, 2024]

[11] – [“In an Epic Battle of Tanks, Russia Was Routed, Repeating Earlier Mistakes,” New York Times, March 1st, 2023]

[12] – [“Moscow’s Military Capabilities Are in Question After Failed Battle for Ukrainian City,” New York Times, February 15th, 2023]

[13] – [“Russia’s losses around Vuhledar renew questions about its ability to sustain a fresh offensive,” New York Times, February 15th, 2023]

[14] – [“Ukrainian Troops Repel Russian Attacks, and Hope Western Arms Turn the Tide,” New York Times, April 27th, 2023]