Differences of opinion within Russia’s ruling elite have begun to emerge with respect to the reporting on the Kursk operation, an operation that has lead immediately to a crisis. In the most right wing quarters of Russia’s ruling elite, there is a concerted effort to bolster the significance of the gains Ukraine’s armed forces have achieved in the Kursk operation in anticipation of their ultimate elimination; one of Russia’s news agency’s, for instance, has sought to portray the struggle over the Kursk as a ‘decisive battle.’
The attempt to portray the Kursk operation as a ‘decisive battle’ is clearly directed at the preservation of the military prestige with which the Chechen forces, whose responsibility is the borderlands, beyond Ukraine’s initial success with its lightening advance to whatever the Chechen military high command is able to reclaim. The attempt to sweep the more 320 square kilometers of Ukraine’s lightening advance under the rug shift the focus of the current crisis away from its causes to predictions about its outcome.
Russia’s RT news agency, for instance, published an article attempt to attribute a significance for the Ukrainian occupied territory in Kursk as a ‘decisive battle,’ when in all reality there is hardly anything more than Ukraine’s ability to hold the Suzdha gas terminal that makes the battle decisive.
In the less right wing aspects of the Russian ruling elite, which are more aligned with Putin’s regime, there is a concerted effort to take advantage of Ukraine’s surprise to emphasize how foolhardy its unrealized or indiscernible military objectives appear to be.
In an article published by Взгляд, for instance, the authors wrote: “Даже спустя неделю после начала атаки ВСУ на Курскую область Запад теряется в догадках—какие цели преследует Киев. Однако западные аналитики сошлись в одном: Зеленскому рано или поздно придется вывести войска из региона.” In terms of the overall response to the “guessing” from that particular faction, the Putin regime has decided on a new course: the appointment of the head of the FSB, Bortinikov, to lead the overall strategy for the opposition to the Kursk operation is a reflection of the Putin regime’s distrust for the mistakes Russia’s military leaders have displayed at the borderlands. Such is what has been reported in the Moscow Times.
The appearance of the FSB in the planning, implementation, or execution of military strategy is a long time coming now. The FSB, as reported by the Hebrew language daily, תיק דבקה, has been engaged in a protracted struggle with Russia’s brass over mistakes, errors, or ill-fated decisions since the beginning of the Special Military Operation. With the appearance of Bortinikov at the head of the Kursk operation, the FSB is beginning to overthrow the Russian military elite. While Bortinikov’s appearance is limited to the Kursk operation, which comes down like the battle for the Antonov airport or the surprise operation during Ukraine’s counteroffensive in 2022 in Kharkov, the FSB’s assumption of leadership over the operation is a first.
The fact that the FSB has not taken over the more than six fronts for the North, South, Center, or West army groups advancing in the eastern Donbas indicates that the crisis is localized to the Kursk region. Should any of these fronts, however, become like the ones in Kursk, there is a real possibility that the new course may be applied to the leadership on those fronts. The situation, for instance, with Ivan Popov from the 58th Combined Arms Army is a case in point.
Against the backdrop of Russia’s response, Belarus has begun to mobilize its military towards the Ukrainian border. While the Ukrainians have dismissed Belarusian armor as lacking the protection or electronic warfare required to survive on the Ostflanke against the looming threat of Ukraine’s drones, the Ukrainians have not addressed one of the reports on the Hebrew language daily, תיק דבקה, that described Belarusian helicopters equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. The story has not received any press in the Western media outlets, news agencies, or newspapers.
While Belarus mobilizes, the Russians under the command of the Chechens has not yet been able to achieve a major strategic breakthrough with respect to Ukraine’s current lines of defense. The Russians have stopped the Ukrainian advances. Intense fighting appears to be occurring all along the front. The fighting, however, appears to be sporadic. In at least one comment, the Russian blogger, @rybar_force, felt the need to address the lack of coordination between the different Russian elements converging on Ukrainian fronts in regards to the Kursk incursion. The lack of coordination underscores the overall lack of preparation the Kursk crisis has revealed within Russia’s ranks. [1]
Ukrainians have continued their hold over Suzhda, the geopolitically strategic military object of the Kursk operation. There are reports that the neighborhoods in the east are witnessing heavy fighting, Ukrainians continue to hold the western neighborhoods. The Ukrainians are entrenching, fortifying, or supplying existing troops with drones, which have played a major role both for FPV strikes as well as mining. Ukraine’s drone mining is key, since the Russians exploited the utilization of mining during Ukraine’s ‘Spring’ counteroffensive to Kyiv’s detriment.
Amidst Ukraine’s continued hold over Suzhda, details of Ukraine’s 116th Khorne Group’s annihilation of a Russian column in Rylsk have begun to emerge. These details. It is alleged that Ukrainians deployed MLRS rockets such as HIMARS to attack more than 13 Russian transport vehicles in Rylsk. Thirteen tented military Urals and KAMAZ trucks with infantry. It appears as though an entire battalion with three to four companies died as a result of the attack.
By some estimates, more than 490 Russian soldiers died. If so, the Rylsk column attack is comparable only to the attack on January 1st, 2023 when Ukraine attack a Russian military base, eliminating its entire staff headquarters with all of its personnel. At the time the New Year’s Eve strike resulted in the death of between 60 and 400 Russian conscript troops. The comparably great loss of life for Russia underscores the severity of the Kursk crisis.
An article published in Al-Arabiya claims that Kyiv’s aims is the following: “كما كشف أن التوغل الأوكراني يهدف إلى “تشتيت” القوات الروسية و”زعزعة الوضع في الداخل الروسي”، حسب ما نقلت فرانس برس.” The incursion, however, does not appear to have had an impact on the overall situation in the war, as the severity of the Kursk crisis proceeds without a direct influence on the fronts in the Donbas. Russian military bloggers continue to outline Russian advances in nearly all of the directions of Russia’s more than five axes of advance.
Even Ukrainian bloggers such as @DeepStateUA, for instance, confirm Russian advances in the Donbas. One of the accounts repeating @DeepStateUA’s announcements, for instance, recently wrote: “Ворог просунувся біля Пантелеймонівки, в Північному, Нью-Йорку та його околицях.” [2] These confirmed advances indicate that the Kursk crisis is localized to the Kursk region for the time being. If and when the Kursk crisis begins to influence Russia’s Donbas advances remains to be seen.
[1] – [@rybar_force: status/1822639472779141451]
[2] – [@hochu_dodomu: status/1822828627412545538]