Synkivka (Ukrainian: Синьківка) has become Sin’kovka (Russian: Синьковка) again. The fall of Synkivka, which is located in the Kharkiv region in the so-called Kupiyansk direction, is a significant moment in the Russia’s advance along its six axes of attack.
Synkivka is one of the villages upon which Russia cast its glances as the sun set on Bakhmut-Artemovsk. Alongside Vuhledar, Chasiv Yar, and Avdiivka, Synkivka’s fall is one of the many ultimately minor strongholds holding the Russians back from total control over the last remaining citadels whose fall provokes the collapses of an entire direction altogether. The last remaining stronghold after Synkivka is the Kupiyansk citadel. Should the Kupiyansk citadel fall, Russians would be able to declare the 2024 Winter offensive along that axis a victory and it would bring the Russians closer to the Dnipro and provide a basis for firmer control over the Kharkiv region in general.
The battle over Synkivka is almost as long as the Ukraine war itself. In as early as August last year, Sky News Arabic noted how Ukraine’s military spokesman, Andriy Kovalyov, attributed defeat to one of Russia’s counter attacks near Synkivka, indicating that fighting has been ongoing for a long time now. He stated: وتابع [كوفاليوف]: “نفذ العدو عمليات هجومية فاشلة في منطقة سينكيفكا في منطقة خاركيف وبودانيفكا في دونيتسك، تدور معارك عنيفة هناك”. Kovalyov added: وأضاف: “تواصل القوات الدفاعية الأوكرانية تنفيذ عمليات هجومية جنوبي باخموت“. []
A few days later, Russia’s Crimean station for the Russian Information News Agency published an article entitled: Боевики ВСУ покинули харьковскую Синьковку под Купянском.[] It stated: “Возле села Синьковка Харьковской области в шести километрах от Купянска продолжаются бои, но украинские подразделения уже покинули данный населенный пункт.”
However, the article claimed that Ukrainian soldiers fled from the village, although these accounts appear to be more situational than definitive, as the language of the article indicates Russians were alongside rather than inside the village. It is also clear that the Ukrainians had not yet left the village at that time.
The head of Russian controlled Kharkiv’s administration, Vitaly Ganchev, stated the following: “российские войска с каждым днем на один-два километра “продавливают” украинскую оборону в сторону Купянска.” At the time the Russia’s advance was likely a ‘grinding’ advance, as the New York Times frequently describes.
In addition, the article stated: “ВСУ пытаются подтянуть резервы на это направление, но авиация и артиллерия ВС России не дает провести ротацию и уничтожает подкрепление на подходе к линии боестолкновения.” This is likely true too, as Ukrainians are able to stop Russian advances with reserves and FPV drones, as Russians are able to pound operational headquarters and prevent rotations with reconnaissance, artillery, and aviation.
Towards the beginning of the New Year 2024, Ukraine continued its counterattacks and on at least a few occasions stopped the Russians from advancing deeper into Synkivka. These failures provided the basis for widespread reporting on Russia’s lack of progress in the village.
One article, which stands out for its quality of reporting, is from the Wall Street Journal. It is one of the rarer articles, since the editorial board at the newspaper heavily censors creative thought, if even pro-NATO or pro-Ukrainian. Published originally on January 29th under the title “This Ambush Shows How Ukraine Is Holding the Line,” the article received a full half a square on the newspaper’s last page on January 30th, where the otherwise more intelligent reporting is buried. It’s title on the newspaper’s last page was “Well-Laid Defenses Bolster Ukraine in War.”
One of the key assertions that the author made is implicit. The author stated: “But after successfully thwarting Kyiv’s counteroffensive over the summer, Russia is struggling to overcome many of the same obstacles that prevented Ukrainian forces from gaining significant ground.” The author implies that the Ukrainians sought to turn the tables on the Russians, utilizing the most salient elements of the Surovikin lines to thwart Russia’s advance just as Russia had thwarted Kyiv’s advance during its much celebrated ‘Spring’ counteroffensive in 2023.
The author details these elements: “Dense minefields funnel advancing troops into enemy crosshairs. The proliferation of surveillance drones has made attempts to breach enemy lines near impossible. On a battlefield where everything is visible, an attacker can’t catch his enemy off guard, while tanks and other armored vehicles become easy targets.”
Although these elements were neither the first nor the last most salient aspects of the Surovikin lines ( the likes of which shall be a part of Russia’s history for as many year as have been Peter the Great’s redoubts ), these elements were, nonetheless, a part of the Surovikin lines.
Since they were fully integrated into Ukraine’s defense of Synkivka, the Ukrainian lessons learned from Russia’s defense’s against the ‘Spring’ counteroffensive have now become one of the booty the Russians have sacked together with the village. The fall of Synkivka necessitates the conclusion that Russia has overcome Ukraine’s implementation of the lessons its learned from Russia. The fact that Russia has overcome these Ukrainian lessors of war in Synkivka is a major significant development. The Russians have surmounted Surovikin style Ukrainian minefields, surveillance drones or otherwise in the fall of Synkivka.
There is, however, another more significant reason to take pause in the analysis of Russia’s advance in Synkivka. One of the major political influences at the time of the article’s publication focused on an effort to level the artillery playing field. The article at that time mentions how “Ukrainian forces are largely holding the line, even as their enemy enjoys a growing advantage in artillery.” The article cites an earlier published article from the Wall Street Journal, featuring ten charts, one of which sought to portray Russia’s ‘growing artillery advantage’ by way of the number of shots fired rather than the complex dynamics related to barrels, storage, production, or shell production.
Despite these shortcomings, the point is well taken. At the time of publication, many claimed a major artillery advantage in favor of the Russians, even the well known Hebrew language daily, whose website anti-Constitutional activists have silenced, תיק דבקה, claimed one in numerous articles. The Western aid packages intended for Ukraine, as well as reports from the Kyiv Independent on Zelensky’s confirmed assessments of artillery, subsequently leveled the playing field as early as the middle of 2024.
A recent report by German Aid to Ukraine, for instance, indicates that the number of artillery shells Ukraine received as a German aid increased substantially ahead of the fall of Sinkivka. In December, Ukraine received 13, 980 shells; in January, Ukraine received, 10, 120; in February, Ukraine received 17, 990, in March, Ukraine received 4, 000 shells, in April, Ukraine received 13, 500, in May, Ukraine received 8, 500 shells; in June, Ukraine received 71, 000.
It stands to reason therefore that the fall of Synkivka cannot be attributed to the reason Russians enjoyed an advantage of Ukrainians at the time when “Ukrainian forces [were] largely holding the line.” The artillery differentiation, which is now a far more complex process than at the time of the article’s publication, cannot be the decisive factor that tipped the balance of power in favor of Russia over Ukraine, as mentioned earlier.
What is even more ominous for Ukraine is that as the number of artillery shells increased, Ukraine’s rate of territorial losses has only continued. Ukraine’s loss of Sinkivka at a time when Ukraine began to receive more shells than any previous time from Germany indicates that even when Ukraine receives military kit, Ukraine is incapable of preventing the Russians from advancing. Sinkivka proves the futility of supplying Western weapons to Ukraine to stall Russian advances. It just doesn’t happen.
However, a more stunning appropriation of the fall’s outcome must be made. The more deeply embedded nature of the Ukrainian armed forces as a U.S.-led NATO proxy force dependent upon the margins of donations from foreign defense budgets has caused irreversible misalignment. Through almost no fault of their own, the Ukrainians have not been able to align military doctrine with force structure.
It is inconceivable to imagine a situation in which Ukrainian commanders are required to launch counteroffensives against the Russians without a clear idea about which vehicles will be readied, how much armor is available or the rate of production for shells Ukraine does not produce. It is almost madness. This is apparent throughout the lines in the north where commander after commander has extolled the virtues of courage and bravery and said that the troops have done everything imaginable and then some. The cause of Ukraine’s collapse in Synkivka is therefore not Ukraine but NATO. NATO’s inability to coordinate the procurement of heavy weapons, vehicles, armor or shells from the various aspects of its defense industrial base has never allowed for Ukrainians to combine its military doctrine with a coherent force structure, leading to Ukraine’s losses in eastern Donetsk.
Last but not least the Synkivka article from the Wall Street Journal is important for its clearly delineated consequences for Synkivka’s fall. The author writes: “His battalion has been fending off daily attacks like this one since Russian forces went on the offensive last fall. So far, they have made little progress toward their aim of seizing Synkivka, which would put them closer to the city of Kupyansk.”
[] – [القتال يحتدم.. أوكرانيا تعزز تقدمها في هذه الجبهة, 17 أغسطس 2023]
[] – [“Боевики ВСУ покинули харьковскую Синьковку под Купянском,” РИА НОВОСТИ КРЫМ, 21.08.2023]
[2d] – [“Well-Laid Defenses Bolster, Ukraine in War,” Wall Street Journal, January 30th, 2024]
[] – [“Here’s How the Russian and Ukrainian War Efforts Compare, in 10 Charts,” WSJ, January 6th, 2024]
[] – [“Армия России громит противника: за сутки ВСУ потеряли почти тысячу солдат,” РИА НОВОСТИ КРЫМ, 11.10.2023]
[] – [“Армия России отразила 18 атак ВСУ на четырех направлениях
Минобороны: ВС РФ отразили 18 атак украинских подразделений на четырех направлениях,” РИА НОВОСТИ КРЫМ, 30.08.2023]
[] – [“14 безуспешных атак и сотни убитых: хроника “контрнаступу” ВСУ за сутки,” РИА НОВОСТИ КРЫМ, 22.08.2023]