In an examination of the body of work produced under the title of one of Russia’s most famous newspapers, «Военно-Промышленный Курьер», only a few articles appeared to addresses Russia’s pre-war production of Ka-52 “Alligators.” wrote an article about ‘New Alligators.’
The examination took into account articles written from the period of time immediately before Russia’s invasion of the Crimean peninsula to the present year of its full-scale invasion. In the edition marked for March 25th – 31st, 2015, number 11(577), one of the articles is entitled: Новые «Аллигаторы» Поступают Ежеквартально. The article details how the Ministry of Defense received no less than 16 Alligators in 2015 with more than 116 scheduled for delivery before 2020.[1]
| Source on Russian Batch of Ka-52 Alligators | Date | Number? |
| No known sources as of the date of publication. | 2014 | ≈ 15 |
| [1] | 2015 | 16 |
| [1] | 2016 | 5/146 |
| [1] | 2017 | 5/146 |
| [1] | 2018 | 5/146 |
| [1] | 2019 | 5/146 |
| [1] | 2020 | 5/146 |
| [2] | 2021 | ≈ 15 |
| [2], [3] | 2022 | 15 |
| [3] | 2023 | 15/«десятки» |
| No known sources as of the date of publication. | 2024 | ≈ 15 |
According to an article published by Russia’s News Information Agency, the so-called «этапность», or, rather, rate of production is allegedly 15 “Alligators” a year.[1] The data appear to indicate that right before Russia’s full scale invasion, production shifted from Ka-52s to the newly modernized version, Ka-52M from 2021 onward. Based on the data presented in «Военно-Промышленный Курьер» as well as in the most recent articles published in various Russian news outlets, Russia’s production of Ka-52 “Alligators” appears to proceed at the same rate of production as during the pre-war years prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion.
The rates of production prior to 2014 appear to have provided Russia with the ability to expand its military. In «Военно-Промышленный Курьер», an article from 2017, for instance, indicates that Russia’s rates of production before 2014 have allowed the country to create a new aviation division.
Entitled, “Крепость Крым,” the article states: “Темпы выпуска в России новых самолетов и вертолетов позволили за лето-осень 2014 годв сформировать новую 27-ю смешанную авиадивизию. Она стоит из трех авиаполков: 37-го смешанного (по эскадрилье штурмовиков Су – 27СМ и бомбардировщиков Су-24М), 38-го истребительного (две эскадрилье, одна из которых С-27СМ3) и 39-го вертолетного (по эскадрилье Ка-52, Ми-8, и Ми-28). 37-й полк базируется в Гвардейском, 38-й – в Бельбеке, 39-й – Джанкое. Аналогов такой дивизии в составе ВКС России нет. Особо стоит отметить, что части формировать на основе эскадрилий истребителей Су-27СМ3 из состава 22-го гвиап (Владивосток), бомбардировщиков Су-24М из 559-го бап (Морозовск), штурмовиков Су-25СМ из 960-го шап (Приморск-Ахтарск) и Ка-52 из Кореновского 55-го ветролетного полка.”[1b]
Although many of the OSINT analysts from operation Raven have tracked materials such as the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian artillery, the expansion or contraction of Russia’s various divisions are largely undocumented, even though these processes are a significant indicator for the health and fitness of the Russian military.
While Sergey Shoigu, Russia’s Minister of Defense, at the time, announced the formation of announcement of the formation of 14 new divisions together with 16 brigades for Russia’s army, the actual details of their formulation have yet to be discussed widely. It is unclear whether Russia’s current tempo and rates of production for helicopters and perhaps aircraft have allowed the country to continue the expansion of its aviational divisions and overall air forces and whether, like Russia’s army, new aviational divisions have been formed, are being organized, or will be planned, as the actual details of their formulation.
Russia’s Coorelation of Forces on a Precipice
It does not appear as though Ukraine or any of the countries from whose defense budgets Ukraine receives a meager percentage that helicopter production continues. In fact, Ukraine continues to lose helicopters at an alarming rate. Since these losses are largely irreplaceable, Ukraine’s coorelation of forces appears to fall short of Russia’s, especially with respect to its fleet of Russian made helicopters.
Despite Ukraine’s vast array of Soviet factories, Ukraine’s defense industrial base has refused to reinitiate the construction of aircraft crucial for its defense. None of the NATO countries currently supporting Ukraine have built new Russian helicopters for Ukraine, even though many have donated used, partial, or whole helicopters.
NATO, which has not discussed the delivery of non-Russian helicopters to Ukraine, does not appear to produce many of its models of helicopter at a rate sufficient to compete with Russia’s. The United States, which has provided no more than an insignificant number of Black Hawk helicopters to Ukraine’s domestic intelligence agencies, does not appear to be producing helicopters at all, let alone Black Hawks. The delivery of non-Russian helicopters does not appear to proceed at a rate commensurate with Ukrainian losses.
Does Russia’s steady rate of helicopter production entail by necessity that its coorelation of forces is on a precipice to exceed that of NATO? It could be. Production, however, is only part of Russia’s Ka-52 and Ka-52M fleet. The exact number of helicopters remaining in Russia’s air force is unclear.
Ukraine’s Target Data on Ka-52 and Ka-52M
Ukraine’s target data on Ka-52 and Ka-52M helicopters is sparse. If there is data, the data generally does not distinguish a Ka-52 from a Ka-52M. Ukrainian bloggers from one of the most widely read Ukrainian news agencies detailed the destruction of Ka-52 helicopters. The Ukrainian news agency, Уніан, for instance, published two articles in Ukrainian detailing attacks on Russian airfields in the annexed territories of Ukraine’s former Бердянська т Луганьска. [4], [5] These reports, however, made sweeping conclusions, arguing that the attacks with ATACMS caused Russia’s Ka-52 fleet to sufffer so many losses as to become combat ineffective. These reports do not align, however, with the majority of the Ukrainian or pro-NATO war bloggers’ data on Russia’s Ka-52 fleet.
While the Ukrainian bloggers appear to have enumerated a high number of these losses, the most geolocated data on destroyed Ka-52 helicopters indicates that fewer there are fewer than 30. Ukraine’s @DeepStateUA, whose reports are quoted in the famous Saudi Arabian news agencies, AlArabiya and AlHadath, lists no more than 22 references to Ka-52 helicopters in its Telegram channel in a survey dating from February 13th, 2022 to July 23rd, 2023. The references, which contain a wide range of data on Ka-52 helicopters, are one among a number of sources.
Ukraine’s own air forces only list a number of “знищено” helicopters on its official channels. The Ukrainian blogger, генерал-лейтенанта Миколи Олещука, who runs a Ukrainian telegram channel described as “Офіційний Телеграм-канал командувача Повітряних Сил Збройних Сил України,” lists no more than three entries from June 20th, 2023 to August 17th, 2023. These entries are for: 1) June 19th, 2023 where Ukraine’s attack destroyed no more than one ударний вертоліт Ка-52, 2) August 14th, 2023 where Ukraine’s attack destroyed no more than one ударний вертоліт Ка-52, 3) August 17th, 2023 where Ukraine’s attack destroyed no more than one ударний вертоліт Ка-52. These attacks are likely a result of an escalated response to Ukraine’s confrontation with the Ka-52s during Ukraine’s ill-fated ‘Summer’ counteroffensive in 2023.
Last but not least is a series of tweets produced by one of the more industrious OSINT specialists, specializing in the analysis of satellite imagery. Shortly before analyzing Russian warehouses became a fashionable trend among war bloggers following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the author produced a series of tweets analyzing the warehouses Russia used for storing Ka-52 “Alligators.”
| Base | Number of Ka-52s |
| Taganrog | 4 |
| Buturlinovka | 5-7 |
| Zernograd | 8-10 |
| Revenki | 3 |
| Kirovske | 6 |
| Total: 5 Bases | 17-21 |
Tatarigami_UA concludes the following: “In summary, satellite evidence collectively indicates that Russia currently maintains a fleet of at least 25 operational Ka-52 helicopters with the actual number likely much higher.” Tatarigami_UA makes his conclusion based on an analysis of the satellite imagery from five bases. Since Russia hosts many more bases for its air forces these bases than the five Tatarigami_UA analyzed, there is no reason to doubt Tatarigami_UA’s conclusion. Absent the analysis of more airbases, little to no clearly agreeable consensus on the exact number of Ka-52s in Russia’s fleet may be ascertained. [6]
Based on the paucity of data from these four sources, the number of destroyed Ka-52 helicopters is difficult to ascertain in detail. If Russia’s Defense Industrial Base managed to delivery the more than 146 alligators promised to its Ministry of Defense in 2015, Russia’s helicopter fleet of Ka-52 “Alligators” remains in tact, operating at an extremely high level or, according to pre-war levels, at the very least. It is unlikely that Ukraine’s ability to strike Russia’s helicopter fleet caused a significant degradation in its ability to dispatch Ka-52 helicopters to the fronts. The most recent reports on Ka-52s indicate that Russia’s armed forces have dispatched the helicopters to support its northern most fronts in the Kharkiv offensive.
3 – 5 a Quarter: What Russia Produces, Ukraine May Destroy
While these numbers appear to provide a reasonable basis upon which to assume Russia’s armed forces have not witnessed a significant degradation in their fleet of Ka-52 helicopters at the present moment, the Financial Times has reported that Israel, which previously avoided the delivery of weaponry to Ukraine, decided to deliver more than eight of its Patriot anti-air defense systems to Ukraine. Should these systems be fully integrated into Ukraine’s air defenses, there is a high likelihood that Russia may witness a greater loss in the number of destroyed helicopters than in any previous period of time during the war.
Should Ukraine succeed with the destruction of more than three to five Ka-52 helicopters per quarter, Ukraine’s destructive capability may overwhelm the precipice upon which Russia’s DIB currently produces Ka-52 alligators. With Ukraine’s Повітряні Силі engaged in improvements to its air defenses, the daily notices Ukraine posts on destroyed aircraft may be witness to an increased number of destroyed Ka-52 alligators, especially in the northernmost fronts (which are located the closest to the agglomeration of anti-air defense systems Kyiv maintains throughout the capital’s region).
References
[1] – [«Военно-Промышленный Курьер», “Новые «Аллигаторы» Поступают Ежеквартально.” 25-31 марта, 2015 года, № 11 (577)]
[1b] – [«Военно-Промышленный Курьер», “Крепость Крым,” 22-28 марта 2017 года № 11 (675)]
[2] – [“Источник: 15 новейших Ка-52М поступят на вооружение в следующем году,” РИА, 11.29.21]
[3] – [“Первые новейшие вертолеты Ка-52М поступили на вооружение российской армии,” Лента, 01.04.2023]
[4] – [Удари “ATACMS” по аеродромах в Бердянську т Луганьску: підраховано втрати Росії. Уніан, 10.22.2023]
[5] – [Ананлітики порахували, скільки ударних ветрольотів Ка-52 залишилось у Росіі. Уніан, 18.11.2023]
[6] – [X: @Tatarigami_UA: “1725628555285893436”]