The American news agency, Axios, published a brief, succinct, straightforward article on the Red Sea. In the article, the author argues how U.S. and allied “firepower has failed to stem [attacks on] the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.” Axios added that the “Iranian regime [is] eager to arm its proxies” such as the Houthis.
The article is one of the shortest articles on the Red Sea. The Arabic press, however, highlighted the article up, posting multiple summaries on social media websites. The two prominent Saudi news agencies, Al-Hadath and Al-Arabiya for instance, published no less than two separate summaries on Twitter. These emphasized the main points the article addressed. Due to the extraordinary attention the article in Axios received in Saudi Arabia, the article merits further discussion.
The article claims ‘firepower’ is at fault. The article does not advance any evidence to support the claim that ‘firepower’ is responsible for the current situation on the Red Sea. It is important to note that Operation Prosperity Guardian ended in a ‘strategic defeat.’ Although it is unclear exactly what is meant by ‘firepower,’ the decision to deploy American, British or French aircraft for strikes in Operation Prosperity Guardian, about which the author makes no mention, is a strategic decision about which firepower is the most appropriate. It is unclear why the decision to deploy aircraft is not the subject of evaluation in the article.
However, the ‘firepower’ is less significant than the strategic decision about which ‘firepower’ the coalition in Operation Prosperity Guardian used. Why did the coalition seek to strike targets in Yemen? Which targets were struck? Why did these struck targets fail to effectuate a change of state on the Red Sea? In light of the failure to effectuate a change of state on the Red Sea, why did the coalition refuse to change its strategy. These are critical questions that the article does not address.
It is clear that the Houthis have triumphed on the Red Sea. 1) The Houthis prevented the coalition from establishing surveillance with drones. The Houthis, for instance, shot down more than five American drones designed for surveillance. 2) None of the more than $1 billion dollars in munitions the article Axios published compelled the Houthis to stop attacks on the Red Sea. The Houthis, for instance, have attacked so many vessels so often over the course of the past few months that extent chronologies of Houthi attacks are still incomplete or non-existent. 3) The Houthis have completely disrupted the global shipping lanes on the Red Sea. The data is manifold. Shipping is much more expensive now than before November. The cost of insurance has risen substantially. Axios, for instance, states: “Insurance premiums for transits rose to 1% of a ship’s total value in the same timeframe.” To avoid the Red Sea, the distance, time, or cost for fuel has risen substantially. The “alternative routes around Africa tack on 11,000 nautical miles, two weeks of travel, $1 million in fuel.”
These three aspects of Houthi power on the Red Sea establish that the strategy for Operation Prosperity Guardian failed to achieve any of its goals. It did not prevent any of the processes in 1), 2) or 3) from happening. None of the ‘firepower’ the coalition sought to advance had any effect on any of these processes. Since Operation Prosperity Guardian failed to achieve any of its goals, the operation cannot be described as anything but a ‘strategic defeat.’
Within the span of a few months, the Houthis have established military supremacy on the Red Seas, preventing foreign military powers from navigating its waters, docking at ports, or sailing freely. The Houthis have become a determinant factor for deciding the freedom of navigation on the Red Sea, indicating that for the first time in the history of the post World War II the United States could not guarantee its order for the collapsed Ottoman Empire its mere presence guaranteed for decades.
Although the United States is aware of its strategic decisions for ‘firepower’ on the Black Sea or the South Chinese Seas, the United States persuaded the coalition to adopt a failed strategy. It is the failed strategy that has led to the current changes in the relations of power on the Red Sea. The United States can no longer rely on its presence alone to persuade competing nation states to accepts its projection of power.
