The Wall Street Journal recently published an article detailing how Ukrainians are attempting to stall Russian progress on its more than five axes of advance in eastern Ukraine. Entitled, “Russia Steps Up Attacks Along Front Lines,” the article is the first to mention the Ukrainian General Staff’s decision to focus its primary challenge to the Russian advances on the city of Pokrovsk. The Journal quotes Ukrainian Prime Minister, Denys Shmyhal, as “[hoping] a line of defense toward the city of Pokrovsk to the west is sufficiently developed to withstand an expected Russian assault in the coming weeks.”
Shmyhal announced on Monday, March 4th, 2024, that “almost 31 billion Hryvnia, or around $800 million, had been allocated for the construction of fortifications.” It appears to be motivated by the lessons that Ukraine learned during its failed ‘Spring’ counteroffensive. The Journal explains that “[when] Ukrainian forces launched their major offensive last summer, they quickly became bogged down in an elaborate network of obstacles Russia had spent months preparing.”
In the Journal‘s description, the ‘elaborate network of obstacles,’ however, only covers Russia’s “main defensive belt,” which was composed of “multilayered trench lines, anti-tank ditches, or concrete blocks with extensive minefields that proved almost impossible to traverse.” The remainder of Russia’s defenses do not appear in the Journal’s description. It appears as though Shmyhal, who is the primary architecture for the emulation of Russia’s Surovikin lines, does not attribute much else to Russia’s ‘elaborate network of obstacles.’
There are three key components to Russia’s ‘elaborate network of obstacles’ that extend far beyond the dragon’s teeth or pill boxes omitted among the stationary installations. The Russia’s enjoyed air superiority over the Surovikin lines, enabling its armed forces to fly support missions nearly within any direction of the actual lines. The Ka-52 alligator, a coaxial helicopter, became famous during its role on the lines. The Mi-28 followed suit. These helicopters enabled Russia to extends it ability to strike far beyond what its vastly differentiated arsenal of artillery or mortars could hit. Secondly, these vastly differentiated pieces of artillery or mortars, the complete list of which includes towed or self-propelled artillery, small, medium or large artillery, MLRS, BMP-21s, or thermo-boric batteries, enabled Russia to update continuously its minefields in real-time or strike advances. The third component became Russia’s ability “to work” these two types of long range strike capabilities against the Surovikin lines.
The latter concept is a concept that is likely to be completely without precedent among the incontestably courageous Ukrainian fighters for two reasons. 1) Ukraine’s limited stock of Western supplied weapons 2) does not permit the country to make predictions on its supply chain for scaling horizontally or vertically in terms of battlefield developments. Ukraine lacks helicopters. Ukraine’s arsenal of long-range strike capabilities is extremely limited. Under these circumstances Ukraine is unlikely to be able “to Surovikinize” its Pokrovsk defense belt in same way Russians brought Ukraine’s ‘Spring’ counteroffensive to a definite terminus.
These circumstances come down to two continuous problems the Ukrainians cannot overcome. The first is that Ukraine’s air inferiority provides Russian with a clear advantage over any or all of its fortifications. Russia’s recent capture of Avdiivka, as noted here on LeftOpposition in an article published as Kharkov Battles: On the Fall of Avdiivka, came about in large part because of Russia’s heavily closed air support. Russia’s decision to graft wing foils onto its FAB bombs of various sizes improved its armed forces’ ability to evade Ukraine’s extremely limited IADS, which is becoming even more limited as the war continues. With these bombs, Russians pounded Ukrainian fortifications in the suburbs of Avdiivka, enabling its ground forces to penetrate deep within decades old fortress Avdiivka.
Ukraine’s extremely limited IADS recently suffered a devastating loss. Russian armed forces targeted, as reported on Russian news agencies, two Patriot missile batteries with its support vehicles. The strike, which Russia conducted with an Iskander missile, destroyed an S-300 system too.
The Journal‘s report confirms the author’s point of view from the article published as Kharkov Battles: On the Fall of Avdiivka. In that article the author noted how Ukraine’s only hope only hope for survival on the battlefield is to immolate Russian defenses in the rear. The emulation, however, is only one-sided with Ukrainians imitating the construction of the stationary aspects of the defensive lines without the ability to emulate its active aspects.
In light of Ukraine’s continuous problems with air inferiority or IADS, Ukraine’s attempt to build a Surovikin line of defense is undoubtedly complicated. There is reason to believe that the Russians will overcome Ukraine’s Surovikin lines in the Pokrovsk defense belt easily for the three aforementioned reasons. The first is that 1) Ukraine suffers from air inferiority. The second is that 2) Ukraine’s lack of IADS with MLRS mines, artillery, Ka-52 or Mi-28 helicopters limits its reach. The third reason is that 3)Ukraine is unable “to work” either one of these aspects to improve its situations on the lines. Accordingly, there is little to no reason to believe that Ukraine’s Pokrovsk Defense Belt is an obstacle that Russians cannot surmount.