Recently published articles on weapons, ships and the waterways that bring them together in epic clashes have pointed to many developments. Chatham House, for instance, published an article on Chinese influence among the Houthis. [1] The article, however, provides little to no evidence to support its claim.
The fact that the Houthis were able to launch long range hypersonic missiles, as per a recent article published by the Washington Post, indicates that the more likely influence for the Houthis may be Russian rather than Chinese. [2] The Ukraine war’s continuation is advancing Russia, China, and Iran into an Eurasian bloc, in which the decision making processes of one or the other may not be easily distinguishable at first glance, complicating attribution on the grand chessboard.
It could very well have been that the three nations decided to implement a reverse engineered ‘Czech approach,’ in which China, Russia or Iran ‘[blur] any direct links’ to a country of origin.[3] Nonetheless, the struggle to find a proximate cause for attribution is one of the themes, highlighting contemporary investigations into the changes of state on the Black, Red, and South Chinese seas.
Israel’s highly conservative daily, First Source, published an interesting article about developments on the water. [4] It addressed the recent announcement that the United States would build a pier off Gaza’s coast. The article described the idea as an example of “gun boat diplomacy,” which can be traced back to World War II. A key claim about the strength of ‘gun boat diplomacy’ is “the most extreme expression of firepower” (i.e., “ביטוי הכי קיצוני של כוח אש רב”), that is, according to the authors, the U.S. aircraft carrier, Ford, whose presence off the coast of Lebanon became persuasive. Given the fact that Hizbollah continues to launch strike after strike against Israel in the north, the claim is completely baseless.
In one of the more well written articles, a staff writer for the Wall Street Journal details in compact sentences filled with details how “Ukraine’s Crimea Campaign” proceeded last year.[5] The Wall Street Journal followed up on that author’s article with a second article hailing how“Naval Victories Reopen Ukraine Export Route.” [6] The article includes a missing piece of information from the first article on the overall outcome of the reopened grain corridor. It states: “Grain exports in December reached 5 million metric tons, more than double September’s total of around 2 million. The increase, if sustained, should add $3.3 billion to exports and 1.2 percentage points to economic growth this year, according to Julia Senyuk, Ukraine’s economy minister.” These two articles are among the most well written, factually based summaries on the first major sea battle of the Ukraine war, if not the 21st century. Nothing the NYT has published has compared.
A recently published article in Time magazine, however, is one of the more ambitious articles in scope, heralding quite rightly a “New Age of Naval Warfare.” [7] It discusses how ‘naval power’ has “come back as a central feature of struggles from the Black Sea to the Red Sea, South China Sea, and Taiwan Straight.”
Although the article from Time does not mention by name the actual struggle, the waterways, seabeds, or commercial seaways are now a part of a major geopolitical struggle between great powers, as mentioned in an article published on January 26th, 2024 on LeftOpposition, many months before these articles began to circulate in the mainstream Western presses. The article from Time does, however, mention how “[naval] power matters today more than ever before.” And this is undoubtedly true.
This can be seen in many more of the most recently published articles. In an article the Wall Street Journal published on March 19th, 2024, for instance, the authors debate the “pebble in the brook,’ an allusion to the ammunition David shot at Goliath with his slingshot.[8] While the article does not detail the ‘heavy’ weapons at stake, the issue appears to be altogether different from weapons or ammunition.
The debate over weapons or ammunition in Taiwan appears to be without a proper basis in a strategic objective. Is the strategic objective to protect the island from a Chinese invasion? Is it to prevent the Chinese from projecting its ‘naval power’ beyond its internationally recognized maritime borders into Taiwan’s? Is it ‘to deter’ Chinese ‘aggression’ against jamming, seabed mining or fisheries? What is the aim of the discussion about weapons or ammunition? The article says nothing more than to mention ‘heavy weapons’ (such as F-16s or M1 Abrams tanks) which the article describes as a foil to ‘asymmetrical warfare’ in place now with light weapons ‘to halt a Chinese amphibious invasion force’ with ‘thousands of small strikes’ on the land, over the sea or in the air. But there is really no discussion of an ‘amphibious invasion force’ at all.
The primary issue facing Taiwan with respect to China is the same as Ukraine with respect to Russia. The fact that the Ukrainians, which combine short, medium or long range strike capabilities together with sea drones, have been able to reopen the Grain Corridor without a navy in the face of Russia’s much stronger, fully developed, multi-dimensional, conventional Navy is a testament to the shift in strategy on the seas. Yemen’s navy, which is composed of small armed boats made of wood, combines identical tactics to repel the American navy coalition Operation Prosperity Guardian. While neither of these navies, American or Russian, appear to have launched a major attack with multiple ships on a land target, the fact that these smaller forces have succeeded in repelling the larger navies indicates that a large navy is a large target.
It is important to note that neither of these forces, Ukrainian or Houthi, have succeeded in more than simply repelling the much larger navy. None of the attacks have resulted in a situation in which the suffering navy could be have been said to have been ‘defeated.’ The coalition navy in the Red Sea, for instance, is not ‘defeated,’ even though the attacks it has launched since December have resulted in little or have little to show for results. The coalition has lost no navy ships but crucially the coalition has not succeeded altogether with its strategic objective. The coalition has on a number of occasions shot down enemy drones or missiles. But the Red Sea remains largely under the control of the Houthis.
The Houthis succeeded in the achievement of their strategic objective. The Houthis stopped Western commercial sea vessels from passing through the Red Sea. With its strategic objective achieved, the Houthis have now expanded their reach to the surrounding seas, declaring recently that the areas of the Gulf of Adan together with the Straight of Hormuz, Iran’s most heavily guarded seaway on the opposite side of Yemen, is now coming or is under their control.
Similarly, the Russian navy’s new position on the Black Sea is challenged. Russia did not succeed in maintaining its control over the seaways subtended by Odesa’s borders on the Black Sea; furthermore, Russia did not succeed with its enforcement against the terminated Grain Deal. The use of English sea drones together with Ukrainian produced Neptune cruise missiles forced the Russians to conclude that the loss of its heavy battle ships in the Black Sea or its anti-air defense systems in Crimea outweigh the perceived or real benefit of continued enforcement against the Grain Corridor. Russia’s navy, which is moved primarily from Crimean ports to ports on the Russian border, is not ‘defeated.’ It is moved to Novorossisk.
Russia’s situation in the Black Sea is slightly different from the American’s on the Red Sea. The American’s on the Red Sea have completely lost control over the waterways. The Russians continue to maintain the seaways subtended by the borders of its annexed territories in Crimea, Kherson or Donetsk. However, the Russians now face the ominous threat that within a short period of time the swing state of Georgia, which on August 26th, 2008 witnessed a war over Southern Ossetia, appears to be swinging towards NATO. If NATO succeeds with the establishment of a naval base in Georgia like the one in Romania, the Russians would face a threat to its continued control over the Black Sea from two directions, in the west from Odesa, in the east from Georgia.
It is likely that the seas subtended by these State’s borders are home to rich, unexplored, deep sea mines. A bill pending in congress is set to address deep sea mines. Entitled “The Responsible Use of Seafloor Resources Act of 2024,” the bill seeks “to provide financial, diplomatic, or other forms of support for seafloor nodule collection, processing or refining” for the ocean’s floor. The Journal states that the “draft bill highlights China’s control over criminal minerals.” [9]
In another article the Journal published on March 17th, 2024, the authors noted how “Mining the ocean floor for minerals often seemed like a fantasy, but U.S. national security concerns could be bringing it closer to reality.”[10] With Georgia’s swing towards NATO, the idea that its seabed may be mined is no longer a fantasy but “on the menu.” With the recent call within the United States for deep sea mining beginning to reach a high point, there is every expectation that the next step in the struggle for control over the geopolitical significant Black Sea is with respect to its raw materials, minerals, or deposits of gas buried deep underwater.
[1] – [“Yes, China pressured Iran on Red Sea attacks—but only to protect its own ships,” Chatham House, February 7th, 2024]
[2] – [“Yemen’s Houthis reported to have a hypersonic missile, possibly raising stakes in Red Sea crisis,” NYT, March 14th, 2024]
[3] – [“Ukraine’s Surprising Supplier,” WSJ, March 18th, 2024]
[4] – [חמדת ימים, מקור הראשון, 03.15.2024]
[5] – [“Ukraine’s Crimea Campaign,” WSJ, March 8th, 2024]
[6] – [“Naval Victories Reopen Ukraine Export Route,” WSJ, March 17th, 2024]
[7] – [“A New Age of Naval Warfare,” Times, March 25th, 2024]
[8] – [“Taiwan Faces Tough Call Over Weapons Choice,” WSJ, March 19th, 2024]
[9] – [“Bill Pushes Mining in Deep Sea to Blunt China,” WSJ, March 13th, 2024]
[10] – [“China Fears Have Put Ocean-Floor Mining on Washington’s Radar,” WSJ, March 17th, 2024]