Geopolitical Struggle
The United States is no longer in a position to do anything but react economically, diplomatically, politically or militarily to the challenges competing nation states are staking as claims against the various aspects of power the United States continues to maintain as a result of its geopolitical standing throughout the world after the end of World War II. These challenges are primarily its ability to manage currency, trade, or military contracts.
There is no doubt that the United States is the dominant political geopolitical power but no longer are the days when the United States’ mere presence could demand compliance with its foreign policy. Its mere presence is no longer enough. It is required to react. In the past the United States could dictate to a certain degree a desired outcome through the imposition of its political will upon smaller, less developed, satellite nations, or, in some cases, large, economically powerful, competing superpowers, as it did with the Soviet Union.
It is clear from the situation in the Ukraine that the United States’ mere presence, for instance, is no longer persuasive. If one couples the United States’ leadership together with NATO, many of whose nations are “preparing for war” with Russia, the coalition’s mere presence has not persuaded Russia to accept its dictates. Germany [1a, 1b], Latvia [2], Scandinavia [3], Great Britain [4], Sweden [5], NATO [6] are all apparently engaged in preparation for war with Russia. Hebrew commentators, of which this one from Israel’s First Source appears to be one of the more objectively minded, are raising alarm over Russia.[7] This is now a period of profound reaction.
But reaction is forming the basis for the evolution of new power relations throughout the world. In the Black Sea, just as in the Red Sea, the United States’ reactions to these challenges is shaping the way that currency, trade, or military contracts are being settled in these areas or with the powers involved in the challenge.
In the Black Sea, for instance, the United States could not but react to the devastating result Russia’s assertion of control over the Sea of Azov empowered the country to wield over the majority of the Black Sea. Russia’s decision to disable the Grain Deal appeared as one of the first naval challenges ever presented to the power the United States seeks to project throughout Eastern Europe and its relevant high seas.
While the United States ultimately managed to alter the course Russia’s decision to disable the Grain Deal, the United States, nonetheless, could not but react. The situation in which the United States found the Ukrainian state after the loss of its “Spring” counteroffensive resulted in a challenge the United States had no choice but to acknowledge economically, diplomatically, politically or militarily. The abysmal failure of the Ukrainian “Spring” counteroffensive fly in the face of the more than $130 billion dollars worth of weapons dispatched for its execution.[8]
This is the fundamental difference differentiating the United States throughout the shifting geopolitical order now. The power relations among nation states are constantly under threat by competing nation states but not since the end of World War II has the United States found itself in a position to do anything but react.
Just in terms of the Black Sea alone, for which the United States had no choice but to react militarily, the Vergeltungswaffe the U.S. led Ukrainian proxy force unleashed resulted in a change of state throughout the Black Sea. In at least two of the leading American newspapers, representing factions within America’s ruling elite, such as in the New York Times or the Journal, the change in state was not immediate but came about from significant effort.
In an article addressing “Ukraine’s Farmers [Scrambling] to Sell Grain,”[8] the Times noted how the Russia’s assaults “demonstrated Russia’s willingness to keep striking Ukraine’s Danube ports, which are just across the river from Romania, a NATO member.” This is despite the fact that “Ukrainian forces intercepted 11 Russian drones attacking the Danube port of Ismail, south of Reni, according to Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command.” This indicates, just for the sake of illustration, the new requirement that the United States may no longer rely upon its presence. The United States had no choice but to react. Russia’s response to the reaction gave way to the new power relations on the Black Sea. The word that the Journal used to described these relations was erosion. [9] Erosion entails the gradual evisceration or degradation of something without any immediate qualitative result.
More or less the same situation appears on the Red Sea. The United States’ decision to build a coalition did nothing to intimidate the Houthi rebels seeking to disrupt the shipping lanes on the Red Sea. Not all of the coalition partners contributed to the war effort, indicating that fewer and fewer willing coalition partners attribute much to the United States’ mere presence. [10]
Within the European Union much debate centered not on whether or not to strike the Houthis but on ultimate control over the attack. In an article published by the Saudi Arabian news media, Al-Arabiya (i.e., “العربية”) entitled, “دبلوماسي أوروبي: أبلغنا إيران أن هجمات الحوثي ستؤدي لتوسيع الحرب,” the authors note how many member nations raised objection to the Washington’s control over the attack. Differences of opinion emerged not only over the planned attack but over its control (i.e., “لكن بعض حلفاء الولايات المتحدة، خاصة الدول الأوروبية، أبدوا تحفظات على الخطة واعترضوا على فكرة أن تكون تحت قيادة واشنطن”).Al-Arabiya is not the only press in the Mideast to comment so. On January 13th, 2024, Maariv (i.e., מעריב ) published an article detailing how the Telegraph, a British daily, exposed the disagreements among the prospective members the United States sought to unite behind its ‘eroded’ ‘naval power’ in the Red Sea. The authors wrote: “According to the Telegraph, a number of countries in Europe refused to join the coalition under the United States’ authority [or] carry out strikes against the Houthis in Yemen. According to the report, these countries avoided signing any agreement supporting attacks against the rebels.” (i.e., “״על פי הטלגרף הבריטי, מספר מדינות באירופה סירבו להצטרף לקואליציה בראשות ארה״ב ולבצע תקיפות נגד החות׳ים בתימן. על פי הדיווח, אותן מדינות אף נמנעו מלחתום על הצהרה התומכת בתקיפות נגד המורדים״”). [11] These events suggest that far more than the mere presence of the United States persuades.
Nevertheless, the attacks on the Houthis have been almost entirely ineffective. The United States achieved little to nothing in the way of a change of state on the Red Sea. It is required now to assert its political will over the Houthis to react with a far greater response than it had in any previous conflict. The United States’ reaction here is the defining moment in the new power relations.
The defining moment is not Russia or Iran. Russia’s involvement in Ukraine started as early as 2014; the attacks on the Red Sea shipping lane have a deep, extremely complicated history, nearly as old as the Sinai Campaign. To say that either one of these states defines the fork in the road, as Friedman writes in his most recent column, misses the fundamental shift already well underway throughout the continuing geopolitical struggle.
[1a] – [Минобороны Германии разработало сценарий возможной войны между НАТО и Россией, ĸоторая может начаться летом 2025 года, сообщает Bild со ссылĸой на доĸумент. Коммерсантъ, 1.12.2024]
[1b] – [Bundeswehr bereitet sich auf Putin-Angriff vor, Bild, 01.16.2024]
[2] – [Минобороны Литвы высказалось о войне с Россией, РИА Новости, 1.17.2024]
[3] – [בסקנדינביה מבועתים: ״הזמן אוזל, צריך להיערך למלחמה מול רוסיה״, מעריב, 1.12.2024]
[4] – [חוששים מעימות ישיר מול רוסיה? בבריטניה מודים: ״הצבא שלנו קטן מדי״, מעריב, 1.24.24]
[5] – [שבדיה נערכת למלחמה אחרי 210 שנה, מעצר דרמטי בארמון הנשיאות בפולין, ידיועת האחרונות , 1.24.24]
[6] – [״יש חלון הזדמנויות״: כך עבר נאט״ו למצב מוכנות למלחמה עם רוסיה, מעריב, 06.13.2023]
[7] – [משקר: הסבירות למלחמה עולמית הולכת, מקור הראשון, 12.31.2023]
[8] – [As Russia Strikes Ports, Ukraine’s Farmers Scramble to Sell Grain, New York Times, August 3rd, 2023]
[9] – [Kyiv Erodes Moscow’s Naval Edge, Wall Street Journal, September 21st, 2023]
[10] – [دبلوماسي أوروبي: أبلغنا إيران أن هجمات الحوثي ستؤدي لتوسيع الحرب، العربية، ١.٢٥.٢٤]
[11] – [חוששות מאיראן? המדינה היארופיות שסירבו לתקוף את החות׳ים, מעריב, 1.13.2024]