The mortally debouched defense of Bakhmut, one of the greatest expositions of Ukraine’s waning military powers, is an indictment of his regime’s catastrophic failure on the battlefield. The Institute for the Study of War, for instance, recently sought to bolster Bakhmut’s defense with blatantly cynical remarks and lies.
In at least one of its Russian campaign assessments, published on April 5th, 2023, the ISW, following coverage of Zelensky’s appearance at a press conference in Poland, with which Ukraine shares a long border key for the United States’ continued logistical support of his regime, stated: “Ukrainian military command will order a withdrawal from Bakhmut when and if they deem a withdrawal to be the most strategically appropriate action.”
With less than 2.36 square kilometers of Bakhmut left within the hands of Ukrainian armed forces, the cynicism of such claims are belied by the fact that the territory from which Ukrainian armed forces may withdraw, “when and if they deem” so, is now so minuscule as to be entirely negligible.
Despite the fact that Bakhmut’s imminent fall is a forgone conclusion, newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal, whose editors propagandize false hopes such as the effect of a positive attitude, a PappaJohn attitude, on the outcome of products in startups, continues to cheerlead Ukrainians as indefatigable champions, as though they were CEOs in a venture capitalist’s dream startup.[1]
In at least one article published on Sunday, May 6th, 2023, entitled, “Fight for Bakhmut Rages in Trenches,” the Wall Street Journal’s exceedingly optimism reaches new heights in its coverage on the Honor Company, explaining for the latter “the battle for the dugout was won.”
Limited to a single story on the struggle for a single trench, the story hardly takes into consideration the overall state of Ukraine’s military, trench by trench, if not brigade by bridge, army after army.
On Wednesday, the New York Times continued the delusion of a victoriously fighting Ukrainian force in an article entitled, “Ukraine Makes Gains Near Embattled Bakhmut, a First in Months,” where the authors celebrate a Ukrainian advance as a breakthrough.
“The advance was not large — roughly three square miles, southwest of the city, in an area of fields, ravines and thickets of trees,” but Ukrainian troops, the authors assure us, “have broken through” Russian positions outside of the embattled eastern city of Bakhmut.
Ukraine claimed that its anti-missile defense systems intercepted 23 out of 25 cruise missiles Russian military forces launched against the country on the eve of its May 9th holiday celebrations in the Red Square, Moscow, although there is no proof.
It is alleged that prior to this most recent barrage, Kiev successfully intercepted a Russian mach 5 hypersonic missile called “Knizhal” with the recently installed Patriot missile systems, exceeding the expected capability of that weapon.
The claims such as those made by the ISW, the Wall Street Journal or Kiev’s leaders, are designed to prop up and provide a citation basis for the illusion that Washington has enhanced Kiev’s air defense and anti missile defense systems and that the country is prepared to exceed, if not equalize, the air superiority Russia’s air force and integrated targeting systems currently maintain.
In at least one of these recent attacks, Russia blew up and rendered combat ineffective no less than nine brigade headquarters scattered throughout Ukraine. It is already widely published that American armed forces stationed at the former Nazi military base in Grafenwöhr have been preparing nine Ukrainian brigades for the “Spring” counteroffensive. It could be that the headquarters for these brigades are now leveled.
On May 3rd, 2023, the Wall Street Journal, in one of its most honest pieces, published an article on how “Ukraine seeks to Bolster Air Defenses,” where the authors explain how a key component of the upcoming “Spring” counteroffensive retake territories seized by Moscow is “to shield the country’s skies” from Russia.
In that article, the authors remark the stunningly low rate of efficacy Ukraine’s anti-missile defense systems achieved, hitting “all but five of the 41 missiles” Russian forces launched against the country.
Although Ukraine is fighting “With Improvised Missile Systems,” such as a Sea Sparrow firing from Ukrainian Buk M1 launchers, which testify to the country’s gory innovations on the battlefield, no statistics support a significant change in the alignment of forces in the air. At a rate of eight to 1, the MacGyver mentality of the military command directing Ukrainians has not quite found a way out of Russian force’s deadly crosshairs.
The attempt to downplay the abilities of Russian armed forces, especially in terms of statements made by Joint Chief of Staff, Miley, or Secretary of Defense, Austin, before Congressional Armed Services Committees, stands in contrast with reporting prior to the outbreak of the Ukraine war in the days leading up to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine.
In an article entitled, “Putin Overhauled Hollowed-Out Russian Forces,” for instance, the New York Times, described Russia’s military as “a modern sophisticated army, able to deploy quickly and with lethal effect in conventional conflicts,” featuring “precision-guided weaponry, a newly streamlined command structure and well-fed and professional soldiers.”
Published on January 27th, 2022, the article’s description of Russian forces puts to death the sudden cries of exclamation that denounce Washington’s failure to equip Ukrainians with the weaponry required to meet or beat Russian air superiority.
In terms of Washington’s equipment there are no guarantees. Currently, reports are circulating on the weakened battlefield effectiveness of the infamously named HIMARS from Lockheed Martin. A pivotal weapon systems for shattering the widespread illusion of United States “vastly superior firepower,” peddled primarily by the New York Times leading up to the day NATO successfully goaded Russia into its ill-fated invasion, the HIMARS system is frequently fall far from its targets.
The phrase “vastly superior firepower” comes from an article published on December 27th, 2021. In the article New York Times testified to the lessons Ukraine “had drawn from the United States’ wars in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past two decades, when guerrillas provided enduring resistance in the face of vastly superior American firepower.”
It does not appear to be the case, however, that vastly superior American or even Soviet firepower is the lynchpin for success. On May 6th, 2023 Ukrainian armed forces, for instance, launched two Grom 2 missiles at targets in Crimea. Neither of these attacks were successful. Russian air defense systems on the peninsula intercepted both of these attempts. On May 8th, 2023, the Magazine Editorial Staff of Military Watch published an article describing in detail how Crimean air defenses intercepted the Ukrainian missile attacks, explaining “Why Ukraine’s Grom 2 Missiles Can’t Get Past S-400s.”
The problem of air defenses arise from the fact that Ukraine’s planned counteroffensive, which is designed to set into motion the 13 brigades trained by NATO, depends in large part the support projectiles, missiles, or fighter jets may provide to ensure Ukrainians breakthrough Russian defenses.
The New York Times has mentioned a counteroffensive directly through Zaporizhzhia to Melitopul ad nauseam. In an endless stream, readers may find the utterance within the following articles: “Russian Forces Attack Bakhmut From 3 Angles as Battles Intensifies,” New York Times, March 6th, 2023 ; “Russian Attacks Yield Little but Casualties in Wide Arc of Ukraine’s East,” New York Times, March 14th, 2023 ; “Little Time on the Battlefield to Dwell on Notions of Peace Talks,” New York Times, March 21st, 2023 ; “Life in Ukraine’s Trenches: Gearing Up for a Spring Offensive” New York Times, April 29th, 2023 ; “Fighting Back in a Very Personal War” New York Times, April 30th, 2023 ; “In Ukraine, Fighting the Muck Under Their Feet” New York Times, May 2nd, 2023 ; “Ukraine Makes Gains Near Embattled Bakhmut, a First in Months,” New York Times, May 10th, 2023. In nearly week after week of coverage, the New York Times has repeatedly mentioned a counteroffensive directly through Zaporizhzhia to Melitopul.
It must be that the more times the New York Times repeats a mantra, the more intensively the mantra must be subject to scrutiny. Given the rate of repetition the New York Times continues to iterate, as though no viable military alternative exists, that Ukrainian armed forces plan to execute a counteroffensive directly through Zaporizhzhia to Melitopul in an attempt to breakthrough the landbridge, the recent attempt to attack the Crimean peninsula from the air appears to provide a legitimate basis upon which to speculate about an altogether different plan of attack.
Crimea is one of the most highly contested landmasses in the history of mankind. Catherine the Great, for instance, conquered the territory in 1783. Ivan Aivazovsky, one of the greatest masters of seascapes, ship battles, waves, and marine art, an Armenian Romantic painter, would depict the arrival of Catherine the Great on the illustrious shores of Feodosia on the 27th of May, 1783.
Crimea is significant, however, for an altogether different reason. Sergey Suvorinkin, the most thoroughly Russified of all the generals on Vladimir Putin’s general staff, is unequivocally a fully fledged follower of Red Army General Zhukov. In his classic withdrawal from the western banks of Kherson across the Dnipro, Suvorinkin successfully canalized Ukrainian armed forces directly into the Bakhmut ‘meat-grinder,’ indicating the degree to which defense rather than offense may result in control over an enemy force. Suvorinkin’s exploitation of Ukrainian armed forces’ obsession with territory—a critical component in the collapse of morale, munitions or strike force—is a testament to his thorough following of Zkhukov. Russia’s strategy—a Zhukov strategy—trades territory for control of the battlefield (i.e., over its timing, position, or lines of communication). Without any dependence upon Russians as “supermen,” Suvorinkin’s strategy, which has decimated the entire Ukrainian third army, is undeniably successful.
In light of Russia’s strategy, which appears to be altogether lost on Ukraine’s general staff (as evidenced by the decision to continuously feed troops, armor, or munition into the ‘meat grinder’ despite the rasputitsa on the ground), the claim that the long herald Ukrainian “Spring” counteroffensive may strike a breakthrough from Zaporizhzhia to Melitupol is odious.
NATO forces, whose ratiocination of the eventual outcome of a ground assault “to break” the land bridge evaluates to a negligible result in Texeira’s releases, are acutely aware of the fact that nothing short of an attack on Crimea is capable of any degree of success for Crimea really is the only landmass of import, the decisive geography, for Russia in war. There are two reasons to believe an attack on Crimea is more likely to occur on Crimea than Zaporizhzhia-Melitupol. 1) Crimea is the only area of land where the Zhukov strategy is impossible; no Russian withdrawal may effectuate a successful Zhukov strategy due to the island’s condensed landmass. 2) Furthermore, the successful French and English campaign in 1853 on Sevastopol is a historical precedent perhaps worthy of repetition in the eyes of NATO’s war planners.