Under the the deal, Poland agreed to buy 980 units of the K2 tanks, 648 units of the K9 self-propelled howitzers and 48 units of the FA-50 light combat aircraft. Following this deal and the delivery of the first batch of tanks and howitzers, Poland has already announced the conclusion of an agreement to purchase more than 288 Korean multiple launch rocket systems (henceforth K-MLRS). 

The first 18 of the K239 Chunmoo K-MLRS will be delivered as soon as 2023 to eastern Poland, Defence Minister Mariusz Błaszczak stated in his announcements. Made by Hanwha Defense, the defense unit of South Korea’s Hanwha, the K239 Chunmoo is a self-propelled rocket artillery system based on a Hanwha 8×8 cross-country chassis. 

The Polish version of K239 Chunmoo are mounted on Polish Jelcz trucks built by the Polish company Jelcz, which is a part of the so-called Polish Armaments Group. It is equipped with the TOPAZ automated fire control systems built by WB Electronics, Polish communication systems, and a battlefield management system.

With the number of arms continuing to race into one European country after another, there is a growing need to distinguish the different systems. Most are familiar with the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (henceforth HIMARS). 

But the K239 Chunmoo K-MLRS is similar to the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (henceforth MLRS).  The HIMARS is similar in design to the M270 (MLRS), with the main exception being that it is a wheeled vehicle as opposed to tracked vehicle. 

The HIMARS carries one ordnance pod, which is identical to the two pods used by the M270. Like the M270, the K239 Chunmoo K-MLRS carries two pods. 

Aside from the specifics of the ordinances of death, Poland’s decision to purchase arms from South Korea reflects its continued pursuit of militarism. In its continuous pursuit of its aim to militarize the country, Poland’s conclusion of the agreement with South Korean comes as a slight of hand to Germany and its defense industry, reflecting a strengthening rift among Member States within the NATO alliance, which is breaking at its seams. 

Pressure from the Ukraine war continues to undermine its cherished nostrums, especially as the call to engage in rearmaments, ramp up productions in the defense industry, or allot a greater share of GDP to a war budget clash with inflation, the skyrocketing costs of energy from shortages of Russian gas, coal, or oil, and the burgeoning health crisis from the Covid 19 pandemic, declining birth rates, and the collapse of the Polish health care system—a crisis in response to which the vast majority of Member States seek to find a solution anywhere but within the alliance’s framework. 

Poland’s deal with South Korea’s Hyundai Rotem is a case in point. It is crucial to understand the significance of Poland’s decision to buy “elsewhere,” or “anywhere” but Germany, and the decision is based upon a number of factors, not the least of which is the structure of Germany’s agreements for the manufacturer, delivery or deployment of its Leopard tank systems. 

Germany’s sole provider of tanks is Rheinmetall, a corporation whose history is inextricably linked to that of the Nazis. While most, if not all, countries and their leaders are prepared to forget about the holocaust and the role Rheinmetall played, even countries like Poland where more than 1,700,000 Jews were murdered in Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka by the end of 1943, Rheinmetall is comparatively slower than South Korea’s companies. 

More importantly, however, South Korea’s Hyundai Rotem honors domestic development of tanks and their associated technologies and therefore provides a basis for Poland to monetize on its own domestic defense industry. After receiving the remained of the first 180, Poland plans to begin domestic production of the remaining 820 South Korean K2PL tanks by 2026, bringing the total number of its tanks to 1,000. 

Poland, which seeks to advance its interests above and beyond Germany, is opposed to and abhors the idea of paying its primary European competitor and finds it incompatible with its own goals for strengthening  its rearmament and becoming a leading military power in Europe.

It is not only Poland that plays a slight of hand against Germany, Rheinmetall, and German defense industry. It is already a growing trend among NATO Member States to seek rearmament elsewhere. Slovakia is one of many NATO countries, who is openly seeking to advance ties with South Korea’s military. 

At the end of January 2021, shortly before the outbreak of the Ukraine war and the eruption of militarism on the European continent, the Minister of Defense and the MoD’s State Secretary for Slovakia invited the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Korea, Chung Byung Hwan, for talks. 

These talks centered on a possible cooperation in the field of and the modernization of Main Battle Tanks and the possibility that South Korean may offer Slovakia the K2 Black Panther tank. In addition to armaments, the two countries discussed cyber security and support for the development of Slovakia’s own domestic defense industry, a key selling point among NATO Member States, who seek to advance their defense interests over and beyond Germany’s. The countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding, the bulk of which is published in the form of a Slovakian white paper entitled, “White Paper on the Defence of the Slovak Republic.”

Slovakia and Poland follow NATO Member State Turkey, whose in its establish defense ties with South Korea and its defense industry, especially Hyundai Rotem, are already significantly advanced and appear to be in response to Germany.

While South Korea is not a member of the alliance, the country maintains extremely close ties to it and in November opened a diplomatic mission at NATO’s headquarters in Brussels. 

In addition to the massive deal with South Korea, Poland’s purchase of 250 M1A2 SEPv3 tanks, 32 F-35 aircraft and 96 Apache attack helicopters from the U.S. adds to Poland’s overall rearmament in the face of the Ukraine war. 

Undoubtedly, driving Poland’s rearmament is its close ties with the United States and its border with Ukraine. Poland’s recent emergence as a key handmaiden for assisting operations designed to achieve favorable outcomes in the Ukraine war isn’t just about Warsaw’s “deft negotiation game,” “pressure tactics,” or “its investment in hard power.”

It’s also about the unyielding logic of geopolitics. The Polish transportation hub near the town of Rzeszów, upon which the United States relies almost entirely as a logistical gateway to Ukraine, is significant. Neither the U.S. nor its allies would be able to supply and sustain the Ukrainian military operation,  deliver massive amounts of economic or humanitarian assistance, or assist Ukraine’s attempt to gain an upper hand on intelligence, reconnaissance, or signals against Russia. 

Poland’s increasingly tightening defense ties with South Korea and the United States and its commitment to bolster the share of its GDP for defense to more than 3% come at the expense of Polish working people, whose civil and human rights are under threat, standard of living is deteriorating, and ability to benefit from the Polish government is dwindling, as Poland’s far-right Law and Justice Party continues to lay waste to Polish democracy. 

In a recent interview with Haaretz this week, Polish ex-President Lech, for instance, stated that he would require a “revolution in the streets with the use of force… That’s how far the Law and Justice Party has gone in destroying democracy and freedom.”