On July 17th, 2022, Sergey Shoigu, the Russian Minister of Defense, who has occupied has position for more than a decade, held a visit with Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. It is the first time that the Russian Minister of Defense made a personal appearance on the ground in Ukraine. During the meeting Shoigu encouraged commanders at work to expand Russian attacks on the Ukrainian military, since Russian forces have successfully conquered the American missile platform, HIMARS (aka High Mobility Artillery Rocket System).
In Ministry of Defense’s on Telegram channel, Shoigu posted: “Army General Sergei Shoigu, noting the strengthening of the group’s strike capabilities, gave instructions to the commander to prioritize the defeat of the enemy’s long-range missile and artillery weapons with high-precision weapons.”
Prior to the announcement, Shoigu inspected the Russian army groups South and Centre, led by Army General Sergei Surovikin, who replaced Suvorov General Dvornikov, and Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin, a structure that reflects the highly centralized command of the Russian Federation’s military capabilities.
On 1 June, US President Joe Biden made public with the new security assistance package to Ukraine, which included a provision for the supply of highly mobile artillery rocket systems (HIMARS). In early July, the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Oleksiy Danilov said that Ukraine received 9 missile systems from the United States and its allies (HIMARS and similar systems), but that many more units are needed for a counteroffensive.
Described by Lockheed Martin, the major defense contractor that executed the $492 Million Contract for the system in 2019, as “the long-range, mobile, precision fire launcher for employment today and tomorrow,” HIMARS is one among many systems deployed for use among Ukrainian forces. Similar in result to the supply of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles or Javelin missile systems, Bayaktar or “kamikaze” drones, or 155mm Howitzer artillery systems, the HIMARS have failed to afford Ukrainian troops with a competitive military advantage over Russian forces.
According to Lockheed Martin, the HIMARS are equipped to launch all forms of MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System) munitions. Ukrainian forces have received eight of M142 HIMARS system. Four more are expected to arrive soon. Unique in that the the M142 HIMARS systems are highly mobile, as they are wheel mounted atop truck frames. Equipped with six-227mm GPS-guided missile where each missile has a range of 84 kilometres, the HIMARS are rapidly deployable.
Comments by Ukrainian officials about the systems, for instance, betray an almost unbelievable cynicism at times. Upon receipt of the HIMARS, Oleksii Reznikov, who recently felt the need to quell fears among ruling elites in Europe about smugglers reselling the systems in a Financial Times article posted July 14th, 2022, tweeted: “HIMARS have arrived to Ukraine. Thank you to my 🇺🇲 colleague and friend @SecDef Lloyd J. Austin III for these powerful tools! Summer will be hot for Russian occupiers. And the last one for some of them.”
HIMARS have arrived to Ukraine.
— Oleksii Reznikov (@oleksiireznikov) June 23, 2022
Thank you to my 🇺🇲 colleague and friend @SecDef Lloyd J. Austin III for these powerful tools!
Summer will be hot for russian occupiers. And the last one for some of them. pic.twitter.com/BTmwadthpp
The division among European ruling elites, who, torn on the one hand between an enthusiasm for NATO, while, on the other hand, impaled by the thought of losing their supply of Russian coal, gas, or oil, is, indeed, clear from Reznikov’s own criticism that politicians are spreading what he describes as “Russian disinformation,” because these politicians are “addicted to [Russia’s] cheap gas and money.” Despite Reznikov not being able to rule out smuggling as “absolutely impossible,” there are definite signs of carelessness, especially, when, during the first three days of the war, for instance, Ukrainian military authorities handed out more than 21, 000 Kalashnikovs.
The results of the “powerful tools” are nugatory. Touting the explosion of munitions depots, command centers, or other key targets, the naïveté of Western media lamentations on its successful impact have failed to detail their effect on Russia’s forward operability. Many of these reports talk about the HIMARS as though they were prizes from teachers for good grades on school projects, like HIMARS “make a mark,” have “powerful impact,” “significant impact” or “hit Russia hard” but never mention anything along the lines of its effect on the Ukrainian forces’ ability to engage in counterattacks to recapture territory or disable the Russian military’s ability to continue seizing, raising, or leveling cities, towns, or provinces, as it continues expanding outward from its flank (i.e., the Eastern land bridge).
“The weapon Ukraine sings about,” is, for instance, one of the titles for what is essentially positive marketing propaganda for Lockheed Martin’s sales team. There are no known Ukrainian soldier songs about HIMARS exist. Ukrainska Pravda reports the destruction of more than 30 “Russian logistic military facilities,” a phrase that does not equate to military targets (i.e., a target that affects the forward operability of the Russian military).
In one of the articles on HIMARS, the French daily, Le Monde writes about the “distinctive fireworks display,” the way the weapon’s explosions appear to the eye, is the key feature of its battlefield effectiveness.
“The results of HIMARS rocket launches in the Ukrainian theater are spectacular. Videos showing huge explosions (mostly at night) in the Russian-occupied zone are appearing daily on social media. These are munitions depots hit by rockets. Instead of a single explosion, as would be the case for tanks of volatile chemicals (such as fuel), the videos show a distinctive fireworks display, resulting from serial detonations of various projectiles, spinning in random directions, and sub-munitions streaking the sky.”
One report, which is filled with optimistic illusion on the prospects of Ukraine’s forces, reports: “American-supplied rocket systems are in action in Ukraine and hitting Russian targets far from the front lines. Kyiv says it is planning a major counteroffensive to retake southern territory lost to Russia.” Reported on July 13, 2022 the author likely could not have known that on July 18th, 2022 Zelensky would announce his purge of the Ukrainian military, a message Ukrainian troops, many of whom speak Russian, may view as a sign of the government’s inability to remain a cohesive source of military direction.
These reports from French, German, or American news media reveal the degree to which military analysis of the war is detached from the war’s objective reality and the basic fundamentals of military theory. The celebration of the “distinctive fireworks display” of military weaponry without which the Ukrainian military would not even be able to fight another day, as a significant positive result, demonstrates how readily Ukrainian military manpower is subverted as mere cannon fodder among the European ruling elite.
Israeli media sources, however, have severely criticized the Ukrainian military’s inability to handle the HIMARS, listing five reasons why the Ukrainian military cannot win the war with Russia: 1) The ability of the Russian military to prevent the Ukrainian forces from destroying or removing Russian heavy artillery, 2) Russian missiles and heavy artillery prevent Ukrainian forces from concentrating a sufficient number of forces for a counter attack, 3) Russian military missile attacks cause the Ukrainian economy heavy losses, 4) The lack of sufficient manpower for infantry, crews for tanks, or armored mobile vehicles in the Ukrainian forces, 5) the inability of the Ukrainian central command to plan or execute counter attacks. (Debka, July 9th, 2022).
It is clear that among the many different stakeholders banking on the Ukrainian military’s ability to leverage the weapon systems to their advantage, fissures are beginning to widen their differences significantly. Although Ukraine’s application for membership is accepted, there is no reason to think Ukraine may become a member anytime soon, especially for lack of results with American military weaponry.
The fact that American military might is incapable of affording the Ukrainian military with a competitive advantage over Russia’s highly concentrated military central command is, in part, driving Zelensky, who recently subjected the entirety of the Ukraine to an internal purge, to seek — anything or everything– that might lead to a sudden strengthening of its core.
Desperate measures such as the sacking of its head of intelligence or its prosecutor general, however, are less the result of a calculated campaign to improve the consciousness of military theory among the highest ranking members of military decision makers than a reaction to criticism among its primary vendors, the Central Intelligence Agency, to the failure of its government to deliver on promises for the use of those weapons.